Skip to content

28 results for “MCP servers”

ListGrid
What you seeeverything
RecentOldestAddedA–Z
All types91Articles28Repos24Papers10Threads10Write-ups9Advisories6Talks2Tools2
📄 Articles“MCP servers”Clear all
pillar.securityarticle🛡️ Security

SAIL Framework: A Practical Guide for AI Security

The SAIL Framework from Pillar Security is a seven-phase, lifecycle-oriented method for securing AI systems. The phases are AI policy and safe experimentation, AI asset discovery, AI security posture management, AI red teaming, runtime guardrails, sandboxed execution for agents and MCP servers, and AI activity tracing. It argues for a "Shift Up" approach that protects the business logic AI controls, and it is meant to sit on top of existing standards.

Model Context Protocol
SAIL FrameworkPillar Securityprompt injection+3

AI Security, GRC· Added 29 Oct 2026

endorlabs.comarticle🧠 AI

What is an AIBOM? AI bill of materials explained for security teams | Endor Labs

An AIBOM is a machine-readable inventory of models, datasets, dependencies, AI services, agents and MCP servers, with evidence of origin, license, integrity and evaluation. The Endor Labs explainer walks through a worked CycloneDX example for a fine-tuned support assistant. It compares CycloneDX ML-BOM, SPDX 3.x, the OWASP AIBOM project and the May 2026 CISA/G7 guidance, and lists what an AIBOM cannot show: runtime behavior and agent actions.

CycloneDXSPDXSBOM+5
Endor LabsOWASPCISA+3

ai-policy, ai-infra· Published and added 29 Oct 2026

endorlabs.comarticle🛡️ Security

What is an AIBOM? AI bill of materials explained for security teams | Endor Labs

AIBOM explainer from Endor Labs: an AI bill of materials is a machine-readable inventory of models, datasets, dependencies, AI services, agents and MCP servers, with origin, license and integrity evidence. It walks through a CycloneDX entry for a fine-tuned model, compares CycloneDX ML-BOM, SPDX 3.x, the OWASP AIBOM Generator and the May 2026 CISA/G7 minimum-elements guidance, and lists a six-step build process. It also states what an AIBOM cannot show: model safety, runtime behavior and coding-agent actions.

CycloneDXSPDXSBOM+2
EU AI ActISO/IEC 42001CISA+5

Supply Chain, AI Security, GRC· Published and added 29 Oct 2026

endorlabs.comarticle🛡️ Security

ADLC Security Best Practices for Teams Shipping with Coding Agents | Endor Labs

ADLC Security Best Practices is an Endor Labs guide to controlling what AI coding agents can access, run, install and ship. It covers inventorying agents and MCP servers, sandboxing, pre-execution hooks instead of AGENTS.md rules, install-time package checks against slopsquatting and malware, reachability-based triage of agent PRs, and CI/CODEOWNERS protections. A five-step worked example and coverage metrics are included.

Model Context ProtocolClaude CodeCursor+3
slopsquattingindirect prompt injectiontool poisoning+5

AI Security, Supply Chain, DevSecOps· Published and added 23 Oct 2026

linkedin.comarticle🧠 AI

AI Agents for Cybersecurity: A Guided Tour of a Repository with Tons of Resources and Examples

A guided tour of a GitHub repository of resources and examples for building AI agents, published on the Becoming a Hacker blog. Per the routing note, it covers LangChain 1.x, LCEL, RAG, LangGraph, CrewAI, DeepAgents, MCP servers and token-cost control such as caching, routing and budget guards. The fetched page held only a LinkedIn redirect notice, so the article text was not read.

LangChainLangGraphCrewAI+4

agents, llm-apps, mcp· Added 13 Oct 2026

becomingahacker.orgarticle🧠 AI

AI Agents for Cybersecurity: A Guided Tour of a Repository with Tons of Resources and Examples

Guided tour of Omar Santos's eight-part AI-agents-for-cybersecurity repository. It moves from LLM building blocks (LangChain, RAG) to security agents built with LangGraph, CrewAI, DeepAgents and MCP servers (nmap, CISA KEV, Shodan). It also covers a hardening guide for six agentic frameworks, token-cost control, and a spec for a supervisor-led, human-gated assessment harness. Design lessons include least-privilege subagents, single-use approvals and kill switches.

LangChainRAGLangGraph+7
Omar SantosOWASPCISA+1

agents, mcp, llm-apps· Added 13 Oct 2026

becomingahacker.orgarticle🛡️ Security

AI Agents for Cybersecurity: A Guided Tour of a Repository with Tons of Resources and Examples

Omar Santos walks through his eight-part AI-agents-for-cybersecurity repository: LLM building blocks (LangChain, RAG), then security agents with LangGraph, CrewAI, DeepAgents and MCP servers (nmap, CISA KEV, Shodan), a hardening guide for six agentic frameworks, token-cost control for agents, and a spec for a supervisor-led, human-gated security-assessment harness. It covers concrete design lessons such as least-privilege subagents, staged response actions, single-use approvals bound to exact actions, kill switches, and mapping controls to the OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications. Also notes Project CodeGuard rules shipped for AI coding assistants.

LangChainModel Context ProtocolPython+3
Omar SantosProject CodeGuardOWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications+5

AI Security, Learning, Blue Team & Detection· Added 13 Oct 2026

linkedin.comarticle🛡️ Security

AI Agents for Cybersecurity: A Guided Tour of a Repository with Tons of Resources and Examples

Omar Santos walks through his AI-agents-for-cybersecurity GitHub repo, which has eight parts. Parts 1–4 cover LLM basics (LangChain, prompting, LCEL, RAG). Parts 5–8 cover building security agents with LangGraph, CrewAI, DeepAgents and MCP servers (nmap, CISA KEV, Shodan), and a hardening baseline for six ready-made agentic frameworks. They also cover token-cost control (caching, routing, budget guards, cost per accepted outcome) and a supervisor-led, human-gated security-assessment harness spec with single-use approvals, a kill switch and an append-only audit log. The post also covers Project CodeGuard rules for AI coding assistants. It is a practical learning path and a reference for governing and securing agents.

LangChainLangGraphCrewAI+5
Omar SantosProject CodeGuardOWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications+9

AI Security, Learning, Blue Team & Detection· Added 13 Oct 2026

github.blogarticle🧠 AI

GitHub Copilot app for Beginners: How to teach Copilot about your codebase

Beginner-oriented GitHub blog guide to giving GitHub Copilot project context through four mechanisms: repository custom instructions (.github/copilot-instructions.md and path-specific .github/instructions files with applyTo), agent skills (SKILL.md folders under .github/skills), custom agents (.github/agents profiles), and MCP servers such as Playwright. It explains when to use each and how they combine, using examples like a quality-checks skill and an accessibility-review agent. Useful as a concrete reference for the repo layout Copilot reads, with a pointer to the community Awesome Copilot collection.

GitHub CopilotModel Context ProtocolPlaywright+1
Awesome Copilot

coding-agents, prompting, mcp· Published and added 12 Oct 2026

endorlabs.comarticle🧠 AI

Context Engineering for Application Security | Endor Labs

Endor Labs whitepaper on using context engineering to make AI coding assistants produce secure code. It covers secure prompting (priming, decomposition, refinement with design-spec and test-first patterns), reusable system rules such as Cursor rules and the CSA R.A.I.L.G.U.A.R.D. framework, and external SAST/SCA tools wired in through MCP servers with a rule that triggers scans. It also covers the costs and risks: extra token use, models ignoring rules, untrusted community rules, and MCP server supply-chain threats. It cites figures such as 62% of AI-generated solutions containing flaws and a 77.5% reduction in weaknesses from recursive prompting.

CursorModel Context ProtocolClaude+1
Endor LabsOWASPCloud Security Alliance

prompting, coding-agents, llm-apps· Published and added 12 Oct 2026

adversa.aiarticle🛡️ Security

Top MCP security resources — October 2026

Adversa AI's October 2026 MCP security roundup, aggregating and synthesizing 15 resources: authentication-bypass vulnerabilities in LiteLLM's MCP endpoint (CVE-2026-59822, now CISA KEV), Grafana's MCP server session spoofing/SSRF (CVE-2026-19516), an MCP Python SDK OAuth-fallback flaw exploited by a malicious server returning a 404, and an Obot gateway route-matching bypass reopening GHSA-vw82. It also covers detection failures (two malicious MCP servers passing five scanners including Cisco mcp-scanner and Snyk agent-scan, 12% of 82,000 public MCP configs hardcoding secrets), a malicious npm wallet-signing package (gadgethumans-mcp), the A2M agent-hijacking attack technique, and CoSAI's MCP Security v2.0 governance model.

Model Context ProtocolLiteLLMnpm+3
CVE-2026-59822CVE-2026-59821CVE-2026-19516+6

AI Security, AppSec, Identity & Access· Published and added 8 Oct 2026

latent.spacearticle🧠 AI

Can a Cloud-Native Harness Make Agents Reliable Beyond the Desktop?

Latent Space interviews Stacklok founders Craig McLuckie and Joe Beda (Kubernetes co-creators) about Mecatl, an open-source "cloud-native harness" for coding agents that separates the agent loop from local tool execution, session state and model provider so enterprises can run and govern agents centrally rather than on individual desktops. The piece also covers Stacklok's earlier pivot from supply-chain security to ToolHive, an open-source platform/Kubernetes operator for running and governing MCP servers, and a not-yet-open-sourced "AI Gateway" focused on access control, budgets and provider routing for regulated enterprises (banks, telcos, semiconductor firms). The framing draws an explicit analogy to how Kubernetes decoupled enterprises from cloud providers, arguing agent harnesses need the same "cattle not pets" treatment to scale beyond desktop tools like Claude Code, Codex and GitHub Copilot.

KubernetesModel Context ProtocolDocker+4
StacklokMecatlToolHive+8

agents, ai-infra, mcp· Published and added 7 Oct 2026

thehackernews.comarticle🛡️ Security

FakeGit Campaign Uses 7,600 GitHub Repositories to Spread SmartLoader Malware

Researchers at Island identified nearly 7,600 malicious GitHub repositories (from ~6,600 fake profiles) making up the "FakeGit" campaign, with over 800 posing as AI Skills or MCP servers (for Gmail, WhatsApp, Databricks, Jenkins, Docker, etc.) to distribute SmartLoader via malicious ZIP files that trigger a LuaJIT loader chain, ultimately deploying the StealC infostealer. The campaign has racked up over 14 million downloads across ~200 repos and 600+ listings on registries like LobeHub, Glama, MCP.so, and MCP Market. The report also introduces "AgentBaiting," a technique where AI agents (Claude Code, Gemini, ChatGPT were shown to be susceptible) autonomously discover and surface these malicious repos while searching for skills/MCP servers on a user's behalf, without ever being given a link.

Model Context ProtocolGitHubClaude Code+3
FakeGitSmartLoaderStealC+9

Threat Intel, AI Security, Supply Chain· Added 26 Sep 2026

thehackernews.comarticle🛡️ Security

Critical Cursor Flaws Could Let Prompt Injection Escape Sandbox and Run Commands

Cato AI Labs disclosed DuneSlide, two critical (CVSS 9.8) Cursor flaws — CVE-2026-50548 and CVE-2026-50549 — that let a zero-click prompt injection (via MCP servers or web search results read by the agent) escape Cursor's terminal sandbox and achieve arbitrary command execution. Both abuse the file-write allowlist logic: one via the run_terminal_cmd tool's working_directory parameter, the other via a symlink-resolution fallback that trusts an in-project path when the real-path check fails; both let an attacker overwrite Cursor's sandbox helper binary or startup files like ~/.zshrc to disable the sandbox entirely. Fixed in Cursor 3.0 (April 2), affecting all prior 2.x versions; the piece also situates this alongside earlier Cursor agent-exploitation chains (CurXecute/CVE-2025-54135, MCPoison/CVE-2025-54136, CVE-2026-26268).

CursorModel Context ProtocolmacOS+3
CVE-2026-50548CVE-2026-50549CVE-2025-54135+7

AI Security· Added 26 Sep 2026

aws.amazon.comarticle🛡️ Security

ICYMI: August 2026 @AWS Security

AWS Security Blog's August 2026 ICYMI roundup covering 20 blog posts, 23 security bulletins, and 17 code samples. The dominant theme is securing agentic AI workloads on Amazon Bedrock AgentCore, alongside IAM/Cognito updates, S3 over-permission remediation, and a bulletin wave featuring prompt-injection consent bypasses in Strands Agents Tools, an IDOR exposing cross-tenant agent memory, credential-disclosure flaws in MCP servers, and RCE issues such as path-traversal-to-root in amazon-ssm-agent and Zip Slip in awsdac.

AWSAWS BedrockAWS IAM+3
IDORZip Slippath traversal+5

AI Security, Cloud & Infra, Identity & Access· Added 7 Oct 2026, published 23 Sep 2026

adversa.aiarticle🛡️ Security

What is an agent harness (and how do you secure one)?

Adversa AI argues that AI agent security lives in the harness, the loop, tool executors, context/memory management, approval gates and sandbox wrapped around an LLM, not in the model itself, and catalogs nine recurring harness failure classes. It details the firm's own research: SymJack (a symlink-based approval-prompt bypass that let six tested coding agents write attacker-controlled MCP config), GuardFall (shell-matcher bypass exploitable in 10 of 11 open-source agents tested), and TrustFall (MCP servers auto-executing on folder-trust acceptance in Claude Code, Gemini CLI, Cursor CLI and GitHub Copilot CLI), plus references to IDEsaster's 30+ AI-IDE vulnerabilities, a Hugging Face download-counter side channel (CVE-2026-54316), and Novee Security's Black Hat findings on credential leakage across Gemini CLI/Codex trust boundaries. It closes with concrete mitigations: Meta's Agents Rule of Two, allowlisting over blocklisting, treating agent config as executable code, and chain-of-event monitoring mapped to the OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications.

Claude CodeCursorGemini CLI+3
CVE-2026-54316SymJackGuardFall+10

AI Security· Added 7 Oct 2026, published 14 Sep 2026

adversa.aiarticle🛡️ Security

Top MCP Security Resources — September 2026 (Adversa.ai)

Adversa.ai's August 2026 MCP security roundup leads with Deadbugz, an active supply-chain campaign that filed 23 GitHub pull requests in 74 minutes to plant a malicious MCP server that only reveals its credential-harvesting instructions after three tool calls, defeating one-time review. It also covers three fresh MCP-server CVEs (Atlassian path traversal, ArcadeDB cleartext cluster-token disclosure, facebook-ads-mcp-server SSRF), a large-scale audit finding 68 vulnerabilities across 414 internet-facing MCP servers with 91.8% lacking authentication, and defense writeups on Keycloak-backed MCP authorization and Cloudflare's MCP traffic fingerprinting.

Model Context ProtocolCloudflareKeycloak+3
CVE-2026-73498CVE-2026-67357CVE-2026-19956+5

AI Security, Supply Chain, AppSec· Added 26 Sep 2026, published 7 Sep 2026

endorlabs.comarticle🛡️ Security

Prompt Injection Against Coding Agents: The Attack Surface Nobody Owns | Blog | Endor Labs

Endor Labs breaks down how indirect prompt injection compromises AI coding agents (Cursor, GitHub Copilot) via poisoned READMEs/rules files, malicious MCP servers, and web/issue content the agent reads with elevated trust and auto-approve permissions. Cites a study testing 314 payloads across 70 MITRE ATT&CK techniques showing up to 84% attack success, OWASP's MCP tool poisoning definition, Unit 42's real-world IDPI telemetry, and CVE-2025-52573 as a concrete command-injection-via-prompt-injection case in an MCP server.

Model Context ProtocolCursorGitHub Copilot
CVE-2025-52573MITRE ATT&CKUnit 42+2

AI Security· Added 3 Sep 2026, published 2 Sep 2026

jfrog.comarticle🛡️ Security

The Evolution of JFrog AI Catalog: Your AI Control Plane for Agentic Development

JFrog vendor post arguing that agentic development (ADLC) introduces new unvetted supply chains — models, MCP servers, skills/plugins, hooks, and APM packages — that bypass traditional signature-based scanning. It cites real incidents: a malicious MCP server impersonating Postmark's email MCP that BCC'd all agent-sent emails to an attacker, and the 'omnicogg' malicious Claude/agent skill that hid a 22MB encoded payload and evaded all 65 VirusTotal engines for 5,000+ installs, plus references to 2026 supply-chain attacks on LiteLLM, TanStack, and Mistral AI. It then pitches JFrog AI Catalog's expanded MCP/skill/model registries as the fix.

Model Context ProtocolJFrog Artifactory
JFrog AI Catalogpostmark-mcpomnicogg+3

AI Security, Supply Chain· Added 3 Sep 2026, published 2 Sep 2026

thehackernews.comarticle🛡️ Security

GhostSplice: Malicious MCP Servers Split Exfiltration to Bypass Guardrails

Reporting on ASSET Research Group's GhostSplice disclosure, which shows a malicious MCP server can bypass single-shot prompt-injection refusals by splitting a data-exfiltration request across multiple channels (tool descriptions, tool results, server-initiated sampling) so no single message looks malicious, letting the coding agent stitch the fragments together and exfiltrate SSH keys, .env secrets, and source code. Testing across 15 models and clients (Cursor, Codex CLI, Claude Code) found splitting a request into two pieces raised average compliance from 42% to 82%, with GPT-4o, Gemini 2.0 Flash, and Llama 3.3 70B going from 0% to 100%, and results varying sharply by client even for the same model (e.g., Claude Haiku 4.5 at 0% in API tests but 100% in a three-piece Cursor test). It follows the same lab's earlier Ghostcommit disclosure and recommends clients treat MCP server output as untrusted data rather than instructions.

Model Context ProtocolClaude CodeCursor+3
ASSET Research GroupGhostSpliceGhostcommit+7

AI Security· Published and added 19 Aug 2026

endorlabs.comarticle🛡️ Security

What is an agent harness? The software that turns a model into an agent | Blog | Endor Labs

Endor Labs explainer arguing that an AI agent's "harness" (orchestration loop, tool calling/MCP, memory, sandboxes, permission guardrails) - not the underlying LLM - is what determines both capability and attack surface. It walks through concrete harness-level risks (prompt injection as OWASP's LLM01, MCP servers as unvetted dependencies, permission sprawl) and pitches deterministic lifecycle hooks (as used in Claude Code/Cursor via Endor's AURI) as a jailbreak-proof control layer, citing Endor's Agent Security League benchmark where Cursor+Fable 5 beat Claude Code and Codex on both functional and security correctness.

Model Context ProtocolClaude CodeCursor+3
Agent Security LeagueOWASP Top 10 for LLM ApplicationsClaude Fable 5+1

AI Security· Added 3 Sep 2026, published 15 Aug 2026

blog.cloudflare.comarticle🧠 AI

MCP spec 2026-07-28: the stateless revolution (Cloudflare)

Cloudflare explains the MCP 2026-07-28 specification, which removes the mandatory stateful session handshake (Mcp-Session-Id) from the core protocol so MCP servers can run as ordinary stateless HTTP workloads (e.g. a single Cloudflare Worker) instead of requiring sticky sessions or Durable Objects. It covers the new Multi Round-Trip Requests (MRTR) model replacing stream-based elicitation, new Mcp-Method/Mcp-Name HTTP headers for gateway-level routing and caching, tightened authorization (CIMD preferred over DCR, RFC 9207 issuer checks, RFC 8707 audience binding), a formal Active/Deprecated/Removed feature lifecycle, and the createMcpHandler API graduating into the official TypeScript SDK, with testimonials from Sentry, Linear, and Anthropic's MCP lead.

Model Context ProtocolTypeScriptPython+6
AnthropicSentryLinear+4

mcp· Added 2 Oct 2026, published 6 Aug 2026

adversa.aiarticle🛡️ Security

Top MCP security resources — August 2026

Adversa AI's monthly MCP security digest for August 2026, grouping ten resources: the July 28 MCP specification revision that hardens authorization (RFC 9207 issuer validation, deprecation of Dynamic Client Registration, a stateless core with header-based routing), a confused-deputy indirect prompt injection against Microsoft's Azure DevOps MCP server that hijacks a review agent into exfiltrating wiki data, SANS ISC telemetry showing 49 source IPs scanning for exposed MCP servers and agent credentials in two weeks, and new research (ChainWatch's kill-chain detection via Hidden Markov Models, SPELLSMITH's description-layer mitigations for taint-style flaws, MTGuard's static/dynamic tool-call analysis, and a 33-vulnerability taxonomy of agentic commerce platforms with the AIP-Bench benchmark). It closes with concrete upgrade guidance: audit DCR dependencies, validate issuers per RFC 9207, grep logs for MCP scanning indicators, and stand up a policy-enforcement gateway.

Model Context ProtocolOAuthAzure DevOps
RFC 9207SANS ISCChainWatch+5

AI Security, Identity & Access, AppSec· Added 7 Oct 2026, published 6 Aug 2026

wiz.ioarticle🛡️ Security

Introducing the Wiz Sensor for Developer Workstations to Protect Endpoints in the AI Era

Wiz announces a new endpoint sensor for developer workstations (Windows/macOS, private preview) that inventories packages, IDE extensions, AI coding agents, and MCP servers, and detects known/emerging supply chain attacks in real time. The post details three real-world campaigns that motivated it: Shai-Hulud (a self-propagating npm worm that ran TruffleHog via postinstall scripts to steal npm tokens and republish itself), the Axios backdoor (a compromised maintainer account injecting C2-calling code executed within 1.1 seconds of npm install), and s1ngularity (a compromised Nx build system/VS Code extension that harvested GitHub/npm/SSH/cloud credentials and weaponized local AI CLI tools like Claude and Gemini to exfiltrate filesystem data, leaking 1,000+ GitHub tokens and exposing 5,500 private repos).

npmWizNx+3
Shai-Huluds1ngularityAxios npm backdoor

Supply Chain, DevSecOps, AI Security· Added 3 Sep 2026, published 3 Aug 2026

darkreading.comarticle🛡️ Security

AI Security Briefing

Dark Reading reports on "PromptFiction", a Claude Desktop flaw found by Oasis Security where a crafted claude:// custom URI link opens the app and auto-submits an attacker-authored prompt with no Send step or user review. Padding the prompt exploits message folding to hide the malicious instructions. Chained with the earlier "Claudy Day" flaws, it could allow silent exfiltration of conversation history and, with Anthropic's Filesystem Server installed, local file access, persistence and RCE. Fixed in Claude Desktop 1.1.2321; the article closes with agent governance advice such as an inspection/policy layer and an inventory of agents and MCP servers.

Claude DesktopClaudeAnthropic+1
PromptFictionClaudy DayOasis Security+3

AI Security· Published and added 18 Jul 2026

snyk.ioarticle🛡️ Security

What nearly 10,000 developer environments reveal about agentic development risk

Snyk Research scanned nearly 10,000 developer environments and found 43% run two or more AI coding tools, 50.8% have at least one MCP server installed (with 1 in 7 of those having a security finding, 1 in 12 high or critical), and 22.8% have agent skills installed. The analysis identified 392 confirmed prompt injection findings embedded in tool descriptions and 98 confirmed malicious code patterns in agent skill files, and cites the separate ToxicSkills study of 3,984 public skills from ClawHub and skills.sh where 13.4% had a critical security issue. The piece frames MCP servers and agent skills as a new, largely ungoverned software supply chain layer sitting outside traditional SAST/SCA/CI-CD controls.

Model Context ProtocolClaudeCursor+3
ToxicSkillsClawHubskills.sh

AI Security· Added 3 Sep 2026, published 23 Jun 2026

orca.securityarticle🛡️ Security

Orca Security: Securing Shadow AI: How to Detect Unapproved LLMs in Your Cloud

Orca Security outlines a detection framework for "shadow AI" — unsanctioned LLM usage via IDE extensions (Cursor), MCP servers, and embedded SaaS/CI-CD AI features that bypass traditional CASB/DLP tools because they ride on already-trusted OAuth tokens and API calls. The framework has three steps: mapping non-human identities and OAuth scope sprawl, auditing CI/CD pipelines and SaaS platforms for embedded AI (checklist includes scanning .env files, package manifests, GitHub Actions/GitLab CI/Jenkins steps, and outbound traffic to LLM endpoints), and assessing each tool by data exposure vs. write/action authority. It closes by promoting Orca's agentless AI-SPM capability for correlating identity, data, and workload context to surface these risks.

OAuthHugging FaceOrca Security+2

AI Security, Identity & Access· Published and added 1 Jun 2026

aikido.devarticle🛡️ Security

What MDM can't protect on developer machines (and what to do about it)

Aikido Security argues that MDM (Jamf, Kandji, Intune) and EDR (CrowdStrike, SentinelOne) operate at the OS/application layer and are blind to the modern developer attack surface: npm/pip package installs with postinstall hooks, VS Code/IDE extensions, browser extensions, and MCP servers used by AI coding tools. It walks through the Nx Console extension compromise that exposed 3,800 GitHub repos, the Cyberhaven and Vercel/Context.ai OAuth-token browser-extension chain, the Mini Shai-Hulud npm worm, and the postmark-mcp malicious MCP server as evidence, then recommends a 48-hour minimum package age, disabling postinstall scripts by default, auditing extensions, and monitoring AI tool installs (pitching Aikido Device Protection/Safe Chain as the fix).

npmVS CodeModel Context Protocol+3
Mini Shai-HuludNx ConsoleAxios+4

Supply Chain, DevSecOps, AI Security· Added 3 Sep 2026, published 28 May 2026