ShulkwiSEC/bb-huge
bb-huge is an open-source MCP server + agent skill ("/bb-huge") plus a Flask/SQLite portal that gives AI coding agents (Claude Code, Gemini CLI, Codex, etc.) persistent memory and a disciplined bug-bounty hunting methodology across web, mobile, binary, and source-code targets. It implements an observation → hypothesis → finding promotion pipeline with evidence provenance, ships 350+ curated community security skills, 35+ MCP tools for CRUD on findings/programs/recon/assets, and includes an install script for the ProjectDiscovery/tomnomnom recon toolkit (subfinder, httpx, nuclei, ffuf, etc.). It's aimed at bug bounty hunters wanting to solve the "context resets every session" problem when working with AI agents.
What it is
bb-huge (MIT license) is a Flask/SQLite portal, a stdio MCP server (mcp_server.py) and a skill (skills/bb-huge/SKILL.md, invoked as /bb-huge) that give an AI agent persistent bug bounty state. The page names gemini-cli, claude-code, codex and emmu as supported clients. The portal stores findings, programs, observations, hypotheses, evidence, assets and endpoints. The skill loads a persona and SOPs, and the 350+ curated skills in skills/curated/ (catalogued in MANIFEST.md) are pulled in on demand.
How it works
The skill's first rule is "capture first, enrich later". A finding is created with a thin entry, then enriched as evidence arrives:
flowchart LR
A[Spotted] --> B[bb_create_finding: discovered]
B --> C[bb_upload_attachment]
C --> D[bb_update_finding: append PoC]
D --> E[confirmed]
E --> F[reported]
F --> G[rewarded]Observations promote to hypotheses and then to findings through /promote endpoints, and each step keeps a link back to its source. Resuming work (SOP-3) calls bb_get_finding, then bb_generate_report_context, then bb-dump-attachments.py <id>, and the agent reads every attachment before summarising. Everything is also exposed as a REST API (/api/v1/..., header X-Dev-Key) and a CLI, skills/bb-huge/scripts/bb.py.
The page says SOP-0 supports unattended "scheduled missions", with constraints read from im-scheduled.md.
What to do
Local setup:
git clone https://github.com/ShulkwiSEC/bb-huge.git
cd bb-huge
cp .env.example .env # set SECRET_KEY and DEV_KEY
python -m venv .venv && source .venv/bin/activate
pip install -r requirements.txt
python run.py # or: docker compose up -dThe portal is at http://localhost:5000. Register the MCP server in the agent's config with command: python, args: [/absolute/path/to/bb-huge/mcp_server.py] and env DEV_KEY and BB_HUGE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:5000. Install the skill with cp -r skills/bb-huge ~/.gemini/skills/.
Optional recon tooling installs under the home directory without root, and can be re-run to update or retry:
docker compose exec bb-huge bash assets/scripts/bb-install-tools.sh
bash assets/scripts/bb-install-tools.shIt installs Go if missing, then subfinder, httpx, katana, dnsx, naabu, nuclei, notify, waybackurls, assetfinder, gf, anew, unfurl, qsreplace, gau, ffuf and amass.
To smoke-test the MCP server:
echo '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{}}' | DEV_KEY=your-dev-key python mcp_server.pyTo check that an agent absorbed the skill, run THEORY_QUIZ.md (10 questions, pass at 9/10).
Caveats
- The scheduled mission example runs an agent hourly with no human input (
0 * * * * echo "/bb-huge This is a scheduled mission. Follow SOP-0 and execute." | opencode ...). The Windows variant uses-ExecutionPolicy Bypass. The page does not say how scope is enforced during such runs, and the recon tools include active scanners (nuclei, naabu, ffuf), so check program rules first. - A single
DEV_KEYauthenticates the whole REST API and the MCP bridge. The page says nothing about network exposure or hardening beyond the localhost examples. - The page gives inconsistent counts: "30+" versus "35+" MCP tools, "7" versus "12+" or 14 reference files, and "11 models" with 12 listed. It reports no tests beyond
tests/test_api.pyand no usage results. The 350+ skills are described as community-sourced, and the page does not describe how they are vetted.
Technologies named here
Techniques named here
- Cross-site scripting
- SQLi
- SSRF
- JWT attacks
- GraphQL attacks
- WebSmuggling
- IDOR
- Android/iOS static & dynamic analysis
- Docker escapes / RBAC misconfigs
- Offensive OSINT / Recon / Subdomain discovery
- Prompt injection, RAG poisoning, Model inversion
- White-box SAST
- Observation → Hypothesis → Finding workflow
Related in Offensive Security