Hades
Named by 9 kept items in this workspace.
7 items name it under threat actors and 2 under classification.key entities.
Search every workspace for Hades. It matches the name as written, so it can find other things that share it.
The items that name it 9
Active credential-stealing campaign embedding fake prompt-injection headers to fool AI-assisted review tools into marking code as benign
PyPI-based variant campaign that followed days after Miasma.
June 2026; evolution of Miasma that added a GitHub Actions secret exfiltration cash-out step. Commits a workflow named 'Run Copilot' (disguised as e.g. .github/workflows/codeql.yml) that dumps repository secrets via toJSON(secrets) into a file, uploads it as an artifact named 'format-results', then
Supply-chain payload documented by Socket whose stealer opens with a fake prompt-injection header to pollute AI-assisted analysis
PyPI branch/campaign of the same threat actor as Miasma; executes on import via an obfuscated one-line hook embedded in a package's __init__.py; downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a JavaScript payload; reads secrets directly from process memory without writing to disk; ships AI prompt-injec
Related campaign; earlier malicious PyPI wheels used fake prompt-injection headers at the beginning of _index.js payloads to pollute AI-assisted review before the scanner reached the obfuscated Hades payload.
Malware/payload family; JavaScript stealer staged through Bun, targets developer credentials and secrets; branch of the Shai-Hulud and Miasma activity
All threat actors in this workspace.