Miasma
Named by 34 kept items in this workspace.
18 items name it under threat actors and 16 under classification.key entities.
Search every workspace for Miasma. It matches the name as written, so it can find other things that share it.
The items that name it 34
infostealer-like malware targeting CI/CD pipelines, dev servers, build processes; targets Azure files and LiteLLM/GCP ADC paths as TeamPCP LiteLLM supply chain infostealer
Active credential-stealing campaign embedding fake prompt-injection headers to fool AI-assisted review tools into marking code as benign
Campaign in June 2026 that compromised dozens of packages in the @redhat-cloud-services npm namespace; built on open-sourced Shai-Hulud code, added cloud-identity collectors targeting GCP and Azure metadata services, and generated a uniquely encrypted payload per infection so no two compromised pack
Real campaign used to validate npm-scan detectors
Cited as a notorious worm example, contrasted with PolinRider.
Malware campaign that landed on npm despite npm's existing scanning
npm worm, open-sourced; targets Red Hat via trusted publishing abuse; suspected cause of Microsoft/Azure repo takedowns for terms-of-use violation investigation.
Malware family open-sourced earlier in the year (around late May/June per episode); components of it were used in the AsyncAPI compromise; described as having evolved/changed meaning since being open-sourced
June 2026; planted configuration files that ran a credential harvester when a repository was opened in an AI coding tool (Claude Code, Cursor, VS Code). Reached Microsoft's Azure organizations, prompting GitHub to disable 73 repositories to contain it.
Attack wave, including 'Phantom Gyp' waves, that used a small binding.gyp file to run code during npm install with no lifecycle script in package.json, slipping past scanners watching only preinstall/postinstall fields; tracked across multiple waves by Socket's team
Credential stealing toolkit leaked publicly on Jun 10, 2026. Avoids a traditional C2 server; instead periodically searches GitHub's public commit search API for a dead-drop marker string (e.g. thebeautifulsnadsoftime), treats the attached payload found in matching commits as a signed command, and ru
Self-replicating worm spreading via npm; uses a malicious binding.gyp file (the "Phantom Gyp" technique) to trigger code execution during npm install through the native build step, bypassing install-script security checks; also infects repositories so payload runs when a folder is opened in an IDE o
Related campaign, alongside Mini Shai-Hulud and Hades, using fake prompt-injection headers preceding obfuscated JS payloads.
Campaign name associated with this supply chain attack wave, tracked on a dedicated campaign tracking page with 471 affected artifacts across npm and PyPI (411 npm artifacts across 106 packages, 60 PyPI artifacts across 37 packages)
Added a malicious preinstall script to compromised npm packages that ran node index.js at install time, harvesting cloud credentials, CI tokens, SSH keys, and more. Hit 32 official Red Hat packages on npm, then spread to other packages across npm, PyPI, and GitHub. A new variant moved its trigger fr
adds dedicated Azure and GCP credential collectors (Azure CLI auth caches, managed-identity tokens); propagates by creating public GitHub repos titled 'Miasma: The Spreading Blight' and committing harvested secrets as JSON; execution signature is a preinstall script invoking Bun against an obfuscate
New variant of Mini Shai-Hulud used in the June 1, 2026 @redhat-cloud-services npm compromise; replaces the Dune references of Shai-Hulud with Greek mythology references
Supply chain attack campaign targeting @redhat-cloud-services npm packages, first identified 1 June 2026; malware creates repositories with description 'Miasma: The Spreading Blight'; a 'Miasma - The Spreading Blight' variant seen in a new wave described in the June 4, 2026 update abusing binding.gy
All threat actors in this workspace.