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31 results for β€œFlow”

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  1. Lonnie VanZandt (@lonniev) on X

    Secure Courier is a consent flow in Tollbooth DPYC, a monetization network for paid MCP services, that lets an AI agent act for a Nostr npub without holding the user's nsec. The service sends a signed, sealed direct message over Nostr relays, the user replies with a signed approval and an expiry, and the service issues its own encrypted grant. Lonnie VanZandt presents it as an alternative to central identity providers and CIBA. The thread gives no audit results.

    x.comthreadAdded 1 Nov 2026🧠 AI

  2. Artificial Analysis (@ArtificialAnlys) on X

    Hyperflow H3 is Video Rebirth's 8-step LoRA for MiniMax H3, released in September 2026 with open weights. Artificial Analysis ranks it #5 on AA-Video-I2V v2.1 and #3 on AA-Video-Editing v1.1, ahead of MiniMax H3 (768p). It costs $9.00 per minute for Image to Video and $18.00 for Video Editing at 1088p, under half of Dreamina Seedance 2.5 ($34.12 and $40.82). The thread gives per-capability and per-use-case breakdowns.

    x.comthreadAdded 31 Oct 2026, published 30 Oct 2026🧠 AI

  3. SGLang (@sgl_project) on X

    SGLang announces Day-0 support for Mistral Large 4 ("Le Chonk"), saying it is the first engine to serve the model on NVIDIA Vera Rubin. The post describes the model as Mistral's largest to date: a natively multimodal 1T-parameter mixture-of-experts model covering instruct, reasoning, coding and agentic workflows. The fetched text is truncated, so benchmark claims and launch commands are not visible.

    x.comthreadAdded 30 Oct 2026, published 29 Oct 2026🧠 AI

  4. TENSA Engineering (@TENSAEng) on X

    A post by TENSAEng describing a workflow for staying within coding-tool usage limits. ChatGPT chat sits outside those limits, while Claude and Grok chats share a pool with Claude Code, Codex and Grok Build. Architecture, file layout, step order and acceptance checks are planned in ChatGPT and saved as repo docs. Claude Code or Codex then implements one small chunk per fresh session.

    x.comthreadAdded 29 Oct 2026, published 28 Oct 2026🧠 AI

  5. Hakimi Eiqbal (@hakimieiqbal) on X

    A practical reverse-engineering map by hakimieiqbal on X that picks tools by target: native binaries, .NET, Electron, iOS, firmware, WebAssembly and network protocols. It introduces REA (morluto/rea), which connects coding agents to RE tools, and lists MCP bridges for IDA Pro, Ghidra and radare2. It adds an evidence-first workflow and free courses such as pwn.college and OpenSecurityTraining2.

    x.comthreadAdded 29 Oct 2026, published 28 Oct 2026πŸ›‘οΈ Security

  6. Hakimi Eiqbal (@hakimieiqbal) on X

    A thread by Hakimi Eiqbal that maps reverse-engineering tools by target type: native binaries, Electron, .NET, iOS, firmware, WebAssembly and network protocols. Its AI sections cover REA (an open-source layer connecting coding agents to analysis tools) and MCP bridges for IDA Pro, Ghidra and radare2. It argues for an evidence-first workflow and gives a prompt that separates verified facts from hypotheses.

    x.comthreadAdded 29 Oct 2026, published 28 Oct 2026🧠 AI

  7. David Gutierrez | Eng (@david_x_ai) on X

    Thread on two October 2026 npm compromises: @subql/common 5.8.3 (5 October), published through GitHub Actions OIDC Trusted Publishing after the attacker tampered with the publish workflow, and tensorlake 0.5.144 (8 October), published by the project's own release workflow with valid provenance for about 1 hour 40 minutes. Both ran on install and stole cloud, GitHub, Kubernetes, Vault, SSH and .env credentials; tensorlake also took AI tool and MCP config. Its payload installed a gh-token-monitor service that deletes the home directory if the stolen GitHub token is revoked, so remove it before rotating.

    x.comthreadAdded 27 Oct 2026, published 26 Oct 2026πŸ›‘οΈ Security

  8. lee1981 (@lee1981b) on X

    Reply on X explaining a Bytecode Alliance advisory for Wasmtime's Cranelift compiler backend. A large or crafted Wasm function that generates enough SSA values overflows Cranelift's value-index representation, which packed indices into 24-bit fields. The fix widens them to 32 bits. The issue is not AArch64-specific, and the advisory names no required optimisation level. Guard pages do not reliably stop the resulting miscompilation and type confusion, so a sandbox escape can arise at compile time.

    x.comthreadAdded 28 Oct 2026, published 26 Oct 2026πŸ›‘οΈ Security

  9. alex lee (@alexlee20122022) on X

    Gheist is a GitHub campaign disclosed by Wiz in October 2026. Stolen tokens push ci-sync-XXXXXX branches with a sync-check workflow that dumps repo secrets base32-encoded to evade log masking, fetches the logs via API, then deletes the run. 13,500+ branches and 850+ accounts were hit since 15 September. Public repos are protected by the approval hold; private and Enterprise repos are not. The thread lists IOCs (.gdmp_pat files, "gheist" user agent, "ci: sync config" commits) and rotation steps.

    x.comthreadAdded 26 Oct 2026, published 25 Oct 2026πŸ›‘οΈ Security

  10. Prasenjit Sarkar (@stretchcloud) on X

    Post on the LiteLLM supply-chain compromise. Attackers spent eleven days in the GitHub org, ran a workflow on a throwaway branch to take twenty secrets including a GitHub App private key, then used stolen GitHub CLI OAuth tokens to publish malicious release 1.107.0 from a lookalike Berri-AI repo. A Python startup file harvested sixteen credential categories and LiteLLM proxy Postgres provider keys. Socket flagged the wheels in seven minutes.

    x.comthreadAdded 26 Oct 2026, published 24 Oct 2026πŸ›‘οΈ Security

  11. Paul Dragoonis (@dr4goonis) on X

    Social post summarising emergency patches for Node.js (4 high CVEs), PHP (2 critical) and nginx (3 critical). Node.js flaws include a Brotli decoder out-of-bounds write, a DNS truncation bug and two TLS hostname-verification bypasses. PHP has use-after-free and heap corruption bugs, and nginx has alias-rewrite and map-regex heap overflows plus an SSI-AIO use-after-free. It lists the fixed versions for each product.

    x.comthreadAdded 23 Oct 2026, published 22 Oct 2026πŸ›‘οΈ Security

  12. SecureChap (@SecureChap) on X

    Post describing a LiteLLM 1.107.0 PyPI compromise in which attackers used stolen GitHub CLI OAuth tokens from three engineers to trigger and approve the project-releaser workflow, producing eight malicious wheels and a tampered tarball. The wheels drop cook.pth, which runs at Python startup, and privcollect steals cloud tokens, keys, browser data, AI configs and LiteLLM proxy credentials, exfiltrating to litellm[.]dev/healthcheck. A second daemon polls a GitHub domain.txt hourly for new domains to fetch and execute. PyPI yanked the package the same day. The post is a single unsourced tweet.

    x.comthreadPublished and added 22 Oct 2026πŸ›‘οΈ Security

  13. Vishesh Raheja (@entropyconquers) on X

    GPT Voice is a free, open-source Mac app by Vishesh Raheja that brings ChatGPT's dictation to any macOS app. A shortcut starts recording, and the transcript is pasted where the user is typing. It uses the ChatGPT Pro subscription, so it needs no API key or extra subscription. The author built it after Handy handled coding prompts poorly and they did not want to pay for Wispr Flow. The thread gives no details on local versus API transcription or latency.

    x.comthreadAdded 22 Oct 2026, published 21 Oct 2026🧠 AI

  14. Mikko Laakkonen (@mikkolaakkonen) on X

    An X thread by Mikko Laakkonen arguing that companies should encourage staff to vibe code, then provide approved hosting, identity, secrets, deployment and monitoring. It lists 200 application checks in 17 sections, from ownership and data flow through keys, authz, coding-agent isolation, appsec, SBOM and releases to recovery, runtime AI and handover. It adds 16 EU bonus checks on GDPR, NIS2, the Cyber Resilience Act (reporting from 11 Sept 2026, main duties 11 Dec 2027), the AI Act and the Data Act. It builds on Mark Ajzenstadt's production-readiness post and links a 300-check worksheet version.

    x.comthreadAdded 18 Oct 2026, published 17 Oct 2026πŸ›‘οΈ Security

  15. Romy (@0xBunny) on X

    Tweet from 0xBunny announcing an update to Jev Workflows, an open-source workflow toolkit. It adds native Claude Code support alongside Codex, an opt-in Jev 1.14, experimental image/Box questions, shared QQ contract sync and local CI. Features were also mirrored to a sibling project called QQ. It is free, with no plugin quotas, and links to a GitHub repo.

    x.comthreadAdded 17 Oct 2026, published 16 Oct 2026🧠 AI

  16. P.K. Sharma (@_pksharma) on X

    Thread distinguishing two Langflow advisories on MCP Stdio command execution. CVE-2026-105740 (GHSA-7w94-79vh-5mr2) affects 1.8.3 and is fixed in 1.9.0, an authenticated non-admin path. CVE-2026-105697 (GHSA-w794-rj3p-xv45) covers 1.1.2 up to but excluding 1.10.3, with fixes in lfx and langflow-base too. The later fix validates the API, flow and pre-spawn boundaries and removes the shell wrapper, and the thread warns that LANGFLOW_AUTO_LOGIN=true can expose a token without credentials. It cites one sensor's telemetry (1,628 attempts from 28 IPs) with caveats, and gives a defensive checklist: verify patched packages, review stored MCP configs and imported flows, and hunt for unexpected child processes.

    x.comthreadAdded 17 Oct 2026, published 15 Oct 2026πŸ›‘οΈ Security

  17. Dark Web Informer (@DarkWebInformer) on X

    A DarkWebInformer post announces a public PoC for CVE-2026-85884, a Windows privilege escalation in the Windows Health and Optimized Experiences service. Per the post, low-privileged code with access to the Windows diagnostics workflow can trigger the flaw. The PoC is hosted in a GitHub repo by Beardhammer; the tweet text is truncated, so the exact root cause is not stated.

    x.comthreadAdded 16 Oct 2026, published 14 Oct 2026πŸ›‘οΈ Security

  18. lee1981 (@lee1981b) on X

    Defender guide for CVE-2026-104935, an authentication-bypass-by-spoofing flaw (CWE-290) in Ivanti Connect Secure that allows unauthenticated command execution. It is confirmed exploited and CISA KEV-listed, with a CNA CVSS 8.6. It covers the fixed-release matrix (25.1.1.2, 22.8R2.5, 25.1.3.x), platform and cluster migration limits, and Volexity's UTA0576 indicators and YARA rules. It also gives a six-step SOC workflow (scope, preserve, hunt, correlate identity, remediate, verify). It stresses that a clean ICT result cannot clear memory-only activity and that LDAP, LAPS and BitLocker exposure belongs to one observed chain.

    x.comthreadAdded 16 Oct 2026, published 14 Oct 2026πŸ›‘οΈ Security

  19. ThreatWire (@ThreatWire_) on X

    ThreatWire post on CVE-2026-97229, an integer overflow in the GitLab CI/CD regex compiler. GitLab rates it CVSS 3.1 10.0 and says it can allow unauthenticated code execution under certain conditions, in both CE and EE. Fixes are in 19.2.8, 19.3.5 and 19.4.2 (not 19.3.4), released Oct 12; GitLab-hosted instances are already patched. The post credits joaxcar via HackerOne and says a Rapid7 researcher published a lab PoC on GitHub, which ThreatWire has not run or verified. It also says the CVE is not in CISA KEV and has no known exploitation.

    x.comthreadAdded 15 Oct 2026, published 14 Oct 2026πŸ›‘οΈ Security

  20. kage (@0XKageX0) on X

    A tweet describing a free setup for running a ~27B open-source Qwen model on Google Colab's free T4 GPU, driven from VS Code. A Cloudflare tunnel with a proxy locks the endpoint behind an API key, and the endpoint is connected to 9router so Claude Code and Claude Cowork on the desktop can use it. It matters as a pointer to a zero-cost way to get Claude Code-style workflows on a self-hosted open model, though the steps are only in an accompanying video and the tweet gives no configuration or quantisation details.

    x.comthreadPublished and added 12 Oct 2026🧠 AI

  21. Phillip Shoemaker (@pbsIdentity) on X

    Social thread reacting to a newly disclosed high-severity OAuth vulnerability in the Model Context Protocol Python SDK, where a malicious MCP server could manipulate the authorization flow and steal credentials used by an agent. The author uses it to argue that delegated agent authority needs provenance (who granted it, to which agent, for which service and resource, whether it is transferable or replayable, and when it expires) and that machine-to-machine trust must be auditable by humans. Gives no CVE ID or technical exploit detail.

    x.comthreadAdded 13 Oct 2026, published 12 Oct 2026πŸ›‘οΈ Security

  22. 0xMarioNawfal (@RoundtableSpace) on X

    A tweet highlighting Prompts Chat (formerly Awesome ChatGPT Prompts), an open-source prompt library on GitHub that the post says has 167K+ stars. It works across ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini and other models. The post lists a CLI, an MCP server, a Claude Code plugin and self-hosting with custom branding and auth, all free. It is worth cataloguing as a pointer to a widely used prompt collection that now plugs into coding-agent and MCP workflows.

    x.comthreadPublished and added 10 Oct 2026🧠 AI

  23. Dan Kornas (@DanKornas) on X

    NuGuard is an open-source AI application safety and security toolkit for agentic AI systems, released under Apache 2.0. It unifies AI-SBOM generation, structural static analysis of the AI stack, and sandboxed adversarial red-teaming (100+ scenarios covering prompt injection, tool abuse, and data exfiltration) into a single CLI workflow, with an automated judge that scores findings by impact and provides remediation guidance.

    x.comthreadPublished and added 7 Oct 2026πŸ›‘οΈ Security

  24. Rajashekar Sudireddy (@raja_sudireddy) on X

    A tweet thread recapping Nate Herk's 18-concept guide to running OpenAI's Codex as a non-coder "AI operating system," organized around four pillars: a place to work (projects, AGENTS.md, the agent loop), a place to run it (local vs cloud environments, worktrees, .codex), controls (models, effort, permissions, skills, plugins), and tools/scale (browser, Sites, subagents, scheduled tasks, voice). It highlights AGENTS.md as the ground-rules file that replaces repeated context-setting (Herk ported his Claude Code CLAUDE.md into it), frames reusable "skills" as an iteratively refined recipe, and describes scheduled tasks as the mechanism that injects prompts into sessions automatically for always-on workflows.

    x.comthreadPublished and added 4 Oct 2026🧠 AI

  25. Brendan Jowett (@jowettbrendan) on X

    A curated Twitter/X thread listing ten GitHub repos that extend Claude Code and Codex workflows: spec-forcing planning/testing skills (obra/superpowers, mattpocock's skills with grill-me/diagnose/handoff), session memory compression (thedotmack's claude-mem-style tool), codebase-to-graph querying (safishamsi/graphify), a spec-driven long-task workflow (gsd-build), scope-reduction and anti-fluff skills, a cross-tool harness spanning Claude Code/Codex/OpenCode/Cursor (affaan-m/ECC), a multi-role agent team setup (garrytan/gstack), and a local model-routing gateway (musistudio's claude-code-router). Each entry is a practical, installable tool aimed at making coding agents more disciplined, memory-aware, and cost-efficient.

    x.comthreadPublished and added 3 Oct 2026🧠 AI

  26. Dizzzank (@dank0296) on X

    A Twitter thread recapping a "forward-deployed engineer" (FDE) talk on AI transformation methodology: find the real process a company runs (not the one it documents) by interviewing veteran staff and embedding engineers in the system of record, then sort every step into four buckets β€” delete, deterministic code, agentic (judgment plus exception history), or human-in-the-loop (payment, signing, negotiation). It argues most deployed workflows don't need frontier models β€” benchmark each workflow against cheap tiers and open-weight models like GLM, Kimi and Qwen, plus Grok, and let evals decide β€” and that agents should live inside existing systems of record like Salesforce/Slack rather than requiring migration to new AI-native tools. Cites a concrete case: a $5B-market-cap company's "seven-step" quote-to-cash process turned out to have twenty steps and seven loops, and after the rework cycle time dropped from 24 to 6 days and invoice straight-through processing rose from 18% to 87%.

    x.comthreadAdded 2 Oct 2026, published 1 Oct 2026🧠 AI

  27. Rohan Paul (@rohanpaul_ai) on X

    A tweet describing Google's RRSI (Regularized Recursive Self-Improvement of Agent Harnesses), a framework that automatically evolves all non-model components of an LLM agent β€” prompts, control flow, tool use and memory β€” while keeping the underlying LLM weights frozen. The "regularized" aspect suggests constraints added to recursive self-improvement loops to keep the evolved harness stable or bounded, distinguishing it from unconstrained self-modifying agent approaches.

    x.comthreadPublished and added 1 Oct 2026🧠 AI

  28. Julio Bandeira de Melo (@juliobmelo) on X

    Two GitHub Actions from the actions-cool maintainer, disabled by GitHub security after May's supply-chain compromise, were reactivated by the maintainer and left accessible for over a week without the malicious release tags being cleaned up. Any workflow still referencing those version tags resumed automatically downloading and executing the Mini Shai-Hulud payload, showing that disabling a compromised action isn't remediation if the poisoned tags survive reactivation.

    x.comthreadAdded 30 Sep 2026, published 28 Sep 2026πŸ›‘οΈ Security

  29. 0xor0ne (@0xor0ne) on X

    A tweet from @0xor0ne surfacing two blog posts by researcher ZephrFish on using LLMs for vulnerability research: one describing an MCP (Model Context Protocol) server for the workflow, and a second on 'harnessing' LLMs for this purpose. The posts (hosted at blog.zsec.uk) cover applying LLM agents to vulnerability discovery/analysis tasks.

    x.comthreadPublished and added 9 Sep 2026πŸ›‘οΈ Security

  30. Raytar (@Raytar) on X

    A Twitter/X thread explaining Claude Code's /goal and /loop commands, which let Claude repeatedly prompt and check itself against a defined finish condition rather than requiring a human to babysit each turn. It contrasts single-prompt workflows (which can produce confidently wrong output, e.g. fabricated sources) with loop-based workflows that self-verify, and gives a copy-pasteable "charter" template covering goal, work discovery, self-checking, state persistence (LOOP-STATE.md), and stop conditions.

    x.comthreadAdded 22 Sep 2026, published 31 Jul 2026🧠 AI

  31. cr3ghost (@cr3ghost) on X

    A tweet by @cr3ghost pointing to Azeria Labs (azeria-labs.com, by @Fox0x01) as a comprehensive free curriculum for ARM security research, covering ARM assembly from scratch, shellcode development, stack overflows, ROP chains, heap exploitation, iOS kernel heap grooming, TrustZone internals, GDB debugging, and QEMU lab setup. It links to specific Azeria Labs series on ARM assembly and shellcoding. Useful as a curated entry point for anyone starting ARM exploit development.

    x.comthreadPublished and added 10 Jun 2026πŸ›‘οΈ Security