PolinRider
Named by 40 kept items in this workspace.
26 items name it under threat actors and 14 under classification.key entities.
Search every workspace for PolinRider. It matches the name as written, so it can find other things that share it.
The items that name it 40
campaign researchers link to North Korea; hides scrambled code in project config files and can run when a project is opened in VS Code
campaign; earliest known sample found in npm packages published May 4, 2025, eight months before the first documented victims in January 2026
campaign involving suspicious, forged-looking changes to code in repositories
DPRK-linked campaign that uses a Windows batch script (e.g. temp_auto_push.bat) to roll back a machine's clock, swap local git identity, fold a malicious change into an existing commit, and force-push the result to hide tampering. Case study: compromised nestjsx/nest-access-control via account micha
DPRK campaign using a fake font file (originally fa-solid-400.woff2) as an auto-run payload via VS Code tasks.json; evolved from the 'TasksJacker' campaign first documented November of the prior year. Over 127 variants found on public GitHub using an .llf extension as of this report, with over 10,00
Malware family using the tasks.json / fake .woff2 font file trick to autorun payloads when a VS Code folder opens; observed running multiple concurrent variants (400, 500, 900) as apparent A/B tests.
Malware described as part of the evolution of the Contagious Interview campaign; found embedded in public (and suspected private) GitHub, and reportedly Bitbucket, repositories; victims have been observed infecting other people.
DPRK-linked campaign tracked since March 2026 that uses Ethereum blockchain transactions for command-and-control configuration, found as a second payload in another victim's repository.
Malware/loader family; loader has PolinRider-family indicators including multi-chain resolver structure, global markers, and XOR keys, matching the blockchain loader analyzed in Socket's PHP supply-chain investigation.
Ongoing supply-chain malware campaign, described as North Korea-linked, distributing malware across npm, PyPI, Go modules, Packagist, and Chrome extensions via compromised developer accounts and Git repositories; primary objective appears to be cryptocurrency theft, with broader information-stealing
Cluster referenced for its numeric per-install campaign-marker convention, which the WeaselBiscuit campaign identifiers (10, 12, 44, 79, 95, 99) are said to mirror.
North Korean (DPRK) supply-chain campaign that compromises legitimate GitHub developer accounts and build environments, then weaponizes their npm/Go/PHP packages to distribute malware. Confirmed footprint of 4,367 repositories across 2,152 unique owners as of the July hunt (a 6.5x increase since Mar
Malware/automation tooling linked to DPRK that performs automatic credential harvesting from infected developer machines (via poisoned VS Code tasks.json), leading to account takeovers of npm and Go packages without deliberate targeting; examined by OSM research across 20 npm and Go packages, and by
DPRK (North Korean) threat actor/campaign active for at least five months; compromises developer machines and accounts via fake interviews, poisoned forks, malicious VS Code tasks, and typosquatted packages, then auto-propagates malware into repos and packages the victim already has access to (not t
Campaign tracked by OpenSourceMalware attributed to DPRK tradecraft; malicious artifact frequently isn't in the npm tarball itself but in the repo, e.g. in tasks.json or a VS Code settings file
North Korean (Lazarus Group) campaign described as a 'human botnet' with persistence on thousands/tens of thousands of developer machines (via fake recruiters or consuming poisoned open-source packages), used for supply-chain compromise; linked via research published by Jenn Gile.
DPRK-linked malware/campaign; uses A/B testing to evade detections, has persistence mechanisms that defeat remediation attempts, shows infrastructure overlap with other DPRK activity.
Massively successful Lazarus Group (North Korean state-sponsored) campaign that emerged in early 2026; weaponized credentials stolen by TasksJacker; considered a parallel or sub-campaign to Contagious Interview; pioneered cryptowallet multiplexing using TRON, Aptos, and Binance Smart Chain. First re
North Korean state-sponsored campaign discovered in March 2026 (per episode, 'earlier this year'); weaponizes credentials stolen via developer compromise; found 2,417 newly-compromised repositories in new research, bringing total to over 4,400; considered a parallel/sub-campaign to Contagious Interv
Lazarus Group (North Korean state-sponsored) campaign that emerged in 2026; forks popular open source projects and submits malicious pull requests injecting payloads into JavaScript config files that execute during builds but rarely receive scrutiny in code review. Confirmed footprint grew from 675
North Korea (Lazarus Group) automated repo-hijacking campaign; a spin-off of Contagious Interview focused on taking over GitHub repositories; discussed as having spread into Go (Go registry) and PHP (Packagist) ecosystems without additional effort by the threat actors, since those registries ship pa
DPRK-linked supply-chain campaign, part of the Lazarus Group / Contagious Interview activity cluster; takes over legitimate GitHub accounts and injects an obfuscated JavaScript loader into repos the maintainer already owns; spread from GitHub to Go, Packagist, npm, and PyPI ecosystems without changi
Supply chain campaign linked to North Korean threat actors, expanding across npm, Packagist, Go modules, and Chrome extensions using hidden JavaScript loaders in developer environments
DPRK-linked research subject; described as North Korea's automated repo-hijacking campaign spreading into Go and PHP ecosystems; has persistence mechanisms that defeat remediation attempts
Further evolution of TasksJacker targeting projects with over one million combined GitHub stars; carried a payload (via tailwind-autoanimation package) in index.js rather than a lifecycle hook
All threat actors in this workspace.