adversa.aiwriteupπ‘οΈ SecurityAdversa AI's "GuardFall" research shows that decades-old shell tricks (quote removal, $IFS expansion, command substitution, base64-to-sh piping, and destructive argv flags like `find -delete`) let prompt-injected content bypass the pattern-matching shell-command guards in most popular open-source AI coding agents, because the guards inspect raw command strings while bash rewrites them before execution. Testing eleven agents (Hermes, opencode, Goose, Cline, Roo-Code, Continue, Aider, Plandex, Open Interpreter, OpenHands, SWE-agent) with live penetrations using Claude Sonnet 4.6, the authors found ten fail via one of four architectural patterns (unsound regex/tokenized guards, no guard plus auto-yes flags, or sandbox with a documented local-mode opt-out), while only Continue's five-stage tokenize-and-canonicalize evaluator structurally closes most of the bypass surface. They publish the bypass-class taxonomy (AβE), a real Makefile/CI exploitation scenario against a Plandex-style pipeline, and concrete remediation guidance including adopting Continue's evaluator design and building a guard-probe CI harness.
ContinueOpenCodeGoose+3
GuardFallTrustFallClaude Sonnet 4.6+4
AI Security, Offensive SecurityΒ· Published and added 18 Jul 2026