57 results for “SBOM”

PRAXO-CORE 2.5.0 is a Go agent kernel that owns model calls, tool authorization, context, checkpoints, events and human-in-the-loop decisions, and leaves graph execution, memory storage and tenant policy to RHEOVELA or the host product. The release adds pkg/conformance, with checks for VFS, memory, sandbox, event, policy, model and tool contracts. It also adds stricter Windows path rejection and a plugin trust/SBOM handoff, and it states which adapters are only offline-tested.

x.comarticleAdded 27 Oct 2026, published 25 Oct 2026🧠 AI

Endor Labs roundup of the 20 to 21 October 2026 patch wave: eMudhra certificate authority keys that anyone can recover, PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618, CVE-2026-109619), Node2Shell (CVE-2026-111497) and malware in LiteLLM 1.107.0. It lists fixed versions (PHP 8.2.35 to 8.5.12, Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1, 26.12.1, LiteLLM back to 1.106.2) and explains why many separate trust-store copies each need updating. It closes with advice on triage, remediation and SBOM/VEX reporting.

endorlabs.comarticlePublished and added 24 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

ENISA Technical Advisory for Software Bill of Materials (October 2026, TLP:CLEAR) is non-mandatory guidance for organisations, especially SMEs, starting SBOM adoption. It covers SBOM data models (CycloneDX, SPDX), a mapping of BSI TR-03183-2 fields to CISA minimum elements, lifecycle and CI/CD integration, an SBOM threat model, and security recommendations. It supports Cyber Resilience Act obligations but is not a legal interpretation.

enisa.europa.euadvisoryAdded 23 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

ENISA Technical Advisory for Software Bill of Materials is practical guidance on SBOM adoption for organizations, especially micro, small and medium enterprises and open-source stewards. It sets out an SBOM implementation architecture and data flows across a defined lifecycle, an indicative SBOM threat model with targeted risks, and measures for the SBOM ecosystem. It aligns with the ENISA Secure by Design and Default Playbook and supports Cyber Resilience Act compliance.

enisa.europa.euadvisoryAdded 23 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Aikido's guide to software supply chain security controls for 2026, tied to real incidents. It covers a 48-hour package cooldown, ignore-scripts, lockfile enforcement, SHA and digest pinning, scoped tokens, FIDO2, developer endpoint protection, extension allowlists, agent sandboxing, MCP server vetting, slopsquatting, signed SBOMs and rotation drills. Examples include the March 2026 axios compromise and the March 2025 tj-actions/changed-files attack.

aikido.devarticleAdded 22 Oct 2026, published 21 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

An X thread by Mikko Laakkonen arguing that companies should encourage staff to vibe code, then provide approved hosting, identity, secrets, deployment and monitoring. It lists 200 application checks in 17 sections, from ownership and data flow through keys, authz, coding-agent isolation, appsec, SBOM and releases to recovery, runtime AI and handover. It adds 16 EU bonus checks on GDPR, NIS2, the Cyber Resilience Act (reporting from 11 Sept 2026, main duties 11 Dec 2027), the AI Act and the Data Act. It builds on Mark Ajzenstadt's production-readiness post and links a 300-check worksheet version.

x.comthreadAdded 18 Oct 2026, published 17 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Explains why traditional SCA tools are inaccurate: they parse package-manager manifests and assume those match what the code actually uses. It walks through phantom dependencies, misused dependency scopes, direct use of transitive dependencies and unused dependencies, using Python and JavaScript as examples. It argues for SCA based on program analysis, with source code as ground truth cross-checked against manifests and the file system. Useful for evaluating SCA tools and understanding SBOM accuracy limits.

endorlabs.comarticlePublished and added 16 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Case study running three open source SBOM generators (two generic, one Maven plugin) on Eclipse Steady 3.2.5 rest-backend at three lifecycle stages (git clone, Maven package, Docker image), yielding 8 CycloneDX SBOMs. Compares precision/recall against the mvn dependency:tree ground truth and finds the Maven-integrated tool perfect (1.0/1.0) while generic tools miss versions, groupIds and transitive dependencies. It also shows PURL qualifier differences (e.g. type=jar, apt qualifiers) make SBOMs hard to compare, test dependencies are indistinguishable, and argues for an SBOM generator benchmark.

endorlabs.comwriteupPublished and added 16 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

A critique of the state of SBOM adoption, written by a CISSP product manager at Endor Labs. It argues that the NTIA minimum elements and the SPDX and CycloneDX specs don't require a package URL (purl), so name and version alone can't tell a Maven log4j-core from an npm or cargo package of the same name. It also notes that no spec defines build time, which makes transitive dependency resolution unreliable, and that generation tools place the same data in different fields. It adds that vendors have mixed incentives to ship SBOMs and that practices are immature, and it calls on standards bodies to define required data per prioritized use case.

endorlabs.comarticlePublished and added 16 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Explains what applies on 11 December 2027 under the EU Cyber Resilience Act: Annex I Part I and II, Article 13 manufacturer duties, conformity assessment and CE marking. It covers classification by core functionality, the conformity routes per tier, and how "known exploitable vulnerability" is defined, including findings from your own tooling and AI analysis. It also covers the engineering obligations (per-build SBOMs with VEX, CVD policy, security.txt, signed updates, CSAF disclosure), the 10-year retention and support-period rules, and the product-family and legacy-modification reliefs. It closes with a checklist, and the Endor Labs product claims are vendor-sourced.

endorlabs.comarticlePublished and added 14 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Explains what Executive Order 14028 requires for SBOMs. It covers the NTIA Minimum Elements (seven data fields, automation support, practices and processes) and the SPDX, CycloneDX and SWID formats. It also covers who must comply and how OMB M-26-05 (January 2026) rescinded the standardized self-attestation mandate while agencies can still require SBOMs by contract. It then argues an SBOM is only a starting point and recommends adding reachability analysis, EPSS, VEX and safe-upgrade remediation. The last part promotes Endor Labs.

endorlabs.comarticlePublished and added 12 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Part 1 of an AWS series showing how to build a quantum-resistant software supply chain with ML-DSA: ML-DSA keys in AWS KMS, an ML-DSA root/subordinate CA hierarchy in AWS Private CA, and IAM Roles Anywhere trust anchors for external build agents. It covers signing binaries (EXTERNAL_MU with OpenSSL 3.5), container images as OCI referrers via ORAS, and SBOMs wrapped in in-toto Statements bound to the artifact digest, plus verification, admission control, trust-store distribution, revocation and SCP guardrails. It frames the "forge later" threat and maps CNSA 2.0 (ML-DSA-87 only for NSS) and EU CRA deadlines to actions.

aws.amazon.comarticlePublished and added 12 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Vendor-authored guide that defines a software supply chain as developers, code, dependencies, AI models, containers and CI/CD pipelines. It walks through program components: OSS governance, SAST vs reachability-based SCA, AI model security, SBOM/VEX (NTIA minimum elements, SPDX vs CycloneDX), secrets scanning, CI/CD hardening, and signing/attestation with Cosign/Sigstore. It cites figures such as 95% of vulnerabilities sitting in transitive dependencies and only 1% of SBOMs being fully NTIA-conformant. Each section closes with an Endor Labs product pitch, so treat the framing as vendor-flavoured. The fetched text was truncated, so the final attestation/provenance section was not seen.

endorlabs.comarticlePublished and added 12 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Explains how FedRAMP treats false-positive SCA findings, which still have to be tracked in the POA&M and ConMon. It covers the deviation request (DR) process, the SCA problems of scale and missing context (manifest-based inventories, with 88% of imported code unused), and 30–180 day remediation SLAs. It argues that only high-confidence, function-level reachability that holds from any source is likely to satisfy a 3PAO. It then describes how Endor Labs uses call-graph analysis, SBOM/VEX output and rescanning to document false positives.

endorlabs.comarticlePublished and added 12 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

NuGuard is an open-source AI application safety and security toolkit for agentic AI systems, released under Apache 2.0. It unifies AI-SBOM generation, structural static analysis of the AI stack, and sandboxed adversarial red-teaming (100+ scenarios covering prompt injection, tool abuse, and data exfiltration) into a single CLI workflow, with an automated judge that scores findings by impact and provides remediation guidance.

x.comthreadPublished and added 7 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

This IACR ePrint paper presents a Linux runtime cryptographic discovery system built on eBPF user-space probes that detects both classical and post-quantum (ML-KEM) cryptographic operations as they execute, complementing static binary/SBOM analysis with dynamic observation. It uses "randomness anchoring" — correlating observed key-generation/encapsulation randomness with subsequent crypto API calls in the same process — to raise detection confidence without adding false positives, reporting perfect precision/recall on classical and ML-KEM workloads, median detection latency of 28 μs, and 14–18% overhead on key-generation-bound workloads. A nine-application case study (drawn from/paired with QED datasets) compares static vs. runtime views and shows how eBPF probe coverage limits what can be observed, relevant to building a runtime cryptographic bill of materials for PQC migration compliance.

eprint.iacr.orgpaperAdded 8 Oct 2026, published 5 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

A vendor thread from ZeroShieldAI argues the patch window has collapsed because AI models can now find and weaponize vulnerabilities faster than defenders can fix them. It cites ZeroDayBench (success jumping from ~13% on blind zero-days to 78% once patch location is known), Aikido Security's benchmark where DeepSeek V4 Pro found 28 of 32 recent CVEs for about 98 dollars per run, a Unit 42 finding that 92% of AI-discovered flaws are logic bugs fuzzers miss, and a Hugging Face stat that 16 of the top 300 models advertise removed safety guardrails with 16.8M downloads. It promotes an attached 6-page case study and lists five defender recommendations: treat disclosure as exploit day, maintain SBOM/AIBOM, inventory models and agents, gate agent tool calls with policy, and red-team code and AI apps.

x.comthreadPublished and added 1 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

A FOSSA blog post explaining why C/C++ SBOMs built from manifest-parsing alone are incomplete, since the ecosystem lacks a centralized package manager and relies heavily on vendored (copy-pasted) source and code snippets. It covers concrete generation paths: Conan's built-in conan.tools.sbom CycloneDX generator, Yocto/OpenEmbedded's native SPDX output via the create-spdx class, process-based tracking for vendored code (third_party/vendor path flagging, manual audits), and the differing snippet-support capabilities of SPDX versus CycloneDX.

fossa.comarticleAdded 1 Oct 2026, published 29 Sep 2026🛡️ Security

git-pkgs is a Go rewrite of a Ruby tool that adds a git subcommand for tracking dependency changes across a repository's history, indexing manifests/lockfiles from 36+ package managers (npm, RubyGems, Cargo, PyPI, Maven, Composer, Go modules, etc.) into a local SQLite database. Beyond history/blame/diff, it offers supply-chain security commands: `vulns` (OSV-based CVE scanning with SARIF output for GitHub code scanning, plus blame/praise/exposure for remediation metrics), `licenses` (with drift detection and CI-friendly exit codes), `deprecated`, `provenance` (trusted-publishing/attestation checks), `integrity` (lockfile hash drift detection), `maintainers`/`health` (via ecosyste.ms metadata), and `sbom` export in CycloneDX/SPDX. It also supports a dependency-aware `bisect` to find when a vulnerability, license change, or capability (e.g. network access) was introduced, and ships GitHub Actions for CI integration.

github.comrepoAdded 25 Sep 2026🛡️ Security

This arXiv paper proposes a blockchain-anchored agentic AI framework for securing the software development lifecycle: specialized LLM-backed agents handle source integrity, SBOM/dependency analysis, CI configuration auditing, artifact verification, and runtime policy evaluation, each producing a cryptographically signed attestation recorded on a permissioned blockchain via smart contracts (agent registry, immutable attestation log, release-policy module). Agent-to-agent and agent-to-blockchain communication is secured through a consortium-operated certificate authority, and a sequence flow illustrates a source-code security agent anchoring its attestation on-chain to trigger an allow/block deployment decision. It's a conceptual architecture paper rather than an evaluated deployment, aiming to give decentralized, tamper-resistant provenance for agentic AI monitoring the software supply chain.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 2 Oct 2026, published 25 Sep 2026🛡️ Security

Mandiant's guidance for hardening the software supply chain across five pillars: endpoint, code repositories, artifact management, CI/CD and deployment. It covers a seven-day dependency cooldown, pinning images and actions by digest or commit SHA, ephemeral runners, OIDC short-lived tokens, build cache isolation, signed SBOMs, SLSA provenance and admission-time signature checks. It responds to campaigns using cache poisoning, OIDC token theft and mutable action tags.

cloud.google.comarticleAdded 29 Oct 2026, published 24 Sep 2026🛡️ Security

Endor Labs analyzes the UK's Software Security Code of Practice, a government-issued framework for software vendors, through the lens of software supply chain security. It breaks down how the Code's requirements map to practices like SBOM generation, dependency/component management, and vendor accountability for third-party code.

endorlabs.comarticlePublished and added 11 Sep 2026🛡️ Security

Endor Labs blog post outlining six practical questions organizations should answer before standing up an SBOM program: how to send/receive/store SBOMs, which vendors must provide them (via business impact analysis), delivery frequency and SLAs, how to analyze them for exploitability (reachability analysis vs. simple CVE counting), remediation/risk-acceptance policy, and using SBOMs plus VEX during incident response (e.g., Log4Shell-style disclosures). It closes with a pitch for Endor Labs' source-code-based SBOM/VEX generation.

endorlabs.comarticlePublished and added 11 Sep 2026🛡️ Security

Endor Labs announces C/C++ language support for its SCA product, addressing the long-standing difficulty of tracking OSS dependencies in ecosystems with no central package registry. Because C/C++ developers commonly vendor (copy and modify) library source directly into their repos, Endor Labs builds a fingerprint index of known OSS libraries using cryptographic hashes for exact-match segments (functions, license blocks, etc.) and ML-generated code embeddings to catch renamed, reformatted, or lightly modified copies. The company reports customer benchmarks showing 81% fewer false negatives and 143% more true positives versus prior tooling for building SBOMs and detecting vulnerable/license-non-compliant code in C/C++ codebases.

endorlabs.comarticlePublished and added 11 Sep 2026🛡️ Security

Endor Labs breaks down the EU Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA), applicable to financial entities from January 2025, focusing on Article 9 (patch management) and Article 25 (open source analysis/source code review), plus the January 2024 Regulatory Technical Standards Articles 10 (tracking third-party/OSS libraries) and 16 (source code review, security testing before production). It then maps these compliance requirements to concrete AppSec practices: SBOM/SCA for component inventory, proactive OSS risk scoring, vulnerability scanning, and function-level reachability analysis to prioritize remediation and generate VEX documents, noting overlap with PCI DSS requirements 6.3/11.3.

endorlabs.comarticlePublished and added 11 Sep 2026🛡️ Security

Endor Labs explains how the CycloneDX Vulnerability Exploitability eXchange (VEX) format's analysis sub-field (state, justification, response, detail) lets software publishers communicate real exploitability of SBOM-listed CVEs, cutting through the noise of scanners that flag thousands of largely non-exploitable findings. It walks through each state value (resolved, resolved_with_pedigree, exploitable, in_triage, false_positive) as a machine-readable alternative to ad hoc spreadsheets/portals for vulnerability disclosure, referencing log4shell (CVE-2021-44228) as a case where faster communication would help.

endorlabs.comarticlePublished and added 11 Sep 2026🛡️ Security

Endor Labs breaks down CISA's finalized Secure Software Development Attestation Form, which requires federal software suppliers to attest compliance with NIST's Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF) under EO 14028, with critical software due June 8, 2024 and other software due September 8, 2024. It covers the form's scope (excluding federal-developed, open source, and freely available software), flags ambiguous language and gaps (no explicit SBOM/threat-modeling/memory-safety mandate), and maps the four required practice areas — secure environments, trusted source code supply chains, code/artifact provenance, and vulnerability scanning/remediation — to Endor Labs' supply chain security platform features.

endorlabs.comarticlePublished and added 11 Sep 2026🛡️ Security

Endor Labs blog post demystifying transitive dependencies — libraries pulled in indirectly through direct dependencies — and explaining why they complicate software composition analysis: multiple versions of the same transitive dependency can coexist in a project, it's harder to see what's actually used, and manually forcing an update is risky. It argues reachability analysis (statically stitching first-party call paths through to transitive library code) is the key tool for determining exploitability and for satisfying auditors under PCI DSS, FedRAMP, and EO 14028 SBOM requirements, and walks through a real example where langchain4j pulls a vulnerable JSON library transitively via Redis's jedis client, with the fix being to bump jedis rather than the JSON library directly.

endorlabs.comarticlePublished and added 11 Sep 2026🛡️ Security

Endor Labs explains VEX (Vulnerability Exploitability eXchange), the CISA-backed machine-readable format that lets software producers assert whether a vulnerability in a component actually affects their product, complementing SBOMs which only list components and versions. It walks through how VEX documents annotate exploitability (e.g., unreachable code), and describes how Endor Labs automates this by building a dependency callgraph via static analysis to determine reachability and auto-generate SBOM/VEX documents.

endorlabs.comarticlePublished and added 11 Sep 2026🛡️ Security

vet is an open-source CLI (from SafeDep) that scans package manifests, SBOMs, container images, and source repos across npm, PyPI, Maven, Go, RubyGems, Cargo, and Packagist to surface vulnerabilities, malicious packages, and license/quality issues. It cuts through CVE noise by analyzing actual code-usage evidence, queries SafeDep Cloud's threat-intelligence database for real-time malware detection (e.g. flagged packages like express-cookie-parser, eslint-config-airbnb-compat), and lets teams enforce security/license/OpenSSF-Scorecard policies as CEL expressions in CI/CD via SARIF/JSON/Markdown reporting.

github.comrepoPublished and added 7 Sep 2026🛡️ Security