55 results for “Oj”

StripWake is a projector-only backdoor attack on large vision-language models. It stays dormant under full-token inference and activates when visual-token compression prunes the context around a trigger (context stripping). On LLaVA-1.5-7B across nine unseen compressors, it reaches 0.4% full-token attack success rate and 94.0%-99.7% compressed ASR on five primary compressors, with no CIDEr loss. Training aligns early visual attention with a frozen benign teacher.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 3 Nov 2026, published 31 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

JADE (Joint Action DEnoiser) is a diffusion-based vision-language-action architecture in which the VLM reads the current noisy action latents together with images and instructions at every denoising step, and guides the action expert through gated cross-attention. The VLM is also trained to recover clean action latents, and an adaptive step-size schedule cuts sampling steps. On RoboDojo it averages 12.67% success, the highest among π0.5-based methods, and it adds 20.8 points over π0.5 on four real bimanual tasks.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 3 Nov 2026, published 31 Oct 2026🧠 AI

ShiftRAG is a decoupled retrieval-augmented generation framework that uses one LLM backbone but separates discriminative retrieval learning from autoregressive generation. It projects retrieval alignments into continuous soft tokens so the generator receives retriever-side signals, and adds a soft orthogonality objective against rank collapse in decoder-only models. The abstract reports gains in retrieval and question answering over state-of-the-art baselines, without numbers.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 3 Nov 2026, published 31 Oct 2026🧠 AI

AgentCap is a runtime authorization layer for LLM agents that moves the authorize decision out of the model and mediates every tool call through an MCP wrapper. It issues short-lived, budget-bounded capability tokens checked at the tool boundary, restricts delegation to attenuating parent-child chains, and uses a declarative policy language. On AgentDojo and InjecAgent it lowers attack success in every tested setting, reaching 0% with GPT-5.4.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 3 Nov 2026, published 31 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

AgentCap is a runtime authorization layer for LLM agents from Virginia Tech (Suresh and Gao), posted to arXiv on 31 October 2026. The model proposes MCP tool calls, and a policy engine issues Ed25519-signed capability tokens only after checks on provenance, intent, trust and prerequisites. It reports 0% attack success with GPT-5.4 on AgentDojo and InjecAgent, but only on scenarios the authors built.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 3 Nov 2026, published 31 Oct 2026🧠 AI

SecPO is a prompt injection defense that combines a new preference-optimization loss with adversarial training. It replaces the insecure DPO reference model with an approximated injection-invariant oracle, and trains on strong injections synthesized at best@240. Against Meta-SecAlign, AT cuts attack success rates 1.5-14.5x, and on Qwen3.6-27B AgentDojo ASR@800 falls to 8.8% from 78.8%, with no noticeable utility loss across nine benchmarks. Code, training data and model are released.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 3 Nov 2026, published 30 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

SecPO is a DPO-variant loss from UC Berkeley for training LLMs against indirect prompt injection. It replaces the undefended-model reference on injected input with its output on the clean input, a one-line change, and pairs with a PAIR-based adversarial training pipeline. On Qwen3.6-27B, AgentDojo ASR@800 is 8.8% against 78.8% for Meta-SecAlign, with utility unchanged across nine benchmarks. Code, training set and weights are released.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 3 Nov 2026, published 30 Oct 2026🧠 AI

SEAL is a defense against indirect prompt injection for local LLM agents. It learns a soft prompt and scoring readout offline, then uses a frozen task model to score and delete injected tokens from tool outputs, with queries built from trusted initial context. On AgentDojo, attack success falls from 34.6% to 0.1% and Joint rises from 51.4% to 77.5%, using about 127x fewer defense tokens than PISanitizer.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 31 Oct 2026, published 29 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

The paper folds the per-key logit bias of Attention Matching (AM) KV cache compaction into the keys along one closed-form direction per head, fitted on context queries. The result is a plain cache that FlashAttention and vLLM paged caches can use, with output error bounded by how far each query's projection on that direction is from 1. Unmodified vLLM serves folded caches through a KV connector. On QuALITY and LongHealth the fold is within noise of AM in 13 of 14 settings. Under AM's published per-head budgets it is within noise in 9 of 10.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 28 Oct 2026, published 27 Oct 2026🧠 AI

SymLift is a compile-free vulnerability detection framework for code fragments that lack project context. A fine-tuned LLM reconstructs control-flow, data-flow, memory and resource relations as a constrained LLVM-like IR, and a deterministic parser turns it into facts for Datalog rules that give findings with derivation traces. SymLift-Qwen-7B reaches 94.41% Target-F1 on FormAI and 91.66% micro-averaged Target-F1 on MegaVul.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 28 Oct 2026, published 25 Oct 2026🧠 AI

OWLS (Open-world Language-conditioned Speed Fields) plans directly over a vision-language model's dense feature map. A text prompt describing traversable terrain scores every pixel of one camera image. The scores are projected onto the ground, adapted with two morphological operations, and used as the speed field of a minimum-time planner. It needs no training, terrain labels, map or extra sensors. It was tested on a physical rover, on simulated Mars and Moon rovers over 200 procedural terrains, and on real planetary imagery.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 26 Oct 2026, published 23 Oct 2026🧠 AI

Paper on memory injection, where prompt injection persists across sessions through the long-term memory of LLM-as-a-service platforms. It presents a general threat model and shows all NIST attack goals are achievable on ChatGPT Instant 5.3, Claude Sonnet 4.6 and Gemini 3 Flash. Vectors include personal memories, projects, skills, organization instructions and MCP resources. On Claude, shared memory lets an attacker compromise multiple users in an organization and exfiltrate prompts. Nearly half of the derived mitigations are unimplemented.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 24 Oct 2026, published 20 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Membership Inference in Privacy-Preserving Vector Search is an IACR ePrint paper (2026/2570) that attacks backend-compatible protections for embedding databases using one snapshot and known plaintexts. It breaks the Scale-and-Perturb scheme of Fuchsbauer et al. (advantage 0.997 on MS-MARCO) and analyzes Rotate-and-Perturb, ideal DCRE and an encrypted HNSW index. It also tests shuffling and secret projection as mitigations.

eprint.iacr.orgpaperAdded 21 Oct 2026, published 20 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

RAISE (Risk-Aware Intensive Supplemental Execution Framework) is a just-in-time framework that predicts which project-days introduce a vulnerability, to decide where to spend extra fuzzing. The dataset joins OSV vulnerability-introducing commits with OSS-Fuzz coverage data for 15 C/C++ projects (15,210 project-days, 347 positive). A Random Forest using VCCFinder static features plus fuzzing features reaches ROC-AUC 0.74. In a simulation over 968 vulnerabilities, Simple-Regression needed 91.60 extra fuzzing sessions per detected vulnerability, against 171.89 for the Median heuristic.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 22 Oct 2026, published 20 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Predictable Scaling (PS) is a framework that predicts full-scale recommendation model performance from scaled-down proxies. It builds proxies with composable scaling functions along separate resource axes, then projects metrics to target scale by curve fitting with calibrated uncertainty. Of three predictors, even the raw proxy falls within repeated-run noise, and a Gaussian Process gives 15% lower relative MAE. On a task-specific ranker and a foundation ranker, PS ranks hypotheses correctly at 79-88% compute reduction.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 20 Oct 2026, published 16 Oct 2026🧠 AI

Ignored, Not Refused audits 33,000 trajectories from eleven open-weight agents (2-14B parameters) on InjecAgent and AgentDojo. A label-blind LLM judge finds most failed indirect prompt injections are ignored (76-80%) rather than refused (17-18%). Changing only the system prompt moves InjecAgent ASR from 0.2% to 43%. The Attack-Task Outcome Matrix (ATOM) shows 21.7% of AgentDojo episodes were safe but left the user task incomplete. The corpus, judge prompt and code are released.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 20 Oct 2026, published 16 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

"Ignored, Not Refused" audits 33,000 trajectories from eleven open-weight agents (2-14B parameters) on InjecAgent and AgentDojo. A label-blind LLM judge finds 76-80% of failed injection attacks were ignored and 17-18% refused. Changing only the system prompt moves InjecAgent attack success rate from 0.2% to 43%, and the ATOM matrix shows 21.7% of AgentDojo episodes were safe but left the user's task undone. The corpus, judge prompt and code are released.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 20 Oct 2026, published 16 Oct 2026🧠 AI

Proposes protecting the retrieval datastore in RAG systems by applying the same random projection to datastore embeddings and query embeddings. This provably preserves query-item semantic similarity while substantially mitigating data extraction attacks. Across multiple RAG architectures and datasets it beats prior differential-privacy-based methods on retrieval and generation quality, with comparable empirical privacy under strong attacks, making it a practical baseline for privacy-preserving RAG.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 17 Oct 2026, published 15 Oct 2026🧠 AI

Proposes applying the same random projection to both datastore embeddings and query embeddings in RAG systems. The authors claim this provably preserves query-to-item semantic similarity while substantially mitigating datastore data-extraction attacks. Across several RAG architectures and datasets it reportedly beats prior differential-privacy-based defenses on retrieval and generation quality, with comparable empirical privacy under strong attack models. It is presented as a lightweight baseline for privacy-preserving RAG.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 17 Oct 2026, published 15 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Paper arguing that agent human-approval prompts count as a second factor only if agent compromise cannot forge them and they name exactly what is approved. It defines twelve attacks on the approval path (decoy recipients, amount cancellation, card padding, label spoofing, enrollment squatting, threshold splitting) and tests them against AP2, Microsoft's action-bound approval design and MCP elicitation. An audit of ten agent runtimes found no third-party verifiable approval record and post-approval argument changes in four of eight. The reference defense ASU (Agent Step-Up) renders the card from a canonical effect descriptor, has a phone passkey sign its digest, and executes only the stored call. It is proven in Tamarin (53 lemmas) and evaluated on 27,108 scripted trials and 609 AgentDojo pairs. The trusted card cut forged-narration attack success from 0.54 to 0.03 and raised LLM-approver catch rate from 0.30 to 0.98.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 17 Oct 2026, published 15 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Systematization of knowledge on private Transformer inference (PTI) that builds an empirical graph of 62 systems, with system attributes as node features and evaluation compatibility as edges. Node-level attribution finds that cryptographic progress drives most speedups but always co-occurs with confounders such as model fidelity, hardware and cost accounting. Edge-level auditing finds only 1 of 1891 candidate system pairs directly comparable. Graph-level analysis shows the scale frontier plateaued at 13B parameters and projects the cost of deploying current PTI techniques on production-scale Transformers.

eprint.iacr.orgpaperAdded 14 Oct 2026, published 13 Oct 2026🧠 AI

Proposes Geometric Calibration of supervised fine-tuning and SPACE (Subspace Projection for Adapted Checkpoint Enhancement). SPACE is a post-hoc, data-free, training-free method that uses the pre- and post-SFT checkpoints to revert SFT update components lying in the principal subspace of the pre-SFT weights and keep those in the orthogonal complement. It is evaluated on Qwen2.5, Qwen3, Qwen3.5, Llama-3.1 and Olmo-3 models (2B–14B) with math, coding and medical SFT. It reduces out-of-domain regression and improves in-domain performance, for example +2.85 ID / +2.26 OOD on Qwen2.5-7B math SFT.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 14 Oct 2026, published 13 Oct 2026🧠 AI

Kairos is a reference monitor placed at the isolation boundary of an unmodified, opaque LLM agent, where tool calls, shell commands and agent-written scripts all appear as the same file and network operations. A declarative trust policy decides most effects deterministically and defers the rest; deferred effects are held while the agent continues speculatively, and a bounded-authority decision oracle (an LLM or a human) releases or refuses them based on the trace. Across three benchmarks and three agent models it beats existing defenses on the attack-success/utility trade-off; on AgentDojo it cuts attack success from 47.0% to 2.7% with no loss of benign utility.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 15 Oct 2026, published 13 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Anthropic's Frontier Red Team tests whether small open-weight models (≤30B) can autonomously replicate across commodity IoT devices. They ran Gemma4-26B-A4B over 15 off-brand Android TV boxes at 0.39 tok/s with pipeline parallelism. A Qwen3.5-9B-class model set up inference on 8 of 9 hardware types, and only GLM-5.2 completed end-to-end worm replication in an 8-node redroid ADB network, spreading to 8/8 nodes in 4 of 5 trials and 7/8 in the other. It also estimates spread using the Kimwolf botnet's size (~133k replicas, about 40 H100s of compute), shows notes inherited between generations improve Qwen3.5-9B's setup success (45% to 61–84%), and projects small models reaching the capability floor by end of 2026. It closes with defensive points: drive R0 below 1, and harden IoT devices.

anthropic.compaperPublished and added 12 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Introduces Policy-Constrained Diffusion Agents (CoDA), which enforces task-dependent security policies inside the denoising process of diffusion language models. At each step, token distributions are projected onto a policy-compliant set, so constraints hold throughout generation instead of relying on detecting injected instructions. Evaluated across several dLLM families under static and adaptive prompt-injection attacks, it reports substantially lower attack success rates with competitive task utility and practical inference overhead.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 15 Oct 2026, published 10 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

AgentTune is a source-available Python library that unifies building, training, evaluating, distilling and maintaining tool-using LLM agents. Its core is a two-tier EventLog representation that preserves agent trajectories and yields consistent projections for training, evaluation and auditing. On top of it sit a shared agent runtime, tool-calling reinforcement learning, agentic distillation, RAG, decision workflows, evaluation utilities and a designed path toward self-healing agents, demonstrated on tasks such as legal contract search.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 12 Oct 2026, published 9 Oct 2026🧠 AI

First systematic empirical study of Cross-chain Verification Vulnerabilities (CVVs) in bridge smart contracts, such as flawed validation of state proofs, message sender identities and signatures. From 588 audit reports across 36 bridge projects it derives 11 CVV patterns in 5 categories and builds a dataset of 830 instances across 786 contract files, mapped to reports, source versions and pattern labels. Existing tools cover few CVV patterns, and only two of four tested LLMs beat a 29.3% Macro-F1 constant baseline (best 51.2%), which motivates detectors built for cross-chain verification semantics.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 12 Oct 2026, published 9 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

RoboJEPA is an 8B-parameter latent world model built on the Joint Embedding Predictive Architecture (JEPA), trained on real-robot data spanning 12 robotic embodiments. The paper establishes the first scaling laws for multi-embodiment robotic world models, showing that imagination error (latent rollout error) follows a second-order power law in compute and predicts downstream planning performance, and demonstrates zero-shot deployment of the model as a goal-image-conditioned planner on real hardware for long-horizon tasks.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 8 Oct 2026, published 7 Oct 2026🧠 AI

This arXiv paper examines why current LLM-based automated vulnerability-patching benchmarks overstate model performance, identifying pitfalls at the agent level (prompting/tooling inflating success without improving patch quality), framework level (permission errors, infra bugs, timeout handling silently skewing scores), and dataset level (single PoC tests failing to verify root-cause fixes). The authors curate 112 historical bugs across 84 open-source C/C++, Go, and Rust projects, each annotated with PoC tests, regression tests, and developer-intent tests, and show that while PoC pass rates look high, developer-test pass rates stay low and barely improve with newer models. They provide guidelines for more rigorous, reproducible evaluation of LLM patching systems.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 9 Oct 2026, published 7 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

This paper introduces a paired-replay testbed that samples a single LLM agent request and replays the identical malicious action, resource, and arguments under four authorization conditions: broad bearer tokens, scoped JWTs, sender-constrained tokens, and Open Policy Agent policies. Across 128 scenarios in four tool domains and five local model configurations, broad-bearer tokens let roughly 9 to 38 percent of attacked, post-exposure decisions execute harmful actions, while all three scoped conditions recorded zero harmful executions; a supplementary AgentDojo extension found 11 of 24 injected attacks succeeded under broad policy versus 0 of 24 under scoping. The authors frame this as evidence that scoping contains cross-action and cross-resource consequences of prompt injection, not that it prevents the injection itself.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 6 Oct 2026, published 5 Oct 2026🛡️ Security