95 results for “Injection”

Understanding and Mitigating Role Spoofing in LLMs is an arXiv paper (October 2026) on role spoofing, a prompt injection where malicious tool output impersonates the user. It shows models track "who said what" using both content cues (semantics, style) and structure cues (control tokens, formatting). Attacks combining fake structure and content succeed often, adversarial training stops only content-based attacks, and linear probes trained to predict conversation roles detect spoofing across settings.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 31 Oct 2026, published 29 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

SEAL is a defense against indirect prompt injection for local LLM agents. It learns a soft prompt and scoring readout offline, then uses a frozen task model to score and delete injected tokens from tool outputs, with queries built from trusted initial context. On AgentDojo, attack success falls from 34.6% to 0.1% and Joint rises from 51.4% to 77.5%, using about 127x fewer defense tokens than PISanitizer.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 31 Oct 2026, published 29 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Paper studying whether self-evolution weakens personal agents' robustness to indirect prompt injection (IPI). A two-phase method has the user ask the agent to follow tasks in external content, then tests with a third-party injected task the user did not authorize. Against the non-evolving base agent, attack success rose 14.0 to 48.8 points under skill evolution and 3.0 to 39.3 points under reinforcement learning. Code is released.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 31 Oct 2026, published 29 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Addendum to the GPT-6 Luna system card for the model update of 29 October 2026 (the title says October 28). OpenAI keeps the High rating for cybersecurity and biological/chemical capability under its Preparedness Framework. It reports ExploitBench 46.19% and SEC-Bench Pro 51.75% (GPT-6 Astra: 85.4%), higher multiturn jailbreak defender success than the October 7 version, and GPT-Red prompt-injection results. It also reports weaker factuality and dual-use biology refusal.

deploymentsafety.openai.compaperPublished and added 29 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Log-To-Leak is an arXiv paper (cs.CR, cs.AI) by Yuepeng Hu, Chongyu Fan, Sirat Samyoun and Jian Du on prompt injection attacks against tool-using LLM agents through the Model Context Protocol. The title points to a logging-based data leakage channel. The fetched page holds only the title, authors and arXiv link, with no abstract, so the method and results are not visible here.

x.compaperAdded 29 Oct 2026, published 28 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

LLMON (LLM Object Notation) is a framework that separates instructions from data and requires explicit identifier-based execution. The authors post-train Granite-4.1 3B and 8B base models with SFT then RL on a 4.6B-token structured corpus covering general, RAG and tool-calling data, with distractor variants. Attack success rates on indirect prompt-injection benchmarks fall from 53-100% to 0.02-5.6%, and general capability is preserved. Attention-based metrics diagnose failures per transformer layer.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 30 Oct 2026, published 28 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

LLMON (LLM Object Notation) is a framework that separates executable instructions from passive data and requires explicit identifier-based execution. The paper post-trains Granite-4.1 3B and 8B base models on a 4.6B-token corpus of general, RAG and tool-calling data with distractor variants, using SFT then RL. Attack success rates on indirect prompt-injection benchmarks fall from 53-100% to 0.02-5.6%, with general capabilities preserved. It also adds attention-based per-layer diagnostics.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 30 Oct 2026, published 28 Oct 2026🧠 AI

Heads of Security (HoS) is a prompt injection defense that enforces instruction-data separation with learned per-head attention gates, redistributing attention between trusted and untrusted tokens. Evaluated on Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct and GPT-OSS-20B against SecAlign++ and ASIDE. The black-box RL-Hammer attack reaches 97% ASR on GPT-OSS-20B and 85% on SecAlign but 10% on HoS. The white-box Claudini attack needs 3 times more FLOPs on HoS. HoS keeps base-model utility in few-shot settings, where SecAlign and ASIDE degrade.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 28 Oct 2026, published 27 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Heads of Security (HoS) is a prompt injection defense that trains a small set of per-head attention gates to shift attention between trusted and untrusted tokens, separating instructions from data. Tested on Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct and GPT-OSS-20B, the black-box RL-Hammer attack reaches 10% ASR on HoS versus 97% on base GPT-OSS-20B and 85% on SecAlign. HoS keeps base utility in few-shot settings, where SecAlign and ASIDE degrade.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 28 Oct 2026, published 27 Oct 2026🧠 AI

What Victims Take Away is an October 2026 arXiv paper analysing 563,349 Tensor Trust attack records to see how players reuse prompt injections they received. Within a week, targets reused 10.0% of attacks that broke their defense, versus 0.03% of matched attacks. Breaches were followed by defense changes that cut same-family attack success by 24.5 points. Received texts made up 23.2% of successful hijacks. The authors propose that AI security tools describe techniques without disclosing full attack text.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 28 Oct 2026, published 27 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Log-To-Leak is a prompt-injection attack on tool-using LLM agents that abuses Model Context Protocol tool metadata to trigger an attacker-controlled logging call after the last legitimate call, leaking the user query, server name, server response and agent response. Evaluated on five MCP servers and four agents, it reaches 62.64-100% attack success with 76.55-95.64% logging accuracy. Three defenses leave over 55% residual ASR on GitHub MCP with GPT-4o.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 28 Oct 2026, published 26 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

An empirical study of security concerns in the OpenClaw AI personal assistant framework, using 25K+ posts from 13 subreddits (162 security-relevant) and 358 security-tagged GitHub issues (180 retained). It maps 521 CWE instances across 59 weakness types, concentrated in access control, sensitive-data exposure, injection and unsafe execution. It extracts 543 practitioner mitigations into seven strategies and reconstructs a sensitive-data exposure path with dummy secrets.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 28 Oct 2026, published 26 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Scope-Gap Injection (SGI) is an indirect prompt injection method for multi-stage LLM-agent safety pipelines, tested in the IJCAI 2026 OpenClaw Agent Security Attack Competition. The visible task and skill stay benign while target identifiers, bypass parameters and authorization steps sit in an attachment written as a business worklist, which the S2 LLM judge appears not to inspect. SGI bypassed all three stages (static scan, LLM judge, live audit) for 5 of 19 targets, best F = 0.385. Attachment placement had 78% S2 acceptance versus 23% in-skill. The paper closes with defenses that align evaluator scope with agent channels.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 27 Oct 2026, published 26 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Addendum to the GPT-6 Astra system card for OpenAI's GPT-6.1 Terra, rated Critical in cybersecurity and High in biological and chemical capability under the Preparedness Framework. It reports multiturn jailbreak and prompt-injection results, alignment tests (auto-review circumvention, ExploitGym honeypot, monitor evasion), and cyber scores: 97.10% ExploitBench, 24.5% on the internal recent-vulnerability port, 5 of 22 Sandbox Bench targets.

deploymentsafety.openai.compaperPublished and added 26 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

SentryBench is a benchmark for tool-using LLM agents in public-safety deployments. It scores attack success, over-refusal (missing a real emergency) and over-reaction (unwarranted action) on a cost-sensitive frontier, using real emergency-call transcripts, disaster messages and injection payloads. Across 840 episodes on three frontier models and three defenses, refuse-more caution pushed over-refusal to 100 percent on two models, while a trust-gating wrapper gave the lowest harm.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 27 Oct 2026, published 25 Oct 2026🧠 AI

SentryBench is a benchmark for tool-using LLM agents in public-safety settings (public alerts, responder dispatch, citizen-record queries). It scores attack success, over-refusal and over-reaction on a cost-sensitive frontier, using real emergency-call transcripts and real injection/jailbreak payloads. Across 840 episodes on three frontier models and three defenses, refuse-more caution raised over-refusal to 100 percent on two models, while a trust-gating wrapper gave the lowest harm on every model.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 27 Oct 2026, published 25 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

BARBICAN is a fail-closed prompt-injection gateway for MCP tool mediation. This paper shows its arbitration classifier ran on tokenizer-mangled text for a whole evaluation. Fixing it raised AUC from 0.392 to 0.855 while system recall fell from 80.67% to 80.34%. The routed band is 96.82% malicious, so deletion ablations mislead without substitution experiments and class-balance reporting.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 27 Oct 2026, published 23 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

The paper analyses BARBICAN, a fail-closed prompt-injection gateway for MCP tool mediation, using deletion, substitution, repair and transplant experiments. Its arbitration classifier ran on tokenizer-mangled text for a whole evaluation. Fixing that raised AUC from 0.392 to 0.855 while system recall fell from 80.67% to 80.34%. The band it receives is 96.82% malicious. The authors argue ablation figures need the band's class balance and substitution baselines.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 27 Oct 2026, published 23 Oct 2026🧠 AI

MCP-Injector is a protocol-aware fault-injection middleware for Model Context Protocol tool calls, with permanent, transient and intermittent faults on seedable schedules. Its fault model comes from 57,240 issue and PR threads across 1,774 open-source MCP repositories. In a 1,350-cell experiment, faults cut task-completion score by 60% (8.08 to 3.23 of 10), and the 120B gpt-oss model was no more resilient than the 20B. Agent stacks differed in how well they absorbed faults.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 26 Oct 2026, published 23 Oct 2026🧠 AI

NTBench (Near-Target Benchmark) tests LLM and agent robustness to near-target prompt injection, where injected instructions steer a response toward a plausible but incorrect or harmful outcome instead of abandoning the task. It builds reference-guided target-instruction pairs on existing datasets, with human validation, and evaluates seven LLMs on ten language datasets and two agent benchmarks. Attack success rose 9.3 to 35.8 points (incorrect targets) and 1.7 to 17.3 points (harmful targets) over fixed-target baselines.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 26 Oct 2026, published 23 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Paper on prompt injection delivered through forensic evidence, where the seized device's contents are attacker-controlled and the examiner must read them. It extends the anti-forensic model to cover manipulation of the reasoning layer and gives a taxonomy (objective, technique, payload location, concealment). Three proof-of-concept attacks on an LLM-assisted analysis pipeline change a reported conclusion, write attacker-chosen content to the analyst workstation, and trigger outbound network traffic. Mitigations are proposed.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 24 Oct 2026, published 21 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

MPIDetector is a detection framework for multi-modal prompt injection that uses few-shot in-context learning so an LLM can reason about the semantic intent of text and image inputs, without fine-tuning. The authors built a benchmark of eight textual and seven visual attack categories plus benign sets. They report up to 90.91% accuracy on text, 99.28% on images, and up to 99.80% detection on 500 obfuscated WebInject web-agent injections, beating baselines.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 24 Oct 2026, published 21 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Paper (arXiv, 21 October 2026) on structural false negatives in LLM vulnerability discovery harnesses. Starting from Knostic's OpenAnt and raptor, then 10 more open-source harnesses, the authors map 13 points where code selection, filtering, and finding storage or merging drop vulnerabilities. One file was dropped by six harnesses before the model saw it, five without notice. It covers attacker evasion, content-steered verdicts, prompt injection, and design principles and tests.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 24 Oct 2026, published 21 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Paper on memory injection, where prompt injection persists across sessions through the long-term memory of LLM-as-a-service platforms. It presents a general threat model and shows all NIST attack goals are achievable on ChatGPT Instant 5.3, Claude Sonnet 4.6 and Gemini 3 Flash. Vectors include personal memories, projects, skills, organization instructions and MCP resources. On Claude, shared memory lets an attacker compromise multiple users in an organization and exfiltrate prompts. Nearly half of the derived mitigations are unimplemented.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 24 Oct 2026, published 20 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

CarryoverBench is a benchmark of 12 personal-assistant scenarios and 101 attack tasks for carryover attacks, where a one-time indirect prompt injection planted in agent memory files or scheduled tasks re-fires in later sessions. Three trigger channels (Instant, Autonomous, Latent) are scored by a rule-based verifier with separate planting and triggering stages. Across five frontier models, payloads re-fire over five rounds without measurable decay. Porting the Latent channel to the Hermes runtime weakens the effect but does not remove it.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 22 Oct 2026, published 20 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

nokast-secureRAG is a roughly 0.5B-parameter small language model that works as a semantic firewall between retrieval and generation in local RAG systems. It classifies each query and context pair as safe, suspicious or malicious. It reaches 0.994 recall at a 0.026 false-positive rate in-distribution, beating Llama Guard 3 1B and Prompt-Guard-86M (0.900 recall, 0.690 FPR). Recall on PoisonedRAG falls to near zero, and single-request latency is 293-404 ms.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 22 Oct 2026, published 20 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Systematic evaluation of fault attacks on ML-DSA (FIPS 204) rejection sampling and of proposed countermeasures. It proves the "third rejection test" of patent WO2025261784A1 re-verifies what check 2 already guarantees, and shows that 30,000 fault injections never detect a skipped z-norm check. The author fully recovers s1 against a third-check-protected implementation under randomized signing. Third check and sign-then-verify are complementary; overhead is 0.04–0.05% on x86-64 and 0.83% on Cortex-M4 for the third check.

eprint.iacr.orgpaperAdded 21 Oct 2026, published 20 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

KNOX is a regulatory sandbox for generative models built by running AI agent workloads inside TEEs. It derives an attested policy manifest (applicable regulations, expected tool calls, permitted system calls) from the user prompt, and an attested reference monitor allows an action only if it matches. Actions and verdicts go into an attested execution graph that regulators can verify. The paper reports detection of prompt-injection deviations and under 1% overhead.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 22 Oct 2026, published 20 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Fake News, Real Crashes is an October 2026 arXiv paper presenting a benchmark for information injection attacks on LLM financial trading agents. It spans five injection vectors, seven event categories and about 10,000 decisions on 15 U.S. stocks. Fabricated news reached 62% attack success versus 14% for prompt injection, and two 30-word templates hit 100%. Only hierarchical aggregation reduced success among the defenses tested.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 21 Oct 2026, published 19 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

SpanGuard is an indirect prompt injection (IPI) guardrail that splits detection into two steps. Lightweight unsupervised segmentation first locates candidate instruction blocks in tool outputs, then a small LLM judges whether each block is authorized by the user's request. The authors report a 0.32% attack success rate with negligible benign utility loss, and the guardrail still works with substantially smaller models.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 21 Oct 2026, published 19 Oct 2026🛡️ Security