35 results for “ML-DSA”

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“ML-DSA”

eprint.iacr.orgpaper🛡️ Security

Unshuffling Fisher-Yates: Practical Recovery of Length-128 Permutations and Application to ML-DSA

Paper (IACR ePrint 2026/2658) presenting a single-trace side-channel attack on a software Fisher-Yates shuffle of length 128, the butterfly count in one ML-DSA NTT layer. It removes rejection-sampling timing variation, extracts Hamming weight and identity leakage, and enumerates likely permutations with constraint programming. On a shuffled ML-DSA-44 NTT it recovers secret polynomial s1, fully or up to a few coefficients.

ML-DSA

Fisher-Yates shuffleFIPS 204

Hardware & RF· Added 28 Oct 2026, published 27 Oct 2026

eprint.iacr.orgpaper🛡️ Security

Non-profiled Single-Trace ML-DSA Secret Key Recovery by Horizontal Distribution Analysis

Non-profiled single-trace side-channel attack on ML-DSA-65 (Dilithium) running on ARM Cortex-M4, by Linus Backlund and Elena Dubrova (KTH). It compares observed sample distributions with expected Hamming weight leakage using a Gaussian mixture model, and stacks partitioned trace segments for multiple observations. Information-set decoding corrects misclassifications; with a 2^70 enumeration budget, the full secret key is recovered from one trace in 99% of attacks, using secret key unpacking as the attack point.

ML-DSAARM Cortex-M4

Hamming weight leakagehorizontal attacknon-profiled attack+4

Hardware & RF· Published and added 26 Oct 2026

eprint.iacr.orgpaper🛡️ Security

VeilDNS: Post-Quantum DNS Privacy from the First UDP Packet

VeilDNS is a DNS-native protocol that uses a post-quantum KEM and AEAD to encrypt DNS questions and answers and authenticate the resolver in one UDP exchange on port 53, preserving the DNS wire format. It has stateless and stateful modes plus optional forward secrecy from the second query. Against ML-DSA-authenticated DoT/DoH/DoQ it reports up to 3.5x higher cold-session throughput and 13.7x fewer bytes; Tamarin proves query confidentiality, response authentication and forward secrecy.

DNSML-DSATLS+1

VeilDNSTamarinDoT+3

other· Added 26 Oct 2026, published 24 Oct 2026

eprint.iacr.orgpaper🛡️ Security

Faster and Smaller Anonymous Credentials from Standardized Signatures

GordieHowe is a language, certifying compiler and zero-knowledge proof system for building anonymous credentials on standardized signatures (ECDSA, RSA, ML-DSA). It proves an ECDSA-signed mobile driving license presentation in 64.8 ms with a 276 KiB proof, 10.1x faster than Google's Longfellow, and an ML-DSA-44 signature in 87.3 ms with at least 116 bits of quantum security. Compiler output and security theorems are checked in Lean. It introduces series-parallel IOPs and extends the BCS transformation in the QROM.

ECDSAML-DSARSA+1

GordieHoweLongfellowBCS transformation+3

Identity & Access· Added 24 Oct 2026, published 23 Oct 2026

bankless.comarticle🛡️ Security

Coinbase's Plan for a Quantum-Safe Bitcoin

Bankless summary of Coinbase's October 2026 proposal for making Bitcoin quantum-safe. It covers upgradeable address designs (BIP-360 P2MR, P2TRv2, hybrid addresses), four candidate signatures (ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, FN-DSA, SHRINCS) with size and stateful-key-reuse trade-offs, a five-stage migration plan, and a separate track for dormant coins with exposed public keys such as Satoshi's.

Bitcoin

CoinbaseBIP-360P2MR+11

Blockchain· Published and added 21 Oct 2026

eprint.iacr.orgpaper🛡️ Security

Verifiable Post-Quantum TLS Handshake: Recognizing Implementation Errors of Cryptographic Verification Steps

PQCD-TLS is a post-quantum TLS handshake that binds confirmation codes into chained key derivation, so a faulty signature or KEM verification step causes a key mismatch and handshake failure. The authors build confirmation-code frameworks for ML-DSA and Falcon signatures and for ML-KEM, HQC and DAWN, with unpredictability proofs. Across 48 configurations, handshake latency overhead stays below 1%.

TLSML-DSAML-KEM

goto failPQCD-TLSFalcon+3

AppSec· Added 24 Oct 2026, published 21 Oct 2026

anthropic.comarticle🛡️ Security

Using Claude to reduce the attack surface of code

Anthropic research on using Claude to map and reduce code attack surface, run over 25 open-source projects (5M+ lines) and yielding 493 issues. It uses three methods: default configuration, configuration interaction and early reachability. In OpenSSH, about 4,500 lines of ML-DSA-44 code were reachable pre-authentication, fixed across 10.5 and 10.6; the post also describes a reusable Claude skill.

ClaudeOpenSSHML-DSA+2

attack surface reductionpre-authentication reachabilityconfiguration interaction+3

AppSec, AI Security· Added 22 Oct 2026, published 21 Oct 2026

eprint.iacr.orgpaper🛡️ Security

A Systematic Evaluation of Fault Attacks and Countermeasures on ML-DSA Rejection Sampling

Systematic evaluation of fault attacks on ML-DSA (FIPS 204) rejection sampling and of proposed countermeasures. It proves the "third rejection test" of patent WO2025261784A1 re-verifies what check 2 already guarantees, and shows that 30,000 fault injections never detect a skipped z-norm check. The author fully recovers s1 against a third-check-protected implementation under randomized signing. Third check and sign-then-verify are complementary; overhead is 0.04–0.05% on x86-64 and 0.83% on Cortex-M4 for the third check.

Cortex-M4

ML-DSAFIPS 204WO2025261784A1+1

Hardware & RF· Added 21 Oct 2026, published 20 Oct 2026

eprint.iacr.orgpaper🛡️ Security

Fault-Induced Nonce Repetition in Threshold Lattice Signatures: A Reveal-Structure Criterion, Cross-Scheme Analysis, and Detection Boundaries

Fault-Induced Nonce Repetition in Threshold Lattice Signatures is an ePrint paper (2026/2566, Yulong Meng) showing that faulting t devices in a t-of-n threshold ML-DSA deployment recovers the full signing secret, verified on Mithril with exact recovery in 96/96 scan groups. It gives a reveal-structure criterion across Quorus, TALUS and Trilithium, a threshold law m* = (ℓ-1)N+⌈N/K⌉ for imperfect faults, and two-layer transcript detection (305/305 hits, no false positives).

ML-DSA

MithrilQuorusTALUS+7

Hardware & RF· Added 21 Oct 2026, published 20 Oct 2026

eprint.iacr.orgpaper🛡️ Security

Further Elaborations on the Provable Dual Attack

Further Elaborations on the Provable Dual Attack is an October 2026 ePrint paper by Kaveh Bashiri presenting a provable dual attack on LWE that recovers a subvector of the secret, with an explicit success-probability bound and no heuristic assumptions. It unifies the analyses of Pouly and Shen (EUROCRYPT 2024) and Bashiri and Wiemers (2025). Applied to ML-KEM it improves the first provable dual attack by 22 to 100 bits; it is also applied to ML-DSA and tested on small instances. The author states ML-KEM and ML-DSA are not threatened.

ML-KEMML-DSA

Pouly and ShenBashiri and WiemersQu, Tian, Wang, and Xu+1

other· Added 21 Oct 2026, published 20 Oct 2026

eprint.iacr.orgpaper🛡️ Security

Energy Consumption of Post-Quantum Cryptography on Constrained and General-Purpose Architectures

Benchmark of the three NIST post-quantum standards, FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA) and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA), measuring speed and energy for key generation, signing and verification. Tests ran on Raspberry Pi 1, Zero and 4 and on laptop hardware, using OpenSSL 3.5 and a FNIRSI FNB58 USB power meter. ML-KEM and ML-DSA match classical elliptic-curve cryptography, while SLH-DSA signing on 32-bit devices cost up to 243% more energy than on 64-bit.

OpenSSLRaspberry PiFNIRSI FNB58

ML-KEMML-DSASLH-DSA+5

Hardware & RF· Added 20 Oct 2026, published 19 Oct 2026

eprint.iacr.orgpaper🛡️ Security

Shorter Hash-Based Signatures via Guarded Sharing in a DAG Model

Proposes "guarded sharing", a technique that moves few-time signatures in SPHINCS-style stateless hash-based schemes from a tree model to a DAG model. Combined with bucket thinning, hash chains and rejection sampling, it yields BGS-CC, which improves on the prior best few-time scheme BPORS-C+BFP. For 128-bit security and a use quota of Q=2^24 it gives 2,228-byte signatures, the first SPHINCS-based stateless signature shorter than ML-DSA-44's 2,420 bytes. This matters for PQ migration because signature size is the main drawback of SLH-DSA.

SLH-DSAML-DSA

BGS-CCBPORS-C+BFPSPHINCS+1

other· Added 17 Oct 2026, published 16 Oct 2026

eprint.iacr.orgpaper🛡️ Security

Post-Quantum Certificate-Based PSK Provisioning for WireGuard via Mutual TLS, DTLS, and QUIC: Design and Performance Study

The paper proposes a post-quantum architecture for WireGuard that leaves the core protocol unchanged. A mutually authenticated TLS 1.3 control channel runs over TCP, UDP (DTLS) or QUIC and uses ML-KEM key establishment, with X.509 certificates from a PKI signed with ML-DSA. A shared secret derived from the session's exported keying material is injected into WireGuard's native PSK interface. A Tamarin model of the TLS–WireGuard composition layer checks secrecy, binding and provisioning-order properties and identifies the conditions needed for secure deployment. The authors benchmark handshake latency and CPU time for classical, pure-PQ and hybrid key establishment across the three transports, and compare against the Rosenpass PQ WireGuard baseline.

WireGuardVPN

ML-KEMML-DSARosenpass+5

other· Added 15 Oct 2026, published 14 Oct 2026

eprint.iacr.orgpaper🛡️ Security

edaBits in the Exponent (edaBitE) and Issuer-Hiding Blind Signatures from ML-DSA and VOLE-in-the-Head

Presents the first blind signature in which the issuer runs unmodified NIST-standardized ML-DSA, so it works with certified secure elements. Issuance is an ML-DSA signature on a commitment. The blind signature is a VOLE-in-the-head zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of that signature, about 1 MB, under 1 s to produce and 0.5 s to verify. Security reduces to ML-DSA EUF-CMA and the proof system. Issuer-hiding and selective disclosure add a few tens of KB. The paper also introduces edaBitE, a batch consistency check between binary and prime-field commitments that replaces the costly edaBits checks.

ML-DSAVOLE-in-the-Head

edaBitEedaBitsNIST+1

Identity & Access· Published and added 14 Oct 2026

eprint.iacr.orgpaper🛡️ Security

Nowhere Man: Device Binding for Post-Quantum Anonymous Credentials

Presents a modular device-binding protocol for post-quantum anonymous credentials. The phone Secure Element signs a verifier challenge with an unmodified FIPS 204 ML-DSA interface, and the user proves knowledge of that signature in zero knowledge at each presentation. Using ML-DSA's structure avoids the cost of generic NIZK systems such as Longfellow. The most efficient variants assume weak-MLWR for unlinkability, and that assumption can be dropped at some efficiency cost. The protocol works with different anonymous credential schemes, and a proof-of-concept implementation is included. This matters for planned EU age-verification and Google Wallet/mDL rollouts, which need protection against credential sharing.

LongfellowGoogle Wallet

ML-DSAFIPS 204Vega+2

Identity & Access· Published and added 14 Oct 2026

en.cryptonomist.charticle🛡️ Security

Coinbase advances Bitcoin’s post-quantum readiness while holding about 5% of BTC

Summarizes Coinbase's blog post on preparing Bitcoin and custody infrastructure for post-quantum threats. It covers public-key exposure (an estimated 6.7–7M BTC behind already-exposed keys), BIP 360 (P2MR) and P2TRv2 outputs, 1-of-2 hybrid classical/post-quantum spending paths, and the state-reuse forgery risk of stateful signatures. It also covers candidate schemes (ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, FN-DSA, SHRINCS), MPC/HSM compatibility and side-channel tests, and separate handling of dormant, lost and exposed legacy funds.

BitcoinCoinbaseFireblocks

BIP 360P2MRP2TRv2+10

Blockchain· Published and added 13 Oct 2026

eprint.iacr.orgpaper🛡️ Security

On the Expected Number of Iterations in ML-DSA Signing: A Complete Accounting of the Rejection Conditions

ePrint paper showing that FIPS 204 Table 1's expected iteration counts for the ML-DSA signing loop cover only the line-23 validity checks (z and r0 norms). They omit the two line-28 encoding-correctness checks (‖c·t0‖∞ and hint weight). It accounts for all four conditions: z by exact counting, c·t0 by an Irwin-Hall tail, and hint weight by a closed-form conditioned per-coefficient probability with a Monte Carlo tail estimate. Corrected expected iterations are 4.36, 5.14 and 3.91 for ML-DSA-44, -65 and -87, within 0.14% of an end-to-end measurement and consistent with NIST's FIPS 204 errata.

CRYSTALS-Dilithium

ML-DSAFIPS 204NIST+2

other· Added 14 Oct 2026, published 12 Oct 2026

aws.amazon.comarticle🛡️ Security

Quantum-resistant signing on AWS, Part 2: Enforce your ML-DSA algorithm policy with SCPs and IAM

Explains how to turn a cryptographic algorithm policy (approve ML-DSA-65/87, exclude ML-DSA-44) into enforceable AWS controls using SCPs, IAM policies, permission boundaries and KMS key policies. The key lever is the kms:KeySpec condition key (kms:SigningAlgorithm can't distinguish variants, since all use ML_DSA_SHAKE_256), applied to CreateKey, ReplicateKey, Sign, Verify and GetPublicKey. It also covers surfaces without algorithm condition keys (AWS Private CA, ACM import, IAM server certificate upload, ELB TLS) via provisioning pipelines plus CloudTrail and AWS Config drift detection, and the default-allow risk of deny-lists.

AWSAWS KMSAWS IAM+3

ML-DSAFIPS 204NIST+2

Cloud & Infra, GRC· Published and added 12 Oct 2026

aws.amazon.comarticle🛡️ Security

Quantum-resistant signing on AWS, Part 1: Build a software supply chain with ML-DSA

Part 1 of an AWS series showing how to build a quantum-resistant software supply chain with ML-DSA: ML-DSA keys in AWS KMS, an ML-DSA root/subordinate CA hierarchy in AWS Private CA, and IAM Roles Anywhere trust anchors for external build agents. It covers signing binaries (EXTERNAL_MU with OpenSSL 3.5), container images as OCI referrers via ORAS, and SBOMs wrapped in in-toto Statements bound to the artifact digest, plus verification, admission control, trust-store distribution, revocation and SCP guardrails. It frames the "forge later" threat and maps CNSA 2.0 (ML-DSA-87 only for NSS) and EU CRA deadlines to actions.

AWSAWS KMSAWS Private CA+3

ML-DSANIST FIPS 204CNSA 2.0+8

Supply Chain, DevSecOps, Cloud & Infra· Published and added 12 Oct 2026

microsoft.comarticle🛡️ Security

Post-quantum authentication: Why organizations should start testing certificate ecosystems now

Microsoft Security Blog post arguing that post-quantum cryptography planning must extend beyond encrypted-data confidentiality to authentication and certificate ecosystems, since larger PQC certificate chains and new algorithms like ML-DSA-87 can break PKI workflows, HSMs, and legacy infrastructure. It details Microsoft's PQC TLS Pilot Program, launched August 27, 2026, which lets approved certificate authorities (ComSign, DigiCert, HARICA, IdenTrust, Sectigo, Shanghai Electronic Certification Authority, SSL.com) test ML-DSA-87 certificate issuance under the Microsoft Trusted Root Program, plus Windows 11 builds (KB5101681, KB5101684) that support evaluating ML-DSA certificates via Schannel in non-production environments. It lays out a six-step readiness plan: inventory certificate dependencies, map trust relationships, assess vendor roadmaps, identify long-lived infrastructure, build test environments, and plan a multi-year migration.

WindowsSchannelTLS

ML-DSAML-DSA-87PQC TLS Pilot Program+8

Identity & Access, GRC· Published and added 8 Oct 2026

eprint.iacr.orgpaper🛡️ Security

Provable Subexponential Algorithms for Module-SIS and Module-LWE

ePrint preprint extending the Ducas–Engelberts–Loyer provable subexponential Gaussian sampler (built on Wagner's generalized birthday algorithm) to module matrices over power-of-two cyclotomic rings. It gives provable 2^{O(n/lnln n)}-time algorithms for Module-SIS and for decision and search Module-LWE using only the k+ℓ ring samples provided, plus sample-preserving scalar search-LWE and narrow Module-LWE variants. Separate heuristic estimates suggest these Wagner-style attacks do not reach the NIST security targets of ML-KEM and ML-DSA.

ML-KEMML-DSANIST+4

other· Added 12 Oct 2026, published 8 Oct 2026

bankless.comarticle🛡️ Security

Vitalik Flags AI Risk to Crypto, Warns Against Rushed Wallet Moves

Vitalik Buterin responds to Ethereum Foundation researcher Justin Drake's bunker mode proposal, agreeing AI-accelerated cryptanalysis could break ECDSA, the signature scheme behind most crypto wallets, in months not years, and that lattice-based schemes like ML-DSA billed as quantum-safe could also take serious hits within two years. Buterin gives practical key-hygiene advice such as keeping funds in addresses that never exposed a public key and rotating multisig signer keys after every operation with offchain signature collection, while warning that botched migrations cost more than hacks.

Ethereum

Vitalik ButerinJustin DrakeECDSA

Blockchain· Published and added 8 Oct 2026

eprint.iacr.orgpaper🛡️ Security

Provable Subexponential Algorithms for NIST Third-Round Lattice Families

An IACR ePrint paper by Yiming Gao, Xuyuan Han, and Honggang Hu presenting provable classical subexponential algorithms (running in roughly 2^((1/2+o(1))n/ln ln n) time/space) for recovering short secrets in growing parameter families tied to all seven NIST third-round lattice candidates: Kyber/ML-KEM, FrodoKEM, SABER, NTRU LPRime, Dilithium/ML-DSA, Falcon, and cyclic NTRU-HPS/HRSS. The approach extends the Wagner-style Gaussian sampling framework of Ducas, Engelberts, and Loyer (CRYPTO 2025) and a low-error decision-LWE algorithm, using an exact squared-Euclidean-norm gap to binary-search each secret coordinate, and an "affine slice search" over the public lattice for NTRU/Falcon-type quotient relations. The authors explicitly note the subexponential complexity applies to growing/weakened parameter regimes and does not reduce the concrete security of the currently specified NIST parameter sets.

NISTML-KEMML-DSA+12

other· Added 8 Oct 2026, published 6 Oct 2026

eprint.iacr.orgpaper🛡️ Security

A Security-Aware PQC Benchmarking Framework on Dual-Core Xtensa Silicon

This IACR ePrint paper proposes a security-aware benchmarking framework for deploying memory-heavy PQC (ML-KEM, ML-DSA) on the dual-core ESP32-S3 (Xtensa LX7) running FreeRTOS, aimed at smart-grid substation devices bound by the IEC 61850 GOOSE tripping window (≤3ms). It details an asymmetric task-isolation design pinning crypto to Core 1, a heap-auditing methodology for FreeRTOS's heap_4.c allocator tracking key-state allocations across DRAM, and an analytical latency model of CPU stall overhead caused when side-channel masking forces secret polynomial shares to spill to external Octal-SPI PSRAM during non-sequential Cooley-Tukey NTT strides. The work gives embedded engineers a methodology to evaluate PQC side-channel/latency trade-offs before migrating real-time grid infrastructure.

ESP32-S3FreeRTOS

ML-KEMML-DSAIEC 61850+2

Hardware & RF· Added 8 Oct 2026, published 6 Oct 2026

discuss.grapheneos.orgwriteup🛡️ Security

Pixel 11 doesn't yet meet the GrapheneOS security standards and may be skipped

GrapheneOS reports that its partial Pixel 11 port must be abandoned because the device lacks working ARM hardware Memory Tagging Extension (MTE) support in software, firmware, and likely hardware, despite Pixel 8/9/10 supporting it since 2023. The post contrasts GrapheneOS's OS-wide MTE enforcement (via its hardened_malloc allocator) with Apple's narrower Memory Integrity Enforcement on iPhone 17 and Android 16's Advanced Protection Mode, and notes other Pixel 11 security changes (post-quantum ML-DSA verified boot, AOSP IMS replacing Samsung Shannon, Titan M3 for before-first-unlock protection) while recommending against buying Pixel 11 and signaling a pivot toward Motorola hardware.

GrapheneOSAndroidARM+2

ARM Memory Tagging Extension (MTE)Apple Memory Integrity Enforcement (MIE)Android Advanced Protection Mode (AAPM)+6

Mobile Security· Published and added 5 Oct 2026

eprint.iacr.orgpaper🛡️ Security

HyBind: Structural Analysis of PQ/T Hybrid Cryptographic Usage

HyBind is an intraprocedural Python static-analysis framework that traces cryptographic component secrets through code to determine whether post-quantum/traditional (PQ/T) hybrid key-derivation and signature-verification logic actually requires both algorithms to succeed, rather than silently accepting a result from only one. It uses registered API contracts and function-return/execution-effect checks to distinguish real AND-logic hybrids from presence-based heuristics that wrongly treat joint and single-algorithm contributions as equivalent. The authors validate it on 50 controlled fixtures and 33 programs (15 using native ML-KEM/X25519 and ML-DSA/Ed25519 APIs), showing relaxed checks can misclassify traditional-only results as hybrid.

Python

ML-KEMX25519ML-DSA+1

AppSec· Added 8 Oct 2026, published 5 Oct 2026

eprint.iacr.orgpaper🛡️ Security

Role-Specific Signature Placement in TLS 1.3: Cost Propagation and PQC Migration

An IACR eprint paper evaluating all 13-cubed ways to assign 13 post-quantum/traditional signature parameter sets across the Root, Intermediate and Leaf roles of a TLS 1.3 certificate chain, holding the algorithm set fixed and varying only placement. Across 286 three-algorithm groups, median max/min ratios reach 2.085x for TLS handshake latency, 4.310x for certificate body size and 4.551x for path-validation cost purely from role order, with Leaf placement mattering far more than Root/Intermediate swaps. It also shows that looking only at Certificate-message size can misrank candidates such as ML-DSA-65 versus SLH-DSA-SHAKE-192s once the Leaf signature in CertificateVerify and full authentication-path cost are included, arguing PQC certificate-chain design must account for role-specific cost under real network/load conditions.

TLS 1.3X.509ML-DSA

ML-DSA-65SLH-DSA-SHAKE-192s

AppSec· Added 8 Oct 2026, published 5 Oct 2026

eprint.iacr.orgpaper🛡️ Security

Post-Quantum Command Authentication for Unmanned Systems: A KpqC Feasibility Study under Real-Time and Bandwidth Constraints

This paper evaluates whether Korean post-quantum crypto candidates (HAETAE, AIMer, SMAUG-T, NTRU+) and NIST PQC standards (ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA) can replace classical ECDSA/ECDH in the authentication and key-establishment path of ROS2/DDS-Security for UAV/UGV command channels. The authors build a feasibility envelope mapping each algorithm's key/signature size and handshake latency against real command-link constraints (message rate, MTU, latency deadline, bandwidth), then validate it with authentication-handshake measurements over emulated constrained links on a two-node testbed, producing a classical→NIST→KpqC comparison and per-channel-budget application guidance.

ROS2DDS-Security

KpqCHAETAEAIMer+7

Hardware & RF, Identity & Access· Added 8 Oct 2026, published 5 Oct 2026

eprint.iacr.orgpaper🛡️ Security

Measuring Parallel Execution of Classical–PQC Component Pairs in Hybrid TLS 1.3

An IACR ePrint paper benchmarks whether running the classical and post-quantum components of hybrid TLS 1.3 key exchange (ECDHE–ML-KEM) and Composite ML-DSA signatures in parallel on separate pthread worker threads reduces handshake latency versus sequential execution. Across three RFC 10024 ECDHE–ML-KEM groups with server and mutual authentication, parallelism sped up all six tested conditions on a standard ARM and x86 system (1.04×–1.28×), with the largest gains in signature stages where component times are balanced, but slowed every condition on a low-power x86 system (0.80×–0.92×) because thread wake/wait overhead outweighed savings. The authors conclude that component independence alone doesn't guarantee a speedup and that parallelization decisions must be validated per target environment.

TLS 1.3pthread

ML-KEMML-DSAECDHE+1

other· Added 8 Oct 2026, published 5 Oct 2026

ethresear.charticle🛡️ Security

PQ spending for Stealth Address Protocol

Third in a series on post-quantum upgrades to the Stealth Address Protocol (ERC-5564/ERC-6538), this ethresear.ch post proposes a new schemeId=6 that replaces ECDH with ML-KEM for quantum-safe payment discovery and replaces ECDSA with either a lattice-based signature (SPIRIT, an ML-DSA/Dilithium variant) or a novel construction called HSAP that uses ML-KEM key delivery plus a ZK proof over hash-preimages for spending authorization. It works through the exact key-generation/derivation math for both schemes, discusses on-chain verification costs (citing ETHDILITHIUM benchmarks and draft EIP-8051's ~4500-gas ML-DSA-44 precompile), and sketches how the extended ERC-5564 announcer/registry interface and smart-account spending path would look under quantum attack assumptions.

EthereumML-DSAML-KEM

ERC-5564ERC-6538EIP-8051+6

Blockchain· Added 29 Sep 2026, published 28 Sep 2026

ethresear.charticle🛡️ Security

Post-Quantum: Lattice or Hash-Based (one question, two right answers)

A deep-dive field guide to choosing between lattice-based (ML-DSA/FN-DSA) and hash-based (SLH-DSA) post-quantum signatures, built from interviews with the designers and implementers behind both NIST standards and their deployments. It walks through Mosca's-inequality-style migration timing, CNSA 2.0's split between lattice signatures and stateful hash-based LMS/XMSS for firmware, the stateful-signature "footgun," and why the broader internet (TLS/WebPKI, via Merkle Tree Certificates) is converging on lattices while Ethereum's post-quantum consensus roadmap (leanXMSS, EIP-8292, EIP-8288 aggregation) and Algorand's live Falcon-1024 state proofs lean hash-based or scheme-neutral because of aggregation and on-chain storage constraints. It closes with a decision framework and a rundown of NIST's round-3 "onramp" signature candidates (MAYO, SQIsign, HAWK, etc.).

EthereumBitcoinAlgorand+3

ML-DSASLH-DSAFN-DSA+16

Blockchain, other· Added 3 Oct 2026, published 15 Sep 2026

openzeppelin.comarticle🛡️ Security

From Algebra to Noise: Why Post-Quantum Cryptography Looks Different

OpenZeppelin Security's technical explainer on why post-quantum cryptography looks so different from classical crypto: Shor's algorithm exploits the abelian hidden-subgroup structure underlying RSA, Diffie-Hellman, ECDSA, EdDSA and pairing-based schemes, while Grover's algorithm only halves the effective security of hashes and symmetric keys (256-bit hashes stay at a comfortable 128-bit level). It then walks through NIST's finalized lattice/hash-based PQC standards — ML-KEM (Kyber) for key establishment, ML-DSA (Dilithium) for general signatures, SLH-DSA (SPHINCS+) as a conservative hash-based backup, plus future Falcon/FN-DSA and code-based HQC — mapping each to blockchain use cases and covering real deployment (Starknet's Falcon-512 Cairo account contracts), Ethereum account-abstraction/hybrid-signature migration paths, Bitcoin's UTXO/consensus constraints, Ethereum's LeanSig consensus-signature research, and a concrete institutional crypto-asset-inventory and PQC audit checklist.

EthereumBitcoinML-KEM+3

NISTCRYSTALS-KyberCRYSTALS-Dilithium+10

Blockchain· Added 29 Sep 2026, published 14 Sep 2026

blog.trailofbits.comwriteup🛡️ Security

Shipping post-quantum cryptography to Python

Trail of Bits, funded by the Sovereign Tech Agency, implemented Rust bindings for NIST's ML-KEM (FIPS 203) key-establishment and ML-DSA (FIPS 204) digital-signature standards into pyca/cryptography, shipped in version 48 with AWS-LC backend support. The post makes them a pip install away for the Python ecosystem (pyca/cryptography sees 1.2B monthly PyPI downloads and underpins Certbot, Ansible, Airflow, and paramiko), while detailing the size/performance tradeoffs versus Ed25519/X25519 and noting SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) support and protocol-level integration are still in progress.

PythonPyPIRust+3

ML-KEMML-DSASLH-DSA+6

AppSec· Added 3 Sep 2026, published 30 Jun 2026

wiz.ioarticle🛡️ Security

State of Post Quantum Cryptography | Wiz Blog

Wiz's follow-up PQC research post quantifies real-world adoption of post-quantum key exchange (ML-KEM/X25519MLKEM768) and digital signatures (ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, pending FN-DSA) across AWS, Azure, and GCP APIs, OpenSSH/OpenSSL versions, and Go's crypto/tls. It finds stark gaps: Azure API servers show no PQC key-exchange support while GCP is universal and AWS sits at 13%, only 15% of TLS 1.3 connections observed use PQC-compliant key exchange, under 15% of OpenSSL instances support PQC, and less than 1% of companies use AWS KMS ML-DSA signing keys. The piece also covers the shift in PQC priority from key exchange (mitigating Harvest-Now-Decrypt-Later attacks) to digital signature migration, and the coming move to Merkle Tree Certificates to keep PQC certificate chains manageable.

AWSAzureGoogle Cloud+3

ML-KEMML-DSASLH-DSA+9

Cloud & Infra, GRC· Added 5 Sep 2026, published 28 May 2026

github.comrepo🛡️ Security

FoxGuard

FoxGuard is a fast local/CI security scanner offering 200+ built-in rules across 12 languages, cross-file taint tracking for 14 languages, secrets scanning, OSV-backed dependency (SCA) scanning, and a post-quantum crypto (PQC) audit that flags quantum-vulnerable primitives (RSA, ECDSA/DSA, ECDH/DH) against CNSA 2.0 deadlines while also inventorying already-adopted PQC algorithms (ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, FN-DSA, HQC). It ships a Semgrep/OpenGrep-compatible YAML rule bridge covering ~98% of the public Semgrep registry, outputs to SARIF/CycloneDX 1.6 CBOM/Semgrep-JSON, and integrates via GitHub Action, pre-commit, VS Code, Claude Code plugin, and MCP server, plus an interactive TUI for reviewing findings and baselines. It's part of the "0sec" open cybersecurity harness project.

SemgrepOpengrepSARIF+5

0secCNSA 2.0

AppSec, DevSecOps, Supply Chain· Added 3 Sep 2026, published 16 May 2026