35 results for “Wiz”

Wiz Research links October 2026 breaches at AI developer platforms (Fireworks, OpenCode, Warp, Zeabur, Railway and others) to stolen environment-variable credentials for AI access. It details two enterprise AWS Bedrock keys abused after vendor breaches: about 800k and 1.7 million calls, over $100k in list-price usage. It profiles two LLM resale operations, "momo" and "Xingjiabi", that tested the keys.

wiz.iowriteupAdded 31 Oct 2026, published 30 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Wiz research on intrusions where AI agents do the hands-on attacker work. It reviews public cases (ARTEX against South Korean banks and the ConnectWise compromise, Hermes at Thailand's Ministry of Finance, JPCERT/CC, CrowdStrike, DIVD) and three Wiz-investigated attacks. It distills fingerprints: machine-paced iteration, embedded natural-language reasoning, self-correcting scripts, checklist enumeration, noisy lateral movement, probe-before-payload habits and self-named scratch files. It also covers attribution, scale and defense implications.

wiz.iowriteupPublished and added 29 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Gheist is a campaign tracked by Wiz Research since 15 September 2026 that uses stolen GitHub tokens to push a sync-check workflow on ci-sync-* branches in every reachable repository. The workflow prints base32-encoded secrets into logs, which the tool downloads through the GitHub API and then deletes. Over 13,500 branches from 850+ accounts were recovered. The post covers the two tool variants, a buggy self-hosted runner payload, GitHub's approval hold (which does not cover private repositories), overlaps with other campaigns, hunting queries, IOCs and hardening steps.

wiz.iowriteupPublished and added 25 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

LiteLLM version 1.107.0 was uploaded to PyPI on 21 October 2026 with a credential stealer, and the same build reached GHCR and Docker Hub images. Wiz describes the three dropped files (cook.pth, cook.py, sitecustomize.py), exfiltration to a fake litellm.dev domain, a GitHub dead drop for a second stage, and the malicious commits pushed through the lookalike Berri-AI repository. The last safe version is 1.106.2.

wiz.iowriteupPublished and added 21 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

PHP2Shell is Wiz Research's disclosure of memory-safety bugs in core PHP, grouped under two CVEs (up to CVSS 9.2) and fixed in patched releases on 21 October 2026. The post details four bugs, all triggered by out-of-memory fatal errors that leave stale state: an upload-progress unserializer use-after-free, a session-ID memory disclosure, a fatal-error backtrace use-after-free and an OPcache type confusion. It describes unauthenticated RCE on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, plus detection signals and a disclosure timeline.

wiz.iowriteupPublished and added 21 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Wiz CIRT investigation of LLMjacking campaigns against Google Cloud billing accounts. Attackers phished admins through malicious Google Search ads and a fake login page that captured MFA codes, then deleted the iam.allowedPolicyMemberDomains policy, added Gmail accounts as billing admins, and linked attacker-controlled projects to the victim's billing account. Victims saw tens to hundreds of thousands of dollars in Gemini API charges within 24 to 48 hours, with no log visibility into prompts. Includes hunting guidance for Workspace, Admin Activity and billing logs.

wiz.iowriteupPublished and added 20 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Wiz CIRT write-up of an AI agent-run intrusion against a multi-cloud organization (GCP, AWS, Kubernetes, CI/CD, GitOps, identity provider). It lists traits of AI-driven attacks: machine-speed tempo, credential chaining, pentest/probe naming, numeric task IDs and commented code. Initial access was a Java RCE in an exposed Kafka UI. It closes with detection and response advice: unified logs, workload visibility and trust isolation.

wiz.iowriteupPublished and added 19 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Hackers-Arise tutorial on NVIDIA's open-source NemoClaw, which runs OpenClaw (and Hermes or LangChain Deep Agents) inside OpenShell sandboxes. OpenShell provides kernel-level isolation and declarative YAML policies for files, credentials and network access. It covers OpenClaw's risks (543 tracked CVEs, 40,000+ exposed instances), an OpenClaw vs NemoClaw comparison, the caveat that sandbox escapes and core-logic zero-days remain possible, and a Docker/Node.js install via the nemoclaw.sh wizard with TUI testing. It also cites the Cisco AI Defense plus OpenShell case study, in which an agent that does security patching was protected against a simulated exfiltration attempt.

hackers-arise.comwriteupPublished and added 14 Oct 2026🧠 AI

watchTowr's analysis of the PaperCut NG 26.0.4-PO build 76508 pre-auth RCE chain, built from WT-2026-0143 (authentication bypass) and WT-2026-0144 / CVE-2026-82077 (post-auth RCE). The bypass reaches Setup Wizard forms through the Tapestry service parameter via the Home page, which resets the admin password. The RCE uses path traversal in the Scan to Fax connector. It also gives the August to September 2026 patch and bypass timeline, including exploited CVE-2026-81578 and CVE-2026-82078.

labs.watchtowr.comwriteupAdded 30 Oct 2026, published 9 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Wiz walks through a case study of its "Blue Agent" autonomous SOC investigator tracing a compromised CI/CD service account (svc_automation) across AWS and GitHub. The attack chain: a stolen GitHub token cloned 18 private repos containing hardcoded AWS keys, which were used to authenticate to AWS from Kali Linux via a Zenlayer VPN IP, pivot to a second account, run SSM SendCommand against a production Windows domain controller, and stage custom Python exfiltration scripts (mssql_table_export.py, pg_table_export.py, billing_export2.py) in S3 to pull data from MSSQL, PostgreSQL, and billing systems. The piece details the investigative technique used - 30-day baseline comparison, ASO/IP dispersion across the tenant, and correlating CloudTrail management-plane events with S3 data-plane events and GitHub audit logs.

wiz.iowriteupPublished and added 29 Sep 2026🛡️ Security

Wiz Research analyzed infostealer-harvested secrets (via its NordStellar integration) to map exactly which credentials malware families like Lumma, RedLine, and Vidar target across AWS, Azure, GCP, GitHub, GitLab, and AI platforms, and how those secrets translate into cloud account takeover. It gives concrete file paths and artifacts attackers hunt for (~/.aws/sso/cache OIDC tokens, Azure accessTokens.json, GCP credentials.db/access_tokens.db, GitHub gh hosts.yml and SSH keys, GitLab Runner config.toml, OpenAI/ChatGPT session cookies, and Claude Code's ~/.claude/.credentials.json OAuth tokens), plus stats: three malware families cause 85.7% of incidents, AWS/GCP account for 46%/13% of stolen secrets, GitHub ~10%, AI platforms ~5%. It also covers CI/CD-targeting infostealers (Miasma, TeamPCP) and session-cookie hijacking as an MFA bypass technique.

wiz.iowriteupAdded 27 Sep 2026, published 25 Sep 2026🛡️ Security

Adversa AI catalogs ten distinct Claude Code attacks documented between September 2025 and September 2026: the Miasma supply-chain worm that hit 73 Microsoft repos via a SessionStart hook, TrustFall's unsandboxed MCP server execution on folder-trust, Check Point's CVE-2025-59536/CVE-2026-21852 pre-trust-dialog code execution and API key theft, Sentry-DSN-based "Agentjacking" prompt injection via fake bug reports, a 50-subcommand cap that silently disables deny rules, the SymJack symlink-to-config-hijack primitive working across six agent CLIs, Wiz's GhostApproval deceptive-approval-prompt finding (with CVE-2026-12958 at AWS and CVE-2026-50549 at Cursor but none at Anthropic), the Plugin4Shell SHA/branch-name collision bypassing plugin pinning, an academic MCP tool-poisoning paper achieving RCE on agent/LLM pairs, and SkillCloak's self-extracting-packer bypass of skill scanners. The piece argues almost none of these are model-behavior bugs - they are trust-boundary and consent failures in the surrounding tooling - and closes by pitching Adversa's own runtime agent security gateway as the fix.

adversa.aiwriteupAdded 7 Oct 2026, published 23 Sep 2026🛡️ Security

Wiz researchers reverse-engineered AWS's new sign-up experience, which silently creates a three-account AWS Organization (management, identity, and a restricted sandbox member account) with Builder ID login instead of root credentials. They found the sandbox blocks security services like GuardDuty, SecurityHub, Detective, Inspector, Macie and Access Analyzer via an allowlist SCP (FreeTierSCP), while still permitting risky practices such as IAM user access keys, public S3 buckets, and IMDSv1 EC2 instances; a data-perimeter RCP also blocks cross-account sts:AssumeRole until the account is upgraded, potentially pushing vendors back toward IAM user keys. The new IAM Role Manager feature further undermines least privilege by auto-attaching PowerUserAccess to console-created roles.

wiz.iowriteupPublished and added 17 Sep 2026🛡️ Security

Wiz researchers chain three LiteLLM flaws into a full pre-auth-to-cloud-compromise path: an MCP endpoint authentication bypass (CVE-2026-59822) that grants a session with any garbage Bearer token, a custom-code-guardrail sandbox bypass leading to root RCE (CVE-2026-59821) via exec() on unsanitized admin-submitted Python, and a config-endpoint authorization gap (CVE-2026-35029). They also show pass-through endpoints can be pointed at the AWS IMDS to steal IAM credentials, bypassing IMDSv2 via header-prefix forwarding. A scan of ~3,074 internet-facing instances found 9.6% accepting the default sk-1234 master key or no auth at all, and CVE-2026-59822 is now in CISA's KEV catalog with observed in-the-wild exploitation.

wiz.iowriteupPublished and added 9 Sep 2026🛡️ Security

Wiz Threat Research ran honeypots across LiteLLM, Flowise, LangChain, Langflow, ChromaDB, Ollama and other AI/ML services for 90 days, capturing active exploitation of an MCP Gateway auth bypass (CVE-2026-59822) and an MCP server test-endpoint command injection (CVE-2026-42271, in CISA KEV, chainable with Starlette CVE-2026-48710 for unauthenticated RCE and linked to Qilin ransomware exploitation) used to deploy fileless cryptominers. It also documents blind prompt injection campaigns against LangChain, Flowise, OpenWebUI, and Node-RED agents that trigger OS command execution confirmed via out-of-band DNS callbacks to OAST domains.

wiz.iowriteupAdded 3 Sep 2026, published 27 Aug 2026🛡️ Security

Wiz researchers found that malicious versions of the Rust crates arrayref, internment, and append-only-vec were published to crates.io, each pulling in a typosquatted build-dependency (proc-macro1, mimicking proc-macro2) whose build.rs executes a remote payload at compile time. The payload beacons to a C2 endpoint (/49890878) shared with the Mastra campaign, disables TLS validation, enumerates Chrome/Brave/Edge saved logins via their SQLite stores, persists via Registry Run keys/LaunchAgents/systemd, and falls back to a DGA — with C2 infrastructure and SSL-issuer overlap tying it to DPRK/Sapphire Sleet activity previously seen in the Mastra and axios supply chain attacks. arrayref is used in roughly 75% of Rust environments, making this a high-impact build-time compromise.

wiz.iowriteupAdded 3 Sep 2026, published 20 Aug 2026🛡️ Security

Wiz details how attackers abuse Entra ID's Device Registration Service to register rogue devices — often via device code phishing — to satisfy Conditional Access policies requiring joined devices, commonly using the open-source ROADrecon framework and predictable names like DESKTOP-XXXXXXXX. As attackers shift to AI-generated, benign-looking device names (e.g., "Work PC") and plausible User-Agent strings, static IOC matching breaks down, so Wiz shifted to behavioral detections: naming-convention anomaly detection against tenant baselines and correlating device-code-phishing alerts with subsequent device registrations, including a shared KQL query for identifying anomalous naming baselines.

wiz.iowriteupAdded 3 Sep 2026, published 18 Aug 2026🛡️ Security

Wiz's autonomous "Red Agent" discovered a GitHub Actions script-injection vulnerability in snowflakedb/snowflake-connector-net's jira_issue.yml workflow, introduced when a PR (co-authored by GitHub Copilot) replaced a safe env:/jq pattern with direct interpolation of the attacker-controlled issue title. GitHub Advanced Security scanned the same PR and workflow but failed to flag the injection; Red Agent autonomously crafted and self-corrected a payload after a bash syntax error, exfiltrated Jira OAuth credentials via an out-of-band callback, and used them to access Snowflake's internal Jira (engineering, security, and bug-bounty projects) — all without human intervention. Snowflake patched and rotated credentials the same day the flaw was reported via HackerOne.

wiz.iowriteupAdded 3 Sep 2026, published 17 Aug 2026🛡️ Security

Wiz's Customer Incident Response Team (CIRT) details a real campaign (mid-May–early June 2026) in which stolen GitHub Personal Access Tokens were used for repository reconnaissance, low-volume validation cloning, and then mass exfiltration of thousands of repos per organization from AWS IPs using automated tooling. The post provides a structured investigation playbook — containing the compromised PAT, expanding the timeline via GitHub audit logs and Enterprise Log Streaming, tracing the leak source, assessing blast radius (exposed secrets/PII in exfiltrated repos), rotating credentials, and hunting for downstream cloud abuse — while noting GitHub's 7-day audit log retention limits visibility.

wiz.iowriteupAdded 3 Sep 2026, published 13 Aug 2026🛡️ Security

Wiz Research reverse-engineers CVE-2026-72898 (GHSA-vwf4-m7j8-wcjf), a zero-day SQL injection in Metabase's /api/session/reset_password endpoint exploited in the wild against Metabase Cloud since August 2026. The bug chains Clojure's merge (which lets an attacker-supplied user-id survive an auth-result merge), JSON keywordization, and HoneySQL's :raw keyword to smuggle unparameterized SQL into a t2/select-one query, yielding blind SQL injection. The post walks through decompiling patched vs. vulnerable JARs to reconstruct the flaw, notes ~2,500 internet-exposed Metabase instances per Shodan, and gives a curl-based exploitability check plus remediation guidance.

wiz.iowriteupAdded 3 Sep 2026, published 10 Aug 2026🛡️ Security

Wiz's H1 2026 cloud threat report documents a 60% jump in significant incidents driven by a doubling of supply-chain attacks (TeamPCP's npm/PyPI/GitHub Actions credential-harvesting spree, its open-sourced Shai-Hulud worm spawning Miasma/Hades/Megalodon/IronWorm follow-ons, North Korea's axios and @mastra trojanizations) and by growing attacks on AI infrastructure, including exposed unauthenticated MCP servers, LiteLLM/Dify/Langflow/n8n/Ollama vulnerabilities, and cryptominers deployed via a Langflow RCE. It also profiles JINX-0163, a cloud-native extortion group targeting non-human identities (service accounts/IAM roles) across AWS/Azure/GCP/Okta/Snowflake linked to the "FulcrumSec" extortion brand, and closes with concrete detection techniques for stolen access keys, Kubernetes VM Run Command abuse, GCP org-policy tampering, and CloudTrail user-agent/boto3 credential-provenance mismatches.

wiz.iowriteupAdded 3 Sep 2026, published 6 Aug 2026🛡️ Security

Wiz Research documents an ongoing supply chain attack in which a compromised GitHub maintainer account was used to publish malicious versions of keyv, cacheable, and 400+ dependent npm packages. The payload is a variant of the open-sourced 'Mini' Shai-Hulud malware (linked to the TeamPCP and antv campaigns) that steals cloud, CI/CD, AI-agent, and cryptocurrency credentials, persists via Claude Code hooks and VS Code tasks.json, exfiltrates data to attacker-controlled GitHub repos, and retrieves its C2 domain dynamically via an Ethereum smart contract (StringListStore) eth_call rather than hardcoding it.

wiz.iowriteupAdded 3 Sep 2026, published 4 Aug 2026🛡️ Security

Wiz Research examines S3-compatible object storage offerings from Nebius, Vultr, Lambda Labs, Cloudflare R2, DigitalOcean, and Crusoe, showing how each deviates from AWS S3 security defaults. Findings include providers that expose access/secret keys via list APIs (Vultr), default ACLs that would be public but aren't enforced (Lambda Labs), lack of least-privilege key scoping (Vultr, Crusoe, Lambda Labs), weak or undocumented encryption-at-rest/TLS enforcement, unstructured access-key formats that evade GitHub/secret-scanner detection, and cross-tenant bucket namesquatting risk due to shared global namespaces.

wiz.iowriteupAdded 3 Sep 2026, published 31 Jul 2026🛡️ Security

Wiz Research found CosmosEscape, a critical Azure Cosmos DB vulnerability exploited via the Gremlin API's .NET-based query engine, whose sandbox failed to restrict .NET reflection, enabling arbitrary code execution on the DB Gateway service. This allowed retrieval of the "Cosmos Master Key," a platform-wide signing key that could fetch any Cosmos DB account's primary key and enumerate accounts via a shared Config Store, enabling attackers to compromise any customer or internal Microsoft database (including those backing Entra ID, Teams, and Copilot) from public endpoints. Microsoft fully remediated the issue and eliminated the master key architecture.

wiz.iowriteupAdded 3 Sep 2026, published 30 Jul 2026🛡️ Security

Wiz Research scanned MCP servers across cloud environments and found roughly 1 in 6 environments expose at least one server to the Internet, most unauthenticated and still running the pre-auth 2024-11-05 protocol version. They demonstrate anonymous tool-catalog enumeration, real data returned from production databases/CRM/IAM backends, write/delete-capable tools, and confirmed SSRF against cloud instance metadata endpoints yielding temporary credentials, plus agents that can be talked into unsafe actions by reframing requests as "routine maintenance."

wiz.iowriteupAdded 3 Sep 2026, published 28 Jul 2026🛡️ Security

Wiz details how its Agentless Workload Detection extends EDR-like visibility to FortiGate firewalls by parsing local FortiOS logs (log IDs like 32001/32002/44547/41987) to hunt for credential stuffing, rogue admin account creation, certificate manipulation, NAT/port-forwarding abuse, and FortiManager script abuse. It maps these techniques to real-world campaigns including the FortiBleed credential-compromise campaign, active exploitation of CVE-2026-24858, and UNC3886's use of CVE-2022-41328 to deploy the CASTLETAP backdoor, plus Salt Typhoon's exploitation of CVE-2023-48788 against FortiClient EMS.

wiz.iowriteupAdded 3 Sep 2026, published 22 Jul 2026🛡️ Security

Wiz Research documents active in-the-wild exploitation of "wp2shell," a pre-auth RCE chain in WordPress Core (CVE-2026-63030 and CVE-2026-60137) affecting every WordPress version since December 2025, discovered by Searchlight Cyber using GPT-5.6 Sol. Attackers abuse the WordPress REST API batch endpoint (/wp-json/batch/v1) to achieve unauthenticated RCE, then deploy malicious plugins/webshells (including a disguised "CMSmap" plugin and a custom REST endpoint backdoor), enumerate users, and attempt LFI against wp-config for credential theft. The post details post-exploitation TTPs, detection signatures (HTTP 207 responses, wp2shell/rezwp2shell user agents), IOCs, and WAF/plugin-based mitigations.

wiz.iowriteupAdded 3 Sep 2026, published 20 Jul 2026🛡️ Security

Wiz's autonomous "Red Agent" AI pentester analyzed a B2B data platform's 130MB of frontend JS bundles, extracted 100+ API endpoints, and found an unused boolean flag (e.g. unmaskContactData) referenced in client code but never sent by the normal UI. Replaying a standard free-tier search request with this flag set to true caused the backend to skip credit/tier checks and return fully unmasked business emails and phone numbers for the platform's 600M+ profiles, letting free-tier users bypass the paywall entirely; the vendor fixed the flaw within two hours of disclosure.

wiz.iowriteupAdded 3 Sep 2026, published 15 Jul 2026🛡️ Security

Wiz Research details how an attacker used 37 decoy pull requests to mask exploitation of a pull_request_target "pwn request" misconfiguration in the asyncapi/generator GitHub Actions workflow, stealing a privileged PAT belonging to the asyncapi-bot service account. The attacker then published four malicious npm packages (five versions) under the @asyncapi namespace with over 3 million weekly downloads, delivering a self-identified "M-RED-TEAM v6.4" multi-stage payload that fetches an 8.25MB encrypted bundle from IPFS and installs a 92,000-line trojan framework with systemd persistence and HTTP/Nostr/Ethereum/libp2p C2 channels, targeting browser credentials, SSH keys, npm/GitHub tokens, AWS credentials, and crypto wallets. The piece also analyzes partial technical overlap with the Miasma malware framework and the unrelated prt-scan campaign without making definitive attribution.

wiz.iowriteupAdded 3 Sep 2026, published 14 Jul 2026🛡️ Security

Wiz Research discloses GhostApproval, a symlink-following vulnerability (CWE-61) found in six AI coding assistants — Amazon Q Developer, Claude Code, Augment, Cursor, Google Antigravity, and Windsurf — where a malicious repo containing a symlink disguised as a config file tricks the agent into reading/writing sensitive files like ~/.ssh/authorized_keys outside the workspace sandbox. In several tools the agent's internal reasoning correctly identifies the true target file, but the confirmation dialog shown to the user still displays the fake filename (CWE-451, UI misrepresentation), turning human-in-the-loop approval into a rubber stamp; some tools (Amazon Q, Windsurf) even write to disk before the approval prompt appears. AWS (CVE-2026-12958), Google, and Cursor (CVE-2026-50549) shipped fixes; Anthropic initially rejected it as outside threat model before later shipping a symlink warning, Augment acknowledged but hasn't patched, and Windsurf has not responded.

wiz.iowriteupAdded 3 Sep 2026, published 8 Jul 2026🛡️ Security

Wiz details how its autonomous "Red Agent" AI red-teaming tool found a critical Broken Object-Level Authorization (BOLA) flaw in an unnamed airline's GraphQL booking API. Starting from just a root URL, the agent reverse-engineered client JS to mint an anonymous session token, ran GraphQL introspection to enumerate 514 queries/428 mutations, and found that mutations like bookingRetrieveByBookingId accepted sequential integer IDs with no backend authorization check — exposing full passenger PII, payment data, and write access to bookings within 15 minutes.

wiz.iowriteupAdded 3 Sep 2026, published 29 Jun 2026🛡️ Security

Wiz Research found that the Amazon Q Developer VS Code extension auto-loaded and executed MCP server configs from .amazonq/mcp.json in a workspace with no consent prompt or workspace-trust check, and spawned those processes with full environment inheritance. Opening a malicious repository (e.g. a malicious PR, typosquatted package, or fake "coding test" per known DPRK social-engineering tactics) could therefore trigger arbitrary code execution and theft of the developer's AWS credentials, demonstrated by capturing aws sts get-caller-identity output. Amazon remediated the issue in language server version 1.65.0, adding a consent prompt before loading workspace MCP servers.

wiz.iowriteupAdded 3 Sep 2026, published 26 Jun 2026🛡️ Security

Wiz walks through how its autonomous 'Red Agent' AI pentesting tool chained an SSRF vulnerability in a GCP Cloud Run service's ?url= file-fetch parameter into a full local file read, bypassing a strict GitHub-blob-URL validator. The breakthrough payload (github.com/x/y/blob/z//proc/self/environ) exploited a parser differential between the validator and the fetcher, letting the agent exfiltrate live GCP service-account credentials and the app's source code after 96 requests of iterative hypothesis-driven probing.

wiz.iowriteupAdded 3 Sep 2026, published 17 Jun 2026🛡️ Security

Wiz CIRT and Wiz Research detail JINX-0164, a previously untracked financially-motivated threat actor targeting cryptocurrency organizations since mid-2025. The group uses LinkedIn-based social engineering to deliver macOS malware (the Python-based AUDIOFIX infostealer/RAT and the Go-based MINIRAT backdoor), steals developer and cloud credentials, hijacks Git commits to propagate through CI/CD infrastructure, and trojanized the npm package @velora-dex/sdk in a supply-chain attack. The post includes full IOCs, C2 domains, and detection guidance (e.g., GitHub Vigilant Mode, audit log correlation) and notes tactical overlaps with North Korean clusters like UNC1069/Sapphire Sleet without confirmed attribution.

wiz.iowriteupAdded 5 Sep 2026, published 27 May 2026🛡️ Security

Wiz Research's technical breakdown of CVE-2026-3854, a critical vulnerability in GitHub's internal git push pipeline (babeld, gitauth, gitrpcd, pre-receive hook) that let any authenticated user achieve unsandboxed remote code execution with a single `git push -o` command. The root cause is a semicolon-delimiter injection into the internal X-Stat header, chained through unsanitized push options to override security fields (rails_env, custom_hooks_dir, repo_pre_receive_hooks) and escape the custom-hooks sandbox, ultimately giving RCE as the shared git user on GitHub.com's multi-tenant storage nodes and full compromise on GitHub Enterprise Server. Wiz also highlights using AI-augmented reverse engineering (IDA MCP) to rapidly analyze GitHub's closed-source compiled binaries and reconstruct the internal protocol, which enabled the discovery.

wiz.iowriteupAdded 5 Sep 2026, published 28 Apr 2026🛡️ Security