tenetsecurity.aiarticleπ‘οΈ SecurityTenet Security's Threat Labs demonstrates "Agentjacking": an attacker POSTs a crafted error event to Sentry using a public, write-only DSN scraped from a target's frontend JavaScript, embedding a markdown-formatted fake "Resolution" section inside the payload. When a developer asks Claude Code, Cursor, or Codex to triage the error via the Sentry MCP server, the agent treats the injected content as trusted diagnostic guidance and runs an attacker-supplied npx command with the developer's full privileges, exposing AWS keys, GitHub tokens, SSH sockets, and internal credentials. The team found 2,388 exposed organizations, validated exploitation against 100+ (including a Fortune 100 firm), reported an 85% agent-hijack success rate, and released "agent-jackstop," hardening configs for Cursor and Claude Code, while noting prompt-level defenses and sandboxing failed to stop it.
SentryModel Context ProtocolClaude Code+3
Agentjackingagent-jackstopAuthorized Intent Chain
AI SecurityΒ· Added 1 Jul 2026, published 17 Jun 2026