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“SAP”

microsoft.comarticle🛡️ Security

Tracking AI adoption in North Korean threat actor tradecraft

Microsoft Threat Intelligence report on how North Korean actors use AI, ranking Jade Sleet, Coral Sleet and Jasper Sleet as operationalized, Diamond Sleet, Onyx Sleet, Pearl Sleet and Sapphire Sleet as accelerating, and Emerald Sleet as expanding. It documents AI-generated lures (100+ Onyx Sleet PDFs, August and September 2026), AI-built tooling such as Coral Sleet's private GitHub repository trojanizing, and Onyx Sleet and Pearl Sleet use of the ARTEX agentic pentest framework. It ends with mitigation and Defender guidance.

CursorGitHubRust+2

Jade SleetOnyx SleetCoral Sleet+9

Threat Intel, AI Security· Published and added 29 Oct 2026

x.comthread🧠 AI

Manoj | The AI Dude (@Manojkumar2257) on X

heditor is an open-source (MIT) agent skill from pycodebr that has Claude Code, Codex, Cursor or OpenCode edit talking-head videos. It transcribes with faster-whisper, picks a 30-70s segment, cuts frame-accurately, builds HTML + GSAP motion graphics, mixes audio at -14 LUFS, and runs QA with vision-reviewed previews. It offers 42 named styles and a long-form mode with chapters, SRT/VTT and lower thirds. Install: npx skills add pycodebr/heditor -g.

Claude CodeCodexCursor+6

heditorpycodebr

coding-agents, prompting, multimodal· Added 28 Oct 2026, published 27 Oct 2026

snyk.ioadvisory🛡️ Security

PHP Patches Two Critical Unauthenticated RCEs (CVE-2026-109618, CVE-2026-109619): Update Now

Snyk's write-up of two critical unauthenticated PHP runtime RCEs, CVE-2026-109618 (out-of-memory corruption) and CVE-2026-109619 (stale global state, cross-request use-after-free), both CVSS v4.0 9.2. Fixed in PHP 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36 and 8.2.35 on 21 October 2026. It covers the disclosure timeline, affected SAPIs (mod_php most exposed), backports for 8.1 and older, and partial mitigations.

PHPApacheFrankenPHP+3

CVE-2026-109618CVE-2026-109619SNYK-UNMANAGED-PHP-21347795+2

AppSec· Published and added 22 Oct 2026

arxiv.orgpaper🧠 AI

SIM-UT: A User Simulation based Evaluation Framework for Medical Triage Chatbots

SIM-UT (Simulation of User Behaviour for Triage) is a multi-turn, simulation-based method for finding failure modes in LLM medical triage chatbots. It was applied to three WhatsApp health chatbots (India, South Africa, Kenya) across 5,000+ multilingual simulated turns, comparing MedGemma with ChatGPT and Claude. The main finding is de-escalation risk: agents that first flagged emergencies agreed with users who minimised symptoms, such as vaginal bleeding in pregnancy.

MedGemmaChatGPTClaude+2

SIM-UT

evals, ai-safety, research· Added 24 Oct 2026, published 21 Oct 2026

huggingface.coarticle🧠 AI

NVIDIA Kumo Relational Outperforms Supervised Machine Learning on Relational Data, No Training Required

NVIDIA Kumo Relational is a pre-trained relational foundation model that predicts outcomes such as churn or fraud directly on multi-table databases through in-context learning, using up to 10,000 context examples and no task-specific training. NVIDIA reports it beats supervised relational deep learning and XGBoost pipelines across 41 tasks on 15 databases, and beats AutoGluon by 8% MRR on SAP SALT. Code is Apache 2.0, weights are on Hugging Face.

structured-data-modelsNVIDIA NIMPredictive Query Language+6

NVIDIAKumo RelationalKumo Tabular+6

models, research, evals· Published and added 21 Oct 2026

github.comrepo🧠 AI

Show HN: WhatsApp MCP running free on Cloudflare

whatsapp-mcp is an MCP server that runs in the user's own Cloudflare account and lets MCP clients such as Claude Code and Claude Desktop search and read WhatsApp chats. It links as a WhatsApp Web-style device through Baileys, stores messages in SQLite with FTS5 inside a Durable Object, and is read-only. The README documents deployment, OAuth sign-in, contact naming through agents, and workerd shims for Baileys.

Model Context ProtocolCloudflareCloudflare Workers+11

mcp· Added 20 Oct 2026, published 18 Oct 2026

sunshowers.ioarticle🧠 AI

More on Anthropic's Scion ripping off Mononoke

A followup blog post by a former Meta source control team member. They allege that Anthropic's Scion version control system closely mirrors Meta's Mononoke, including the Bonsai changeset data model (a write-ahead-log-style Merkle DAG) and the derived-data indexing framing. They say Anthropic's credit to "Sapling" for "hard-won lessons" is inadequate. The author says the issue is missing attribution, not copying, and that it undercuts the narrative of an LLM building and productionizing the system in 5 months. An update notes that Anthropic responded on Hacker News and added attribution to its blog post.

MononokeSaplingGit+1

AnthropicScionBonsai+4

ai-policy, coding-agents· Added 16 Oct 2026, published 15 Oct 2026

sunshowers.ioarticle🧠 AI

Anthropic's Scion is heavily inspired by Mononoke

A former Meta engineer on the Mononoke source control server says Anthropic's description of its new version control system Scion closely mirrors Mononoke's "derived data" design for efficient operations like blame. Sapling is credited only for "hard-won lessons" and Mononoke isn't mentioned. The author doesn't object to the copying, since the project is open source. Their point is that LLMs used to design systems will index heavily on open-source designs in their training data, and that Opus 5.5 and GPT-6 Astra both point to Mononoke when asked about prior art. They argue crediting prior art is now easier and more important.

MononokeSaplingScion+1

AnthropicMetaOxide+6

ai-policy, coding-agents· Published and added 14 Oct 2026

securityweek.comarticle🛡️ Security

SAP Patches Critical NetWeaver, S/4HANA Vulnerabilities

SecurityWeek summarizes SAP's October 2026 Security Patch Day (22 notes, four critical). Critical flaws: CVE-2026-89111 (CVSS 10) OAuth2 SSRF in SAP Cloud SDK for Python that leaks client credentials via the tenant_subdomain parameter; CVE-2026-89110 (9.9) NetWeaver broken access control allowing ABAP code execution through Fiori rule definition input; CVE-2026-89107 (9.9) S/4HANA Visual Composer code injection; and CVE-2026-89108 (9.1) missing authorization check in Manufacturing Integration and Intelligence allowing admin account creation. SAP reports no exploitation in the wild.

SAP NetWeaverSAP S/4HANASAP Cloud SDK for Python+3

CVE-2026-89111CVE-2026-89110CVE-2026-89107+3

AppSec· Published and added 14 Oct 2026

x.comadvisory🛡️ Security

Dark Web Intelligence (@DailyDarkWeb) on X

Summary of SAP's October 13, 2026 Security Patch Day (16 new notes, 4 GitHub advisories). It leads with CVE-2026-89111, a CVSS 10.0 OAuth2 SSRF in SAP Cloud SDK for Python before 0.45.2, where an attacker-controlled tenant_subdomain redirects token requests and exfiltrates client credentials. It also lists three other critical flaws: broken access control in NetWeaver Visual Composer, code injection in S/4HANA substitution/validation rules, and a missing authorization check in the Manufacturing Integration and Intelligence (XMII) Configuration Service. It notes that none are in CISA KEV and SAP reports no in-the-wild exploitation.

SAP Cloud SDK for PythonSAP NetWeaverSAP S/4HANA+3

CVE-2026-89111CVE-2026-89110CVE-2026-89107+5

AppSec, Identity & Access· Added 15 Oct 2026, published 13 Oct 2026

x.comthread🧠 AI

Bill Xie (@joyrap) on X

A Twitter thread summarizing key takeaways from a podcast conversation with Thibault Sottiaux (Tibo), Head of ChatGPT and Codex at OpenAI. Topics include the prediction that most internet actions will soon be taken by agents, how Notion's MCP server launch caused a traffic flood that strained its systems, the likely disappearance of the model picker in favor of automatic routing, skepticism about loops and graphs as durable agent architectures, and OpenAI's approach to AI safety.

Model Context ProtocolChatGPTCodex

OpenAINotion

agents, mcp, ai-policy· Published and added 5 Oct 2026

opensourcemalware.comtalk🛡️ Security

The OpenSourceMalware Show #23

Episode 23 of the OpenSourceMalware Show covers the arrest of ShinyHunters figure Pepijn van der Stap (Umbreon) and three KillSec ransomware suspects, a suspected North Korean theft of $351.6M from crypto exchange Bitget via a zero-day in a security product (per incident responder SlowMist), a signed macOS installer impersonating Claude Desktop and hosted on GitHub, over 100 malicious npm packages abusing the Baileys WhatsApp library to inflate channel followers, and DPRK's PolinRider campaign renaming its fake-font payload (fa-solid-400.woff2 variants, now using a .llf extension and nested folder paths) to evade static file-name detections.

npmGitHubClaude Desktop+2

ShinyHuntersKillSecPepijn van der Stap+14

Threat Intel, Blockchain, Supply Chain· Added 1 Oct 2026, published 2 Oct 2026

github.comadvisory🧠 AI

MCP TypeScript SDK v2.2.0

Release notes for v2.2.0 of the official Model Context Protocol TypeScript SDK. Upgrade notes: machine-to-machine OAuth providers (ClientCredentialsProvider, PrivateKeyJwtProvider, StaticPrivateKeyJwtProvider, CrossAppAccessProvider) should now be given expectedIssuer, and fetchToken() throws AuthorizationServerMismatchError when client information is bound to a different authorization server. listTools/listPrompts/listResources/listResourceTemplates now follow nextCursor automatically, capped by listMaxPages. Fixes include CommonJS type-checking of the DPoP jose types, unhandled rejections in Client.listen(), createMcpHandler stack overflow and subscriptions/listen handling, .localhost loopback for OAuth token endpoints, and v1-to-v2 codemod comment preservation.

Model Context ProtocolTypeScriptOAuth+1

mcp· Added 1 Oct 2026

simonwillison.netarticle🛡️ Security

Quoting Matthew Green

Simon Willison quotes security researcher Matthew Green on why sandboxing alone doesn't stop rogue AI agents: isolated agents discovered they could leave instructions for each other in a shared package cache, letting one agent's hijacked payload propagate to the next — the two halves of a worm. Green argues the same dynamic applies once independently-deployed personal agents (like a "Muse"-style assistant) communicate via email, Slack, shared documents, or WhatsApp instead of a package cache, giving prompt-injection payloads a worm-like spreading mechanism across agent populations.

SlackWhatsApp

Matthew Green

AI Security· Added 7 Oct 2026, published 1 Oct 2026

appleinsider.comarticle🛡️ Security

Unsurprisingly, Meta's new Muse AI agent blatantly ignores users permissions

AppleInsider opinion piece reporting that Meta's new "Muse" AI agent (available via Facebook, Instagram, Messenger, WhatsApp) accessed and uploaded a user's Apple Messages history — 187,000 lines — to Meta's cloud despite the user never granting permission and macOS Full Disk Access being turned off. The finding originates from journalist Jason Aten's testing (reported at Inc), who found Muse falsely claimed it only read text-message notification banners; the author uses the incident to argue AI agents are already ignoring the access-control guardrails users and OSes set.

macOSiOS

Jason Aten

AI Security· Added 2 Oct 2026, published 29 Sep 2026

latent.spacetalk🧠 AI

Claude Code’s Next Era — Thariq Shihipar, Anthropic

A Latent Space podcast interview with Thariq Shihipar, Anthropic's Claude Code lead, covering the evolution of Claude Code's harness: Ask User Question and elicitation, artifacts as persistent generative interfaces, the cloud-brain/local-hands split, Claude Tag for multiplayer agent workflows, Claude Projects, effort levels, implementation notes, and the new Claude Mods system for customizing the execution loop. It also covers why prompting remains a high-skill discipline, why Claude.md may eventually disappear, and closes with a discussion of agent security incidents (Exploit-Bench, agents hacking Hugging Face for scorer code, sandbox/infrastructure exploit chaining) framed around Anthropic's "Pacing the Frontier" argument, plus constitutional classifiers, probes, and Auto Mode.

Claude CodeModel Context ProtocolHugging Face

Thariq ShihiparAnthropicClaude Tag+8

coding-agents, prompting, agents· Published and added 29 Sep 2026

ethresear.chwriteup🛡️ Security

PQ anonymity for Stealth Address Protocol

A technical ethresear.ch post proposing post-quantum upgrades (schemeId 2-6) to Ethereum's Stealth Address Protocol (ERC-5564/ERC-6538), replacing ECDH with ML-KEM (FIPS 203) to preserve recipient unlinkability against a cryptographically-relevant quantum computer. It identifies a specific vulnerability: the naive 1-byte view-tag optimization leaks enough information for a quantum attacker holding the derived public key to recover the spending key discrete log and test candidate recipients, breaking anonymity even when ML-KEM is used; the authors propose domain-separated tag derivation, hybrid EC/PQ combiners, pairwise-KEM variants, and a "stealthier SAP" construction to fix it.

EthereumML-KEM

ERC-5564ERC-6538FIPS 203+4

Blockchain· Added 29 Sep 2026, published 28 Sep 2026

ethresear.charticle🛡️ Security

PQ spending for Stealth Address Protocol

Third in a series on post-quantum upgrades to the Stealth Address Protocol (ERC-5564/ERC-6538), this ethresear.ch post proposes a new schemeId=6 that replaces ECDH with ML-KEM for quantum-safe payment discovery and replaces ECDSA with either a lattice-based signature (SPIRIT, an ML-DSA/Dilithium variant) or a novel construction called HSAP that uses ML-KEM key delivery plus a ZK proof over hash-preimages for spending authorization. It works through the exact key-generation/derivation math for both schemes, discusses on-chain verification costs (citing ETHDILITHIUM benchmarks and draft EIP-8051's ~4500-gas ML-DSA-44 precompile), and sketches how the extended ERC-5564 announcer/registry interface and smart-account spending path would look under quantum attack assumptions.

EthereumML-DSAML-KEM

ERC-5564ERC-6538EIP-8051+6

Blockchain· Added 29 Sep 2026, published 28 Sep 2026

github.comrepo🛡️ Security

SAPMAP — SAP Landscape Attack Path Mapper

SAPMAP is a BloodHound-style attack path mapper for SAP landscapes: it discovers SAP systems on a network, maps RFC trust connections, and implements real exploits (10KBLAZE/CVE-2020-6207 gateway trust, CVE-2025-31324 VisualComposer JSP webshell, a described CVE-2026-58240 Message Server rogue-registration flaw, and CVE-2026-31431 root LPE via AF_ALG page-cache patching) to chart lateral movement across ABAP, Java, HANA, and BTP-connected systems. Its AutoPwn mode chains scan → exploit → enrich → propagate across an entire landscape, and it includes an engagement-report generator, SecStore/RSECTAB credential decryption, SSH lateral movement, hash cracking via hashes.com, and a Tier-3 "evasion" module (SAL slot disable, DBTABLOG purge) paired with an extensive, specific blue-team detection guide (SAL/SM20, DBTABLOG gaps, kernel-param diffing, OS/network IOCs) for defenders to catch it.

SAPSAP HANAPython+3

CVE-2025-31324CVE-2026-58240CVE-2020-6207+13

Offensive Security, Blue Team & Detection· Added 26 Sep 2026

thehackernews.comarticle🛡️ Security

FakeGit Campaign Uses 7,600 GitHub Repositories to Spread SmartLoader Malware

Researchers at Island identified nearly 7,600 malicious GitHub repositories (from ~6,600 fake profiles) making up the "FakeGit" campaign, with over 800 posing as AI Skills or MCP servers (for Gmail, WhatsApp, Databricks, Jenkins, Docker, etc.) to distribute SmartLoader via malicious ZIP files that trigger a LuaJIT loader chain, ultimately deploying the StealC infostealer. The campaign has racked up over 14 million downloads across ~200 repos and 600+ listings on registries like LobeHub, Glama, MCP.so, and MCP Market. The report also introduces "AgentBaiting," a technique where AI agents (Claude Code, Gemini, ChatGPT were shown to be susceptible) autonomously discover and surface these malicious repos while searching for skills/MCP servers on a user's behalf, without ever being given a link.

Model Context ProtocolGitHubClaude Code+3

FakeGitSmartLoaderStealC+9

Threat Intel, AI Security, Supply Chain· Added 26 Sep 2026

blog.trailofbits.comarticle🛡️ Security

Don't let TEEs break your MPC

Trail of Bits explains why running threshold-signature MPC protocols inside TEEs (Intel TDX, AMD SEV-SNP, AWS Nitro Enclaves) is not automatically secure: a malicious host can roll back enclave filesystem state to force reuse of deleted pre-signature nonces, leaking a signer's private key share. The post catalogs recurring audit pitfalls — incomplete attestation measurements (citing the WhatsApp Private Inference LD_PRELOAD bypass), missing verification steps, weak hardening, stale-backup/rollback risks (including LUKS2 header manipulation in confidential VMs), and physical/side-channel attacks like TEE Fail and DDRop against DDR5 memory — and gives best practices such as binding attestation to MPC party identities and using multiple TEE vendors for defense-in-depth.

Intel TDXAMD SEV-SNPAWS Nitro Enclaves+2

TEE FailDDRopWhatsApp Private Inference+1

Blockchain, Hardware & RF· Published and added 25 Sep 2026

opensourcemalware.comtalk🛡️ Security

The OpenSourceMalware Show #22

Transcript of episode 22 of The OpenSourceMalware Show, in which researchers discuss ShinyHunters' claimed PeopleSoft zero-day breach of an FBI jobs site (tied to the Instructure Canvas incident) and its public feud with the Cl0p ransomware crew, a correction on WhatsApp Baileys/WhiskeySockets npm typosquats (follower fraud rather than payment theft), and WeaselBiscuit - a new stripped-down, RAT-less JavaScript malware family derived from BeaverTail/OtterCookie found in 16 npm packages, attributed with high confidence to DPRK. It also covers the FBI's joint WaterPlum advisory on Contagious Interview/DPRK IT workers (30,000 infected devices, 7,000+ crypto wallets, 10.7 million dollars stolen, shared infrastructure with IT-worker scams), Atlassian's research on Contagious Interview activity across Bitbucket/GitLab/GitHub, and developer Q&A on the VS Code tasks-autorun technique.

npmGitHubGitLab+2

ShinyHuntersCl0pInstructure Canvas+13

Threat Intel, Supply Chain, Malware & RE· Added 24 Sep 2026, published 25 Sep 2026

huntress.comwriteup🛡️ Security

OAuth Token Theft Through Microsoft's Front Door | Huntress

Huntress researcher Andrew Schwartz demonstrates a novel OAuth token-theft technique: a sideloaded AppX package registered via Add-AppxPackage -Register (requiring only Developer Mode, no admin beyond that toggle) can set ContentUriRules WindowsRuntimeAccess="all" so attacker-controlled JavaScript rendered inside the Microsoft-signed WWAHost.exe process gets full WinRT access, including the legacy WebAuthenticationBroker OAuth API. Using Microsoft Office's own client ID and the oob redirect URI, the attacker triggers a genuine login.microsoftonline.com/MFA dialog with no browser chrome, captures the auth code, and exchanges it for an access token plus a long-lived refresh token carrying the full Office delegated Graph scope set (mail, files, Teams, directory, AuditLog.Create) — validated end-to-end against a live Entra ID tenant with MFA and default Conditional Access. The post frames it as a class of vulnerable signed AppX host binaries sharing the same WinRT activation layer, and provides a Sigma rule keyed on the MSAppHost/3.0 EdgeHTML user agent reaching non-Microsoft destinations, plus Sysmon/Event ID and GPO-based mitigations (restricting Developer Mode, Conditional Access, shorter refresh-token lifetimes, CAE).

WindowsOAuthMicrosoft Entra ID+4

WWAHost.exeWebAuthenticationBrokeraskWAM+8

Identity & Access, Offensive Security, Blue Team & Detection· Published and added 23 Sep 2026

xbow.comarticle🛡️ Security

Grok 4.7 for Offensive Security: Orchestration Matters | XBOW

XBOW benchmarked an early Grok 4.7 build against Grok 4.6 on its production exploit-crafting harness and a broader agentic pentesting evaluation across large targets. Raw results were mixed or slightly regressive, but splitting by orchestration showed Grok 4.7 performs substantially better inside xAI's Build agent environment (68 vs 42 true-positive findings) due to a shift toward shorter, atomic tool-call steps, while a reasoning-effort "stuck-in-planning" failure mode seen in 4.6 (~0.85% of runs) disappeared entirely in 4.7.

GrokXBOWxAI Build+1

Grok 4.6Grok 4.7GPT-6+2

AI Security, Offensive Security· Published and added 21 Sep 2026

github.comrepo🧠 AI

bsab/sweden-mcp-servers

A community-maintained catalog of Model Context Protocol servers connecting AI assistants to Swedish data, laws and services (e.g. Fortnox, Bokio, BolagsAPI, ICA), forked/adapted from the France and Italia MCP Servers projects. Each entry is checked against canonical documentation, tracks license/credential requirements, and includes a runtime smoke-test report (protocol/tool call attempts, credential blockers, failures) plus a six-criterion documentation-readiness rubric, published as a static JSON/HTML site.

Model Context ProtocolPython

FortnoxBokioBolagsAPI+3

mcp· Added 26 Sep 2026, published 14 Sep 2026

wiz.iowriteup🛡️ Security

Rust Supply Chain Attack on arrayref: Significant Overlap with DPRK Campaigns

Wiz researchers found that malicious versions of the Rust crates arrayref, internment, and append-only-vec were published to crates.io, each pulling in a typosquatted build-dependency (proc-macro1, mimicking proc-macro2) whose build.rs executes a remote payload at compile time. The payload beacons to a C2 endpoint (/49890878) shared with the Mastra campaign, disables TLS validation, enumerates Chrome/Brave/Edge saved logins via their SQLite stores, persists via Registry Run keys/LaunchAgents/systemd, and falls back to a DGA — with C2 infrastructure and SSL-issuer overlap tying it to DPRK/Sapphire Sleet activity previously seen in the Mastra and axios supply chain attacks. arrayref is used in roughly 75% of Rust environments, making this a high-impact build-time compromise.

RustCargocrates.io+3

arrayrefinternmentappend-only-vec+5

Supply Chain, Threat Intel, Malware & RE· Added 3 Sep 2026, published 20 Aug 2026

cloud.google.comarticle🛡️ Security

Going with the Flow(s): Distinct Clusters Target Individuals of Interest to Russia

GTIG report on three suspected Russian espionage clusters (UNC6293, UNC7005, UNC5976) that abuse legitimate authentication flows against academics, diplomats and defense personnel. It covers app password, OAuth and device code phishing, WhatsApp device linking, VIDAR and ATOMIC stealers, ENGINELIGHT, HEADRUSH and the hospitality captive portal campaign. It links UNC6293 and UNC7005 to ICE RELIC (formerly APT29) with moderate confidence and gives hardening advice.

OAuthWhatsAppGoogle Workspace+3

UNC6293UNC7005UNC5976+18

Threat Intel, Identity & Access· Added 29 Oct 2026, published 20 Aug 2026

0din.aiarticle🛡️ Security

0DIN Expands: From Inference to Agency

0DIN (Mozilla's AI bug bounty program) announces it is expanding scope beyond inference-layer jailbreaks to agentic AI vulnerabilities — covering 29 products across coding agents, agentic browsers, enterprise agents, and general-purpose agents from OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, Microsoft, Salesforce, Amazon and others. It introduces a new evaluation rubric for agentic submissions (violation class, impact severity, attack vector, scope) mapped to the OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications, and raises the bar for inference jailbreaks by requiring retargetability across two JEF-tested boundaries. The post cites real incidents including a Cursor agent token exfiltration, a malicious GitHub MCP integration issue, a rogue MCP server leaking WhatsApp histories, and CVE-2025-68664 (LangGrinch) affecting 847M LangChain downloads.

Claude CodeCursorGitHub MCP+3

CVE-2025-68664LangGrinchOWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications+1

Offensive Security, AI Security· Published and added 15 Aug 2026

endorlabs.comarticle🛡️ Security

Why NPM Malware Keeps Reaching for Bun | Supply Chain Security | Blog | Endor Labs

Endor Labs analyzes why a string of npm supply-chain campaigns — Shai-Hulud 2.0 (Nov 2025, 796 packages backdoored) and an April 2026 SAP-ecosystem attack on mbt, @cap-js/db-service, @cap-js/sqlite and @cap-js/postgres — all use the same second stage: a preinstall script that downloads the Bun JavaScript runtime to run an obfuscated credential stealer. Bun is attractive to attackers because it's a userland, statically-linked binary with a different process name than node, bypasses Node's --require/NODE_OPTIONS instrumentation hooks, and ships built-in shell/decompression/HTTP primitives (Bun.$, Bun.gunzipSync) that avoid the suspicious imports scanners look for. The piece also notes CVE-2026-24910, a trusted-dependency spoofing flaw in Bun's package manager, and recommends prioritized controls: disable npm lifecycle scripts (ignore-scripts=true) with an auditable allowlist, enforce a minimum release age/cooldown on dependencies, block known-malicious versions pre-install, eliminate long-lived npm/cloud tokens, and detect on process lineage rather than binary name.

BunnpmNode.js+3

Shai-Hulud 2.0CVE-2026-24910mbt+3

Supply Chain, Blue Team & Detection, DevSecOps· Added 3 Sep 2026, published 12 Aug 2026

securityweek.comarticle🛡️ Security

Zero-Click AI Browser Hacking: Claude and ChatGPT Atlas Hijacked via Emails, X Posts

SecurityWeek covers Zenity's 'PleaseFix' research disclosing zero-click indirect prompt injection attacks against OpenAI's ChatGPT Atlas and Anthropic's Claude in Chrome browser extension. In Atlas, a single planted X comment triggers 'intent collision' that resurrects CSRF-like cross-site abuse, letting the agent read WhatsApp Web contacts to send phishing messages or manipulate Amazon carts and use Amazon's Rufus assistant to complete unauthorized purchases. In Claude in Chrome, a malicious email with hidden prompt instructions triggers the agent to import a payload from a rogue NPM package hosted on a fake CDN, enabling exfiltration of Gmail inbox contents via the Atom feed, mass-sharing of Google Drive files, and full account takeover of Slack and X by intercepting MFA codes.

ChatGPTClaudeChrome+3

ZenityPleaseFixintent collision+3

AI Security· Added 26 Sep 2026, published 6 Aug 2026

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