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eprint.iacr.orgpaper

Cryptanalysis and Enhancement of VTBSAE: Provably Secure Verifier-Based PAKE Protocols for the Industrial Internet of Things

Cryptanalysis of VTBSAE, a verifier-based PAKE protocol for the Industrial Internet of Things, showing it fails to resist client impersonation after server compromise. The authors propose E-VTBSAEv1, which binds the client point E1 to fresh server randomness, and prove AKE security and forward secrecy in the random-oracle model under CDH. Raspberry Pi 4B tests show runtime comparable to VTBSAE with the same communication and storage overhead.

TL;DR Breaks the VTBSAE verifier-based PAKE via server-compromise client impersonation and fixes it with a provably secure variant benchmarked on a Raspberry Pi 4B.
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Technologies named here

  • E-VTBSAEv1
  • PAKE
  • Raspberry Pi 4B
  • VTBSAE

Techniques named here

  • Cryptanalysis
  • client impersonation after server compromise

Concepts named here

  • random oracle model
  • AKE security
  • Computational Diffie-Hellman
  • Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption
  • forward secrecy
  • Verifier-based PAKE

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