
Architecting a secure landing zone in the AWS European Sovereign Cloud
AWS Security Blog walkthrough of building a secure, production-ready landing zone in the new AWS European Sovereign Cloud (aws-eusc partition), covering multi-account governance via AWS Control Tower/AFT, IAM Identity Center federation as Terraform code, centralized logging into a Log Archive and Security Tooling account, network perimeter design with dedicated Direct Connect PoPs and VPC endpoints, KMS/External Key Store data protection, and partition-aware CI/CD for pushing container images, AMIs, and artifacts across the partition boundary. It maps design decisions to the AWS Security Reference Architecture and Well-Architected Framework, distinguishes hard partition boundaries from configurable choices, and references BSI C5:2020, SOC 2, and ISO 27001/27017/27018/27701 certifications for EUSC.
What it is
A reference architecture for the AWS European Sovereign Cloud (EUSC, partition aws-eusc, first Region eusc-de-east-1), focused on the specific, enumerable technical boundaries that trip up teams porting a commercial AWS landing zone into it. The summary already covers the tool/service list; what it omits is the concrete list of what does and doesn't cross the partition boundary, plus the exact patterns to work around that.
How it works
EUSC is a hard partition like aws-cn or aws-us-gov: separate IAM, billing, control plane, endpoints, and ARNs (amazonaws.eu instead of amazonaws.com, except IAM service principals which stay amazonaws.com in every partition). No IAM credential, role assumption, cross-Region replication, or Direct Connect gateway extends across a partition boundary.
Concrete boundary effects stated in the page:
- No cross-partition ECR replication, AMI copy, or S3 replication — getting images into EUSC requires an explicit push with EUSC credentials, not a replicated pipeline.
- No cross-partition Direct Connect gateway — EUSC requires its own dedicated DX connection/VIF or separate site-to-site VPN into the EUSC Network account.
- VPC endpoints don't cross partitions — any commercial-partition service exposed to EUSC must go over DX/VPN plus an in-EUSC load balancer.
- Route 53 hosted zones aren't visible across partitions — cross-cloud name resolution needs subdomain delegation or Resolver forwarding over DX/VPN.
- Region-deny SCPs are not required in EUSC today (unlike commercial) because the partition itself is the isolation boundary — but become relevant once EUSC adds a second Region/Local Zone.
- Terraform state must be kept in a separate in-EUSC S3 backend + DynamoDB lock table per partition; state is never shared across partitions.
- No org-wide billing roll-up — EUSC has a fully separate payer, billed in EUR through an EU contracting entity.
Preconditions / Affected
Applies to any org already running AWS Control Tower/AFT, IAM Identity Center, CI/CD, or DX in the commercial aws partition that now needs a presence in eusc-de-east-1. Relevant the moment you write IaC with hardcoded arn:aws (breaks when applied against aws-eusc), or assume cross-account/cross-partition trust, replication, or billing consolidation will "just work."
What to do
- Derive the partition dynamically in Terraform/CloudFormation ARNs instead of hardcoding
arn:aws, so the same modules deploy to bothawsandaws-eusc. - Run a second IAM Identity Center instance in EUSC, SAML/SCIM-federated to the same corporate IdP, with permission sets/assignments (
aws_ssoadmin_account_assignment) managed separately per partition. - For image/artifact delivery into EUSC: push container images directly to an in-partition ECR with EUSC credentials and a sovereign signing key; rebuild AMIs natively via EC2 Image Builder or
aws ec2 import-image; stage binaries in an EUSC Shared Services bucket and move them viaaws s3 syncor AWS DataSync over DX/VPN. - For CI/CD crossing the boundary, use OIDC federation with two separate trust configurations (one per partition) rather than any shared role.
- Keep EUSC firewall/segmentation automation pulling current IP ranges from the partition's own published ip-ranges file.
- Use Account Factory for Terraform (AFT) deployed natively in EUSC for account vending; reference the LZA Universal Configuration for European Sovereign Cloud (GitHub) as a ready-to-deploy baseline, and the LZA Compliance Workbook/Independent Assessment Report (AWS Artifact) for C5:2020 mapping.
Caveats
The page notes GuardDuty/Security Hub org-wide auto-enable "might differ" from commercial feature parity at any given time — treat the EUSC service list as the current source of truth and gate unsupported features behind a flag, enabling per-account via StackSets if org-level auto-enable isn't yet available.
Organisations named here
- BSI C5:2020
- ISO 27017
- ISO 27018
- ISO 27701
Technologies named here
- AWS European Sovereign Cloud
- AWS Control Tower
- AWS commercial partition
- AWS Organizations
- AWS IAM Identity Center
- AWS GovCloud
- AWS China Regions
- AWS CloudTrail
- Amazon GuardDuty
- AWS Security Hub
- AWS Key Management Service
- AWS KMS External Key Store
- AWS Direct Connect
- AWS Transit Gateway
- AWS Resource Access Manager
- AWS Network Firewall
- Gateway Load Balancer
- VPC interface endpoints
- Amazon Route 53
- Amazon ECR
- EC2 Image Builder
- Amazon S3
- AWS DataSync
- AWS CodePipeline, AWS CodeBuild, AWS CodeDeploy
- Account Factory for Terraform
- Landing Zone Accelerator on AWS
- LZA Compliance Workbook
- AWS CloudFormation StackSets
- Amazon DynamoDB
- AWS Data Exports
- Terraform
- AWS CloudFormation
- AWS
- AWS IAM
- Microsoft Entra ID
- SOC 2
- ISO 27001
Techniques named here
- Partition isolation
- Partition-aware IaC
- Multi-account governance with SCPs/RCPs
- Identity federation via SAML/SCIM
- Least-privilege permission sets as code
- Cross-account role assumption with external ID hardening
- Centralized immutable logging
- Delegated administrator model for detective controls
- Network segmentation and centralized egress inspection
- Segmentation as code
- Sovereign supply-chain pipeline for images/artifacts
- Image signing and verification
- OIDC federation with per-partition trust configurations
- Consolidated billing within a single partition
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