Dependency confusion
Named by 10 kept items in this workspace.
Search every workspace for Dependency confusion. It matches the name as written, so it can find other things that share it.
The items that name it 10
Attack prevented by keeping internal repositories distinct from public registries.
Related supply chain attack listed alongside slopsquatting and typosquatting in the page's comparison table of related supply chain attacks
Nine npm packages impersonating real cryptocurrency wallet and signing libraries, published in a synchronized drop on August 5, 2026 to win a dependency-confusion race
Malice is in the package name and version number relative to something in a private registry; code itself doesn't reveal the attack, predicted to evade scanning
Attacker publishes a public package with the same name as a company's private package; resolver's 'highest version wins' behavior combined with checking both public and private registries causes the build to pull the malicious public package
Attacker publishes a public package with a higher version number matching an unreserved internal package name, causing the resolver to pull the malicious public version.
Malicious packages may use high version numbers to exploit dependency confusion attacks.
Attack technique where packages are published with higher version numbers (e.g., 99.9) to float above legitimate internal/private packages; used extensively by bug bounty researchers and by the Moika campaign
Exploits how package managers resolve dependencies between public and private registries to get a malicious package installed instead of an internal package; often targets specific technologies like crypto and typically has lower download numbers.
Used in the earlier Moika campaign to steal environment information and deliver OS-specific second-stage payloads
All techniques in this workspace.