DLL sideloading
Named by 13 kept items in this workspace.
11 items name it under techniques and 2 under classification.key entities.
Search every workspace for DLL sideloading. It matches the name as written, so it can find other things that share it.
The items that name it 13
NitroPromotion.exe sideloads Eztwain4.dll (ADAPTAGENT) from %LOCALAPPDATA%\Nitro Pro\
Microsoft-signed GatherOsState.exe loads malicious slc.dll (Antino) from local directory
Legitimate signed apps (Canon's COTFileReadApp.exe, Stardock's DeElevate64.exe) load a trojanized companion DLL (ceiinfolog.dll / DeElevator64.dll) placed in the same folder, which in turn imports a malicious library (rdCore.dll) to execute attacker code.
First-stage loader masquerades as a required DLL and is loaded through DLL sideloading alongside legitimate software
Legitimate Windows binary bthudtask.exe copied to a spoofed path (C:\Windows \SysWOW64\ with trailing space) and executed to side-load a malicious DLL; spoofed directory then deleted.
Used by UNK_LateNight (ShadowPad), UNK_DoubleCheck (Rust loader), and UNK_QuietRacket (GfExperienceService64.exe/GFExperienceUpdate.dll) to load malicious payloads via legitimate-looking executables paired with malicious DLLs.
Malicious DLLs (libcef.dll, tempdir.dll) placed alongside legitimate signed executables (jcef_helper.exe repurposed as ClaudeDesktop.exe/DockerDesktop.exe, and IBM SPSS's sslconf.exe) to achieve execution in a trusted process context.
Legitimate FMAPP.exe loads a malicious FMAPP.dll placed in the same folder (c:\Users\Public\Downloads\), which contains code that connects back to C2
Technique attributed to Storm-2603 for dropping loaders after web shell deployment on SharePoint servers, per the Singapore government security advisory
Antino implant ('slc.dll') launched via DLL sideloading using the legitimate Microsoft-signed binary 'GatherOsState.exe'.
All techniques in this workspace.