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Architecting a secure landing zone in the AWS European Sovereign Cloud
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Architecting a secure landing zone in the AWS European Sovereign Cloud

AWS Security Blog walkthrough of building a secure, production-ready landing zone in the new AWS European Sovereign Cloud (aws-eusc partition), covering multi-account governance via AWS Control Tower/AFT, IAM Identity Center federation as Terraform code, centralized logging into a Log Archive and Security Tooling account, network perimeter design with dedicated Direct Connect PoPs and VPC endpoints, KMS/External Key Store data protection, and partition-aware CI/CD for pushing container images, AMIs, and artifacts across the partition boundary. It maps design decisions to the AWS Security Reference Architecture and Well-Architected Framework, distinguishes hard partition boundaries from configurable choices, and references BSI C5:2020, SOC 2, and ISO 27001/27017/27018/27701 certifications for EUSC.

TL;DR AWS's guide to architecting a secure sovereign landing zone inside the new AWS European Sovereign Cloud partition, with IaC patterns for identity, logging, networking, and CI/CD across the aws/aws-eusc boundary.
Document

What it is

A reference architecture for the AWS European Sovereign Cloud (EUSC, partition aws-eusc, first Region eusc-de-east-1), focused on the specific, enumerable technical boundaries that trip up teams porting a commercial AWS landing zone into it. The summary already covers the tool/service list; what it omits is the concrete list of what does and doesn't cross the partition boundary, plus the exact patterns to work around that.

How it works

EUSC is a hard partition like aws-cn or aws-us-gov: separate IAM, billing, control plane, endpoints, and ARNs (amazonaws.eu instead of amazonaws.com, except IAM service principals which stay amazonaws.com in every partition). No IAM credential, role assumption, cross-Region replication, or Direct Connect gateway extends across a partition boundary.

Concrete boundary effects stated in the page:

  • No cross-partition ECR replication, AMI copy, or S3 replication — getting images into EUSC requires an explicit push with EUSC credentials, not a replicated pipeline.
  • No cross-partition Direct Connect gateway — EUSC requires its own dedicated DX connection/VIF or separate site-to-site VPN into the EUSC Network account.
  • VPC endpoints don't cross partitions — any commercial-partition service exposed to EUSC must go over DX/VPN plus an in-EUSC load balancer.
  • Route 53 hosted zones aren't visible across partitions — cross-cloud name resolution needs subdomain delegation or Resolver forwarding over DX/VPN.
  • Region-deny SCPs are not required in EUSC today (unlike commercial) because the partition itself is the isolation boundary — but become relevant once EUSC adds a second Region/Local Zone.
  • Terraform state must be kept in a separate in-EUSC S3 backend + DynamoDB lock table per partition; state is never shared across partitions.
  • No org-wide billing roll-up — EUSC has a fully separate payer, billed in EUR through an EU contracting entity.

Preconditions / Affected

Applies to any org already running AWS Control Tower/AFT, IAM Identity Center, CI/CD, or DX in the commercial aws partition that now needs a presence in eusc-de-east-1. Relevant the moment you write IaC with hardcoded arn:aws (breaks when applied against aws-eusc), or assume cross-account/cross-partition trust, replication, or billing consolidation will "just work."

What to do

  • Derive the partition dynamically in Terraform/CloudFormation ARNs instead of hardcoding arn:aws, so the same modules deploy to both aws and aws-eusc.
  • Run a second IAM Identity Center instance in EUSC, SAML/SCIM-federated to the same corporate IdP, with permission sets/assignments (aws_ssoadmin_account_assignment) managed separately per partition.
  • For image/artifact delivery into EUSC: push container images directly to an in-partition ECR with EUSC credentials and a sovereign signing key; rebuild AMIs natively via EC2 Image Builder or aws ec2 import-image; stage binaries in an EUSC Shared Services bucket and move them via aws s3 sync or AWS DataSync over DX/VPN.
  • For CI/CD crossing the boundary, use OIDC federation with two separate trust configurations (one per partition) rather than any shared role.
  • Keep EUSC firewall/segmentation automation pulling current IP ranges from the partition's own published ip-ranges file.
  • Use Account Factory for Terraform (AFT) deployed natively in EUSC for account vending; reference the LZA Universal Configuration for European Sovereign Cloud (GitHub) as a ready-to-deploy baseline, and the LZA Compliance Workbook/Independent Assessment Report (AWS Artifact) for C5:2020 mapping.

Caveats

The page notes GuardDuty/Security Hub org-wide auto-enable "might differ" from commercial feature parity at any given time — treat the EUSC service list as the current source of truth and gate unsupported features behind a flag, enabling per-account via StackSets if org-level auto-enable isn't yet available.

Organisations named here

  • BSI C5:2020
  • ISO 27017
  • ISO 27018
  • ISO 27701

Technologies named here

  • AWS European Sovereign Cloud
  • AWS Control Tower
  • AWS commercial partition
  • AWS Organizations
  • AWS IAM Identity Center
  • AWS GovCloud
  • AWS China Regions
  • AWS CloudTrail
  • Amazon GuardDuty
  • AWS Security Hub
  • AWS Key Management Service
  • AWS KMS External Key Store
  • AWS Direct Connect
  • AWS Transit Gateway
  • AWS Resource Access Manager
  • AWS Network Firewall
  • Gateway Load Balancer
  • VPC interface endpoints
  • Amazon Route 53
  • Amazon ECR
  • EC2 Image Builder
  • Amazon S3
  • AWS DataSync
  • AWS CodePipeline, AWS CodeBuild, AWS CodeDeploy
  • Account Factory for Terraform
  • Landing Zone Accelerator on AWS
  • LZA Compliance Workbook
  • AWS CloudFormation StackSets
  • Amazon DynamoDB
  • AWS Data Exports
  • Terraform
  • AWS CloudFormation
  • AWS
  • AWS IAM
  • Microsoft Entra ID
  • SOC 2
  • ISO 27001

Techniques named here

  • Partition isolation
  • Partition-aware IaC
  • Multi-account governance with SCPs/RCPs
  • Identity federation via SAML/SCIM
  • Least-privilege permission sets as code
  • Cross-account role assumption with external ID hardening
  • Centralized immutable logging
  • Delegated administrator model for detective controls
  • Network segmentation and centralized egress inspection
  • Segmentation as code
  • Sovereign supply-chain pipeline for images/artifacts
  • Image signing and verification
  • OIDC federation with per-partition trust configurations
  • Consolidated billing within a single partition