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88 results for โ€œfalโ€

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  1. TextSeal2: Distortion-Free LLM Watermarking with Copula Mixing and Memoryless Races

    TextSeal2 is a distortion-free LLM text watermark that merges two or more keys into one virtual key and couples it to fresh noise through AutoMark's Gaussian copula. Under speculative decoding it verifies keyed drafts with an extra exponential race, so output matches the target model and acceptance rate is unchanged. On three LLMs at a 10^-3 false-positive rate, it detects 8 to 22 points more 100-token answers than TextSeal.

    arxiv.orgpaperAdded 31 Oct 2026, published 29 Oct 2026๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Security

  2. TextSeal2: Distortion-Free LLM Watermarking with Copula Mixing and Memoryless Races

    TextSeal2 is a distortion-free watermark for LLM output that keeps its signal under speculative decoding. It merges two or more keys into one virtual key coupled to fresh noise through AutoMark's Gaussian copula, and verifies drafts with an extra exponential race. On three LLMs it detects 8 to 22 points more 100-token answers than TextSeal at a 10^-3 false-positive rate.

    arxiv.orgpaperAdded 31 Oct 2026, published 29 Oct 2026๐Ÿง  AI

  3. Stop Calling Them Provers: The Case for Calling ProVerif and Tamarin Symbolic Protocol Analyzers

    Nadim Kobeissi's ePrint paper 2026/2683 argues that ProVerif and Tamarin should be called symbolic protocol analyzers, not provers. It audits their published soundness arguments, finding false statements, missing proofs and gaps between paper and implementation, and reproduces reported Tamarin bugs that accept false claims. It also covers model gaps in parsers and state machines, weak secrecy queries and unjustified primitive equations. The page is an abstract only.

    eprint.iacr.orgpaperAdded 31 Oct 2026, published 29 Oct 2026๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Security

  4. SEAL: Sealed Queries for Local Sanitization against Indirect Prompt Injection

    SEAL is a defense against indirect prompt injection for local LLM agents. It learns a soft prompt and scoring readout offline, then uses a frozen task model to score and delete injected tokens from tool outputs, with queries built from trusted initial context. On AgentDojo, attack success falls from 34.6% to 0.1% and Joint rises from 51.4% to 77.5%, using about 127x fewer defense tokens than PISanitizer.

    arxiv.orgpaperAdded 31 Oct 2026, published 29 Oct 2026๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Security

  5. High Precision Noise Cleaning for CKKS with Application to Asynchronous Threshold CKKS

    High Precision Noise Cleaning for CKKS is an IACR ePrint preprint (2026/2675) by Zhihao Li, Cheng Hong and Tao Wei. It composes lower-degree Hermite polynomials to reach output noise bounds such as 2^-300 for noise flooding, and uses this to build an asynchronous threshold CKKS scheme with strong simulation security in the random oracle model. In OpenFHE, binary-message cleaning falls from 9.63 s to 1.54 s.

    eprint.iacr.orgpaperAdded 31 Oct 2026, published 29 Oct 2026๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Security

  6. REALM: Identifying Minimal Task Assets for LLM Agents

    REALM (Required Execution Assets Linked to a Mission) is an approach to applying least privilege to LLM agents by identifying the assets a task needs, including ones discovered at runtime. It models assets as Dependency Graph nodes, separates discovering an asset from authorizing it, and exposes resource-bound Partial APIs inside a Task Container. On AgentDyn with qwen3.5-flash, attack success rate falls from 16.6% to 0.2%, with 40.0% task completion on clean tasks and 36.4% on injected cases.

    arxiv.orgpaperAdded 31 Oct 2026, published 29 Oct 2026๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Security

  7. From Leniency to Suspicion: How an Open Post-Training Recipe Changes Whom LLM Fact-Checkers Believe

    This paper measures job-based doubt in LLM fact-checkers: judging a claim false more often when the poster has a lower-status job. It compares base and post-trained checkpoints of six model families on fact-checked claims with randomised poster profiles. Only the open Tรผlu-3 recipe (OLMo-2 32B, Tรผlu-3 70B) creates the effect, under one percentage point but reliable. In OLMo-2 32B the flip comes from one residual-stream direction and appears at supervised fine-tuning, confirmed on 400 new claims. None of seven commercial models doubts lower-status posters more.

    arxiv.orgpaperAdded 30 Oct 2026, published 28 Oct 2026๐Ÿง  AI

  8. Post-Training Large Language Models with LLMON

    LLMON (LLM Object Notation) is a framework that separates instructions from data and requires explicit identifier-based execution. The authors post-train Granite-4.1 3B and 8B base models with SFT then RL on a 4.6B-token structured corpus covering general, RAG and tool-calling data, with distractor variants. Attack success rates on indirect prompt-injection benchmarks fall from 53-100% to 0.02-5.6%, and general capability is preserved. Attention-based metrics diagnose failures per transformer layer.

    arxiv.orgpaperAdded 30 Oct 2026, published 28 Oct 2026๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Security

  9. Post-Training Large Language Models with LLMON

    LLMON (LLM Object Notation) is a framework that separates executable instructions from passive data and requires explicit identifier-based execution. The paper post-trains Granite-4.1 3B and 8B base models on a 4.6B-token corpus of general, RAG and tool-calling data with distractor variants, using SFT then RL. Attack success rates on indirect prompt-injection benchmarks fall from 53-100% to 0.02-5.6%, with general capabilities preserved. It also adds attention-based per-layer diagnostics.

    arxiv.orgpaperAdded 30 Oct 2026, published 28 Oct 2026๐Ÿง  AI

  10. Can LLMs Uncover Hidden Physical Laws through Free Exploration?

    LongChang is an automated framework that builds simulated worlds with altered physical laws, such as heavier objects falling more slowly, to test whether LLMs can find the law by free exploration. Explorer LLMs manipulate objects and build tools without tasks or hints, while separate LLM agents generate scenes, review tool designs and grade reports. Across 12 LLMs, GPT-6 Astra reached a 16.7% discovery rate and the other 11 scored 0%.

    arxiv.orgpaperAdded 28 Oct 2026, published 27 Oct 2026๐Ÿง  AI

  11. Falcon Key Recovery from Joint Sampler Leakages

    Falcon Key Recovery from Joint Sampler Leakages is an ePrint paper presenting a power side-channel attack on Falcon and FN-DSA that fuses three SamplerZ leakages (exponent class of the center, sign bit, proposal magnitude). It turns them into slab and halfspace constraints solved by softplus interval regression, with no LLL or BKZ. On PQClean Falcon-512 (ARM Cortex-M4) it recovered all 50 keys with at most 34 signatures; on c-fn-dsa it recovered 38 of 50 keys within 200 signatures.

    eprint.iacr.orgpaperAdded 28 Oct 2026, published 27 Oct 2026๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Security

  12. Private Information Retrieval with Accountability at Erasure-Optimal Server Redundancy

    SynTrace is a single-round compiler that adds accountability to linear private information retrieval (PIR). The client mixes the retrieval query with m audit queries, so audit syndromes identify up to d deviating servers among t colluding ones before reconstruction. The paper proves perfect query privacy and zero false identification within the threshold. For Shamir-based PIR it needs k=t+d+1 servers. For a 32 KiB record from a 1 GiB database it uses 2.25 MiB, against 8.96 MiB for the Eriguchi, Kurosawa and Nuida (TCC 2022) homomorphic-MAC construction.

    eprint.iacr.orgpaperPublished and added 26 Oct 2026๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Security

  13. SymLift: Neural Semantic Lifting for Compile-Free Vulnerability Detection in Context-Incomplete Code Fragments

    SymLift is a compile-free vulnerability detection framework for context-incomplete code fragments. A fine-tuned LLM lifts control-flow, data-flow, memory and resource relations into a constrained LLVM-like IR. A parser turns the IR into facts, and Datalog rules derive findings with derivation traces. On Juliet function-level fragments Clang compilation success falls to 12.00%, while SymLift's completion rate drops only 1.17 points. SymLift-Qwen-7B reaches Target-F1 94.41% on FormAI and 91.66% micro-F1 on MegaVul.

    arxiv.orgpaperAdded 28 Oct 2026, published 25 Oct 2026๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Security

  14. A Kelseyโ€“Kohno Attack Variant against SHA-2 Message Digests in HSS/LMS and XMSS

    Falko Strenzke's ePrint 2026/2635 presents a multi-target second-preimage attack on message hashing in HSS/LMS and XMSS with SHA-256 and SHA-256/192. It herds chaining states from many collected signatures into one state, defeating the key and leaf-index prefix. With 2^64 signatures, SHA-256 cost falls from 2^256 to about 2^166 (2^156 at maximal message length). SHAKE256 parameter sets are unaffected.

    eprint.iacr.orgpaperAdded 26 Oct 2026, published 25 Oct 2026๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Security

  15. Who Is Sycophantic to Whom? Confident LLMs, Human Deference, and the Collapse of Trust Calibration

    This paper studies reverse sycophancy: whether users bend toward a confident, consistent, wrong LLM. In a within-subjects experiment, 32 participants learned science topics from five GPT-5-mini assistants with 0 to 100% of facts replaced by falsehoods. Scores fell from 7.4 to 2.9 out of 10, planted falsehoods were chosen on 60% of falsified items against 11% of correctly taught ones, and confidence stopped tracking correctness. It introduces a baseline-corrected Human Deference Index.

    arxiv.orgpaperAdded 24 Oct 2026, published 22 Oct 2026๐Ÿง  AI

  16. Linear Cryptanalysis of TFHE-Friendly Cipher FRAST in the Average Key Setting

    Linear cryptanalysis of FRAST, a TFHE-friendly stream cipher, in the average key setting. It fixes the false-positive problem left open in the earlier attack by Bak et al., showing key differences fall into five indistinguishable classes per round. The Contract algorithm recovers the master key for 10 rounds and, on weak keys of density 2^-11.8 to 2^-5.4, reaches full FRAST within the claimed security.

    eprint.iacr.orgpaperAdded 24 Oct 2026, published 22 Oct 2026๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Security

  17. TRIAD: Benchmarking Omni-Modal Ambiguity in Multimodal Large Language Models

    TRIAD is a benchmark for omni-modal ambiguity resolution. It has 327 hand-written text-image-audio queries in 86 scene groups across 18 ambiguity categories, and removing any one modality makes the answer non-unique. Across 14 omni-modal systems, the best model trails humans by over 20 points in group accuracy. Without answer options, model group accuracy falls to single digits, and leave-one-out tests show audio cues are often underused.

    arxiv.orgpaperAdded 23 Oct 2026, published 22 Oct 2026๐Ÿง  AI

  18. Disentangling Robustness and Sycophancy in Multilingual LLMs

    The SC-matrix is an evaluation framework for multilingual LLM sycophancy. It crosses a model's competence (correct answer with no pressure) with its sycophancy (keeping that answer under pressure), so agreeing with a false premise can be told apart from not knowing the answer in that language. Results: equal aggregate sycophancy rates hide different failure mixes, high competence does not always protect, and reasoning-oriented mitigations beat directive ones.

    arxiv.orgpaperAdded 24 Oct 2026, published 22 Oct 2026๐Ÿง  AI

  19. RingTrace: Model-Free Spatio-Temporal Detection and Core Attribution for Cache Side-Channels

    RingTrace is a monitoring framework that detects Flush+Reload cache side-channel attacks by combining per-core cache-miss counters with slice activity across uncore CBoxes. Its Joint Spatio-Temporal Attribution (JSTA) builds a joint-activity matrix without model training: the largest entry is the screening score and row sums point to a candidate core. The authors report detection before secret leakage, fewer false alarms under heavy memory load, and negligible runtime overhead on commodity processors.

    eprint.iacr.orgpaperAdded 24 Oct 2026, published 21 Oct 2026๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Security

  20. Verifiable Post-Quantum TLS Handshake: Recognizing Implementation Errors of Cryptographic Verification Steps

    PQCD-TLS is a post-quantum TLS handshake that binds confirmation codes into chained key derivation, so a faulty signature or KEM verification step causes a key mismatch and handshake failure. The authors build confirmation-code frameworks for ML-DSA and Falcon signatures and for ML-KEM, HQC and DAWN, with unpredictability proofs. Across 48 configurations, handshake latency overhead stays below 1%.

    eprint.iacr.orgpaperAdded 24 Oct 2026, published 21 Oct 2026๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Security

  21. Where AI Vulnerability Discovery Harnesses Go Quiet: Structural False Negatives and Hidden Vulnerabilities

    Paper (arXiv, 21 October 2026) on structural false negatives in LLM vulnerability discovery harnesses. Starting from Knostic's OpenAnt and raptor, then 10 more open-source harnesses, the authors map 13 points where code selection, filtering, and finding storage or merging drop vulnerabilities. One file was dropped by six harnesses before the model saw it, five without notice. It covers attacker evasion, content-steered verdicts, prompt injection, and design principles and tests.

    arxiv.orgpaperAdded 24 Oct 2026, published 21 Oct 2026๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Security

  22. PQ-Vault: Provably Quantum-Safe Asset Custody for Unmodified Ethereum

    PQ-Vault is a custody design for unmodified Ethereum against quantum key recovery. It combines a quantum-safe vault contract, a proof-of-stake sidechain with compact certificates, and an optimistic dispute protocol. The paper proves that compact certificates with classically chosen parameters fall from 128 to about 60 bits against quantum attackers, and bounds a seed-update stake-steering attack. For 65,536 validators a certificate is 0.8 MB and verifies in about 20 ms, and the vault accepts a checkpoint for about 420,000 gas.

    arxiv.orgpaperAdded 24 Oct 2026, published 21 Oct 2026๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Security

  23. Beyond 4 bits: Data-Centric Post-training Quantization and Recovery

    This paper studies 2-bit post-training quantization (PTQ) of six dense and mixture-of-experts models from 3.8B to 32B parameters. It finds the quantization representation matters most: vector codebooks give usable models where scalar PTQ falls to chance. Calibration and recovery data must be chosen jointly. The recipe uses about 2.3 effective bits per weight, keeps 89 to 97% of full-precision QA accuracy, and needs 1.4 to 30x less compute than the strongest QAT baseline.

    arxiv.orgpaperAdded 22 Oct 2026, published 20 Oct 2026๐Ÿง  AI

  24. Code2Video-Compass: A Comprehensive Benchmark for General-Purpose Code-Based Video Generation across T2V, I2V, and V2V

    Code2Video-Compass is a benchmark of 2,104 tasks for code-based video generation, where multimodal LLMs write executable programs that produce complete videos from text (T2V), image (I2V) or video (V2V) inputs. Tasks span 10 categories and 24 subtypes. Scoring uses 12 objective metrics and five MLLM-judge metrics. Across 15 proprietary and open-weight models from nine families, performance falls as construction, dynamic animation and state-dependency complexity rise.

    arxiv.orgpaperAdded 22 Oct 2026, published 20 Oct 2026๐Ÿง  AI

  25. Context-Aware Prompt Injection Detection via Small Language Models in RAG Pipelines: nokast-secureRAG

    nokast-secureRAG is a roughly 0.5B-parameter small language model that works as a semantic firewall between retrieval and generation in local RAG systems. It classifies each query and context pair as safe, suspicious or malicious. It reaches 0.994 recall at a 0.026 false-positive rate in-distribution, beating Llama Guard 3 1B and Prompt-Guard-86M (0.900 recall, 0.690 FPR). Recall on PoisonedRAG falls to near zero, and single-request latency is 293-404 ms.

    arxiv.orgpaperAdded 22 Oct 2026, published 20 Oct 2026๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Security

  26. Is Sycophancy a Form of In-Context Updating?

    "Is Sycophancy a Form of In-Context Updating?" argues that factual sycophancy, a model's deference to a user's false beliefs, is a failure of in-context updating rather than only a bid for approval. Models also revise answers for claims attributed to external sources, more so when better supported, and deference persists when no user approval is at stake. The internal components behind deference also matter causally for general updating, so reducing sycophancy may reduce useful updating.

    arxiv.orgpaperAdded 22 Oct 2026, published 20 Oct 2026๐Ÿง  AI

  27. Fault-Induced Nonce Repetition in Threshold Lattice Signatures: A Reveal-Structure Criterion, Cross-Scheme Analysis, and Detection Boundaries

    Fault-Induced Nonce Repetition in Threshold Lattice Signatures is an ePrint paper (2026/2566, Yulong Meng) showing that faulting t devices in a t-of-n threshold ML-DSA deployment recovers the full signing secret, verified on Mithril with exact recovery in 96/96 scan groups. It gives a reveal-structure criterion across Quorus, TALUS and Trilithium, a threshold law m* = (โ„“-1)N+โŒˆN/KโŒ‰ for imperfect faults, and two-layer transcript detection (305/305 hits, no false positives).

    eprint.iacr.orgpaperAdded 21 Oct 2026, published 20 Oct 2026๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Security

  28. Regular Syndrome Decoding Is Easier Than Previously Estimated

    Preprint by Jiseung Kim, Minkyu Kim, Changmin Lee and Hochang Lee on the Regular Syndrome Decoding (RSD) problem. It presents a hybrid-algebraic attack that balances zero-coordinate guesses and syndrome-based eliminations across regular blocks. Parameter sets in Ferret, Wolverine and committed VOLE fall below 128-bit targets by up to 67 bits, and the revised Liu et al. (EUROCRYPT 2024) PCG sets cost under 2^111 field operations.

    eprint.iacr.orgpaperAdded 21 Oct 2026, published 20 Oct 2026๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Security

  29. Regular Syndrome Decoding Is Easier Than Previously Estimated

    Preprint 2026/2563 presents a refined hybrid-algebraic attack on Regular Syndrome Decoding (RSD) that balances zero-coordinate guesses and syndrome-based eliminations across all regular blocks. It puts at least one parameter set each from Ferret (CCS 2020), Wolverine (IEEE S&P 2021) and committed VOLE (CCS 2025) below the 128-bit target, with losses up to 67 bits. PCG attack costs improve by up to 29.77 bits (non-binary) and 25.91 bits (binary), and the revised Liu et al. (EUROCRYPT 2024) 128-bit sets fall below 2^111 field operations.

    eprint.iacr.orgpaperAdded 21 Oct 2026, published 20 Oct 2026๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Security

  30. Graphs and cycles in curve-based collision walks

    Graphs and cycles in curve-based collision walks is an IACR ePrint paper (2026/2560) on van Oorschot-Wiener style collision attacks in the multi-user setting. It covers elliptic curve discrete logarithms and isogeny pathfinding on supersingular F_p^2 and F_p curves, and proposes new pseudorandom walks. For F_p^2 curves, L keys need about L + log(L) useful collisions with no infiltrator. For F_p curves, about 0.75L keys fall to L collisions with an infiltrator.

    eprint.iacr.orgpaperAdded 21 Oct 2026, published 20 Oct 2026๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Security

  31. Privacy with Leakage from Falsifiable Assumptions

    Privacy with Leakage from Falsifiable Assumptions is an ASIACRYPT 2026 paper by Francesco Berti and Itamar Levi. It replaces simulatability with "secure refreshing", a key-refreshing assumption that evaluation laboratories can test directly, and adds "strongly protected secure refreshing". Using these, it proves privacy of the PSV encryption scheme without assuming a leak-free component.

    eprint.iacr.orgpaperAdded 20 Oct 2026, published 19 Oct 2026๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Security

  32. Evasive Inner Product Functional Encryption Is Broken Too

    Evasive Inner Product Functional Encryption Is Broken Too is a 2026 ePrint paper by Agrawal, Modi, Yadav and Yamada. It gives a counterexample showing the evasive IPFE assumption of Hsieh, Lin and Luo (Eurocrypt 2024) is false in full generality. The attack extends the 2025 PRFE counterexample and needs only the weak inner product functionality, not pseudorandom function computation. The authors conclude that letting the adversary choose unrestricted private coins breaks the Evasive LWE family.

    eprint.iacr.orgpaperAdded 20 Oct 2026, published 19 Oct 2026๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Security

  33. IISFA: Ineffective Instruction-Skip Fault Attacks on Bitslice Implementations

    IISFA (Ineffective Instruction-Skip Fault Attack) targets bitsliced block cipher implementations protected by redundancy countermeasures. Skipping one bitslice instruction leaves the result unchanged only when all m S-box inputs fall in an ineffective set, so each released ciphertext restricts all m subkeys. The authors give known- and chosen-plaintext key-recovery procedures and expected injection counts, and recover keys in every trial on GIFT, SKINNY and PIPO implementations on an 8-bit AVR microcontroller using clock glitches.

    eprint.iacr.orgpaperAdded 20 Oct 2026, published 19 Oct 2026๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Security

  34. Post-Quantum Stateless Steganography & MTU Bounds: Bridging P2P Censorship Resistance to Quantum Networks

    Forum announcement of a Zenodo preprint on post-quantum migration for censorship-resistant P2P steganographic tunnels. It argues that ML-KEM's prime modulus (q=3329) makes naive bit-packed ciphertexts statistically distinguishable from uniform noise, which gives a cheap passive DPI distinguisher. It also argues that composite PQ 0-RTT envelopes over 4.4 KB force fragmentation, which requires stateful reassembly before AEAD verification and reopens memory-exhaustion DoS in eBPF/XDP filters. Proposed fixes are algebraic uniformization (LWR lattices or inverse rejection sampling), sub-MTU hybrid or pure-PQ envelopes (Falcon-512, signcryption), and Fujisakiโ€“Okamoto implicit rejection for constant-time silent drops. Aimed at Ethereum validator, libp2p and RPC transports facing harvest-now-decrypt-later threats.

    ethereum-magicians.orgpaperPublished and added 17 Oct 2026๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Security

  35. E๏ฌƒcient Fixed-Point Implementation of Mitaka

    Presents a fixed-point C implementation of the Mitaka signing algorithm, a simpler, parallelizable Falcon (FN-DSA) variant. It replaces MitakaZ's wide integral Gram root decomposition with a fixed-point square Cholesky decomposition, which cuts the cost of integer Gaussian sampling, and proves bounds on intermediate values and representation errors without empirical assumptions. Signing averages 361 kcycles (Mitaka-512) and 707 kcycles (Mitaka-1024) on AVX2, and 4.0 and 7.8 Mcycles on an STM32F411 Cortex-M4F. This makes floating-point-free lattice signatures practical on constrained devices.

    eprint.iacr.orgpaperPublished and added 17 Oct 2026๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Security

  36. Predictable Scaling: Efficient Model Exploration via Scaling-Law Prediction

    Predictable Scaling (PS) is a framework that predicts full-scale recommendation model performance from scaled-down proxies. It builds proxies with composable scaling functions along separate resource axes, then projects metrics to target scale by curve fitting with calibrated uncertainty. Of three predictors, even the raw proxy falls within repeated-run noise, and a Gaussian Process gives 15% lower relative MAE. On a task-specific ranker and a foundation ranker, PS ranks hypotheses correctly at 79-88% compute reduction.

    arxiv.orgpaperAdded 20 Oct 2026, published 16 Oct 2026๐Ÿง  AI

  37. safeRNSgcd: Accelerating Falcon key generation with RNS in SafeGCD

    ePrint paper presenting safeRNSgcd, which computes the single Bรฉzout coefficient needed at the deepest level of Falcon's NTRU solver while keeping large integers in a residue number system. Centered explicit CRT recovers the exact low bits needed by SafeGCD batches using single-word fixed-point arithmetic. A C implementation integrated into ntrugen reduces inversion and private-key basis-generation cost on a Raspberry Pi 5 and two x86-64 CPUs, versus the original ntrugen and a variant that skips the unused coefficient.

    eprint.iacr.orgpaperAdded 17 Oct 2026, published 16 Oct 2026๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Security

  38. Onboard Lightweight LLM Reasoning for Human-Aware Safe UAV Navigation

    Presents a modular, fully onboard UAV navigation pipeline that closes the "human-aware safety gap" of geometry-only planners. A shared BLIP encoder drives captioning and text-conditioned segmentation, which is fused with depth for 3D obstacle localization. Qwen-2.5-0.5B, stabilized with RAG and grammar-constrained JSON decoding, infers per-category risk once per class and caches the verdict. Perception runs at 10 Hz on a Jetson Orin NX, and fallback LLM queries take about 0.8 s off the control path. In Gazebo it gives roughly 3x fewer collisions than a geometric planner and raises semantics-aware landing success from 34% to 96%. The 224-pixel encoder input limits small-object perception at range.

    arxiv.orgpaperAdded 17 Oct 2026, published 15 Oct 2026๐Ÿง  AI

  39. Multi-Reward Hacking: From Aggregation-Induced Drift to Trust-Anchored Defense

    The paper shows that symmetric aggregation of a primary reward (correctness) and auxiliary rewards (brevity, efficiency) in LLM post-training can raise aggregate reward while primary-task performance falls. It proves that deterministic conditional-mean GRPO converges to auxiliary-favoring behavior when auxiliary rewards are more reliably obtained. It proposes Trust-Anchored Gating (TAG), which elects an anchor channel by policy drift and gates auxiliary credit on anchor satisfaction. On Qwen3-4B with a brevity reward, TAG reaches 0.581 pass@4 versus 0.220 for additive aggregation, and shortens responses by 44% relative to correctness-only training. Experiments on Qwen and Llama models cover math and program synthesis.

    arxiv.orgpaperAdded 17 Oct 2026, published 15 Oct 2026๐Ÿง  AI

  40. From Detection to Decision: Calibration and Deferral for Prompt-Injection Detection

    Evaluates a native probabilistic decision model (Jev), Llama Prompt Guard 2 (22M and 86M) and an LLM judge on 47,611 held-out examples covering direct/indirect prompt injection, hard-benign inputs, obfuscation and distribution shift. The LLM judge has the best AUROC (0.897), followed by Jev (0.871), Prompt Guard 2 86M (0.757) and 22M (0.714). Jev's native probabilities do not consistently beat post-hoc calibrated classifier scores, and temperature scaling improves calibration but not discrimination. At a 1% false-negative-rate target, every system needs over 91.8% escalation, so probabilistic outputs alone do not give reliable security decisions under distribution shift.

    arxiv.orgpaperAdded 17 Oct 2026, published 14 Oct 2026๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Security

  41. Evidence-First Agentic Verification

    Introduces Sauron, an evidence-first agentic verifier that checks rubric criteria for long-horizon agent tasks by investigating both environment state and execution trace, and trusts a claim (including an agent's self-reported success) only after validating it against its source. Bounded queries and joint investigation of related criteria cut context use, and each verdict carries an auditable evidence receipt. On 2,586 human-labeled criteria from 100 personal-assistant episodes it has the best F1 of five verifiers across eight backbones (0.96 vs 0.92 for Gandalf with GPT-5.6 Sol, at 23% lower cost). It detects 97% of injected failures across 13 fault families, including reward-hacking simulations, with 2% false flags on clean controls, and leads on the TRAIL agent-error benchmark. It matters because unreliable rubric verdicts used as RL rewards can reinforce bad behavior.

    arxiv.orgpaperAdded 14 Oct 2026, published 13 Oct 2026๐Ÿง  AI

  42. BrowseSafe++: Benchmarking Prompt Injection Detection Across Web Contexts, Languages, and Browser Views

    BrowseSafe++ extends BrowseSafe to 38,675 paired attacked/clean web pages, most with prompt injections observed in the wild on production sites. Pages cover twelve site types, 24 attack types and 18 injection locations, each given as HTML, Markdown, accessibility tree and screenshot with a user task and expected answer. The authors train BrowseSafe-Guard, two 0.8B detectors (text and screenshot) that beat a frontier-model-based detector on F1 with low false positives and low inference cost. BrowseSafe-Adapt rewrites injections using browser-agent feedback, raising attack success from a few percent to up to 95.41%.

    arxiv.orgpaperAdded 15 Oct 2026, published 12 Oct 2026๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Security

  43. Staggered Instruction-Fetch Duplication: A Lightweight Processor-Level Countermeasure Against Fault Injection

    Proposes Staggered Instruction-Fetch Duplication (SIFD), a processor-level fault-injection countermeasure that fetches each instruction twice in consecutive cycles while fetching two different instructions per cycle, so inconsistent fetches are detected without full processor duplication, compiler support or crypto hardware. Implemented on a custom RV32I core on an Artix-7 FPGA, it costs 15.0% more slices and 16.3% more execution time. Attack success falls from 0.86% to below 0.01% under clock fault injection and from 0.32% to 0.13% under EMFI, with 73.18% of CFI and 11.44% of EMFI attempts detected.

    eprint.iacr.orgpaperAdded 14 Oct 2026, published 10 Oct 2026๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Security

  44. Confidential Error-Correcting Codes

    Introduces Confidential Error-correcting Codes (CECs), a primitive that decodes reliably from perturbed codewords while keeping the message confidential, defined by confidentiality, robustness and soundness. The Randomness-Security Separation framework encodes a nonce and masks the payload with a PRF; the Conc-CEC instantiation uses concatenated Reed-Muller and Reed-Solomon codes and claims stronger concrete security than PRCs (CRYPTO'24). The application, CECMark, watermarks AI-generated images and reportedly beats Gaussian Shading, PRCMark and T2SMark across 56 perturbations with a false positive rate below 1e-5 and no side effects.

    eprint.iacr.orgpaperAdded 14 Oct 2026, published 10 Oct 2026๐Ÿง  AI

  45. Confidential Error-Correcting Codes

    Introduces Confidential Error-correcting Codes (CECs), a cryptographic primitive for decoding perturbed codewords while keeping the message confidential, defined by confidentiality, robustness and soundness. The Randomness-Security Separation framework encodes a nonce and masks the payload with a PRF. The Conc-CEC instantiation uses concatenated Reed-Muller and Reed-Solomon codes, and the authors claim stronger concrete security than PRCs (CRYPTO'24). The CECMark application watermarks AI-generated images, and the authors report it beats Gaussian Shading, PRCMark and T2SMark across 56 perturbations with a false positive rate below 10^-5.

    eprint.iacr.orgpaperAdded 14 Oct 2026, published 10 Oct 2026๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Security

  46. SecReason: Vulnerability Detection and In-Stream Self-Repair for LLM Code Generation

    SecReason is an in-stream defense for reasoning LLMs that monitors code drafted inside the streamed chain of thought. Dual-track incremental scanning applies security rules per statement and traces dataflows across accumulated code; when a rule fires, generation is interrupted, a warning is inserted, and decoding resumes so the model repairs the draft in the same trace. On CWEval and SecCodeBench it raises the share of secure and functionally correct runs from below 15% to 72.8%โ€“98.1%, uses fewer tokens than post-hoc repair, and limits regressions from false warnings.

    arxiv.orgpaperAdded 16 Oct 2026, published 10 Oct 2026๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Security

  47. SecReason: Vulnerability Detection and In-Stream Self-Repair for LLM Code Generation

    SecReason is an in-stream defense for reasoning LLMs that monitors code drafted inside the streamed chain of thought. Dual-track incremental scanning applies security rules per statement and traces dataflow across accumulated code. When a rule fires, generation is interrupted, a warning is inserted and decoding resumes, so the model repairs its draft without regenerating the full response. On CWEval and SecCodeBench it raises the share of secure and functionally correct runs from below 15% to 72.8%โ€“98.1%, uses fewer tokens than post-hoc repair, and limits functional regressions from false warnings.

    arxiv.orgpaperAdded 15 Oct 2026, published 10 Oct 2026๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Security

  48. When VLMs Destroy What They Know: Spatial Representations Fall Below Lexical Priors

    Introduces EICS (Evaluation-Invariant Concept Stability), a metric for checking whether representations consistently encode a concept under controlled one-concept interventions. Also introduces CASP-VL, a benchmark of causally controlled spatial perturbations derived from Visual Genome scene graphs. Across several VLM architectures, spatial relations are represented much less faithfully than lexical information, even for models well above chance on compositional benchmarks. The relation is identifiable at the predicate's own tokens but is lost when the sentence is aggregated into a global representation (EOS token or mean pooling), a failure that output-based evaluation does not reveal.

    arxiv.orgpaperAdded 12 Oct 2026, published 9 Oct 2026๐Ÿง  AI

  49. Flying, Not Floating: Precise Fixed-Point Falcon on Embedded Processors

    Presents the first fixed-point FN-DSA (Falcon) signer for microcontrollers, using 32.64 arithmetic in constant-time Cortex-M4 assembly for Falcon-512 and Falcon-1024. Techniques that keep reciprocals, inverse square roots and small constants wide and round once at the consumer restore the precision lost by naive fixed-point. Measured precision supports about 2^99.7 (Falcon-512) and 2^96.7 (Falcon-1024) signing queries per key, against about 2^61.5 and 2^58.7 for double precision and the 2^64 target. The signer needs about 45% fewer cycles than double-precision emulation, at the cost of signing RAM rising from 59n to 83n bytes. The paper also shows which implementation choices lift double-precision c-fn-dsa above 2^64, derives Falcon-1024 key-generation bounds (72.3% of keys accepted vs 8.5% with the Falcon-512 values), and gives recommendations for the fixed-point FN-DSA NIST plans.

    eprint.iacr.orgpaperAdded 12 Oct 2026, published 9 Oct 2026๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Security

  50. DITTO: A Context-aware Pickle-based Pre-Trained Model Scanner for Effective Security Audits

    Introduces DITTO, a stack-based, context-aware scanner for Pickle-based pre-trained models that tracks Pickle VM state transitions and applies semantic analysis to infer model intent. Authors found 9.3% of 10,000+ popular Hugging Face repos still use Pickle, and release PickleBench (959 benign, 92 malicious models, including extension registry attacks missed by existing tools). Reports 100% coverage, 0% false negatives, 0.7% false positives, F1 0.966, outperforming current scanners.

    arxiv.orgpaperAdded 9 Oct 2026, published 7 Oct 2026๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Security

  51. On the Reliability of LLM-Based Vulnerability Patching Benchmarks

    This arXiv paper examines why current LLM-based automated vulnerability-patching benchmarks overstate model performance, identifying pitfalls at the agent level (prompting/tooling inflating success without improving patch quality), framework level (permission errors, infra bugs, timeout handling silently skewing scores), and dataset level (single PoC tests failing to verify root-cause fixes). The authors curate 112 historical bugs across 84 open-source C/C++, Go, and Rust projects, each annotated with PoC tests, regression tests, and developer-intent tests, and show that while PoC pass rates look high, developer-test pass rates stay low and barely improve with newer models. They provide guidelines for more rigorous, reproducible evaluation of LLM patching systems.

    arxiv.orgpaperAdded 9 Oct 2026, published 7 Oct 2026๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Security

  52. Provable Subexponential Algorithms for NIST Third-Round Lattice Families

    An IACR ePrint paper by Yiming Gao, Xuyuan Han, and Honggang Hu presenting provable classical subexponential algorithms (running in roughly 2^((1/2+o(1))n/ln ln n) time/space) for recovering short secrets in growing parameter families tied to all seven NIST third-round lattice candidates: Kyber/ML-KEM, FrodoKEM, SABER, NTRU LPRime, Dilithium/ML-DSA, Falcon, and cyclic NTRU-HPS/HRSS. The approach extends the Wagner-style Gaussian sampling framework of Ducas, Engelberts, and Loyer (CRYPTO 2025) and a low-error decision-LWE algorithm, using an exact squared-Euclidean-norm gap to binary-search each secret coordinate, and an "affine slice search" over the public lattice for NTRU/Falcon-type quotient relations. The authors explicitly note the subexponential complexity applies to growing/weakened parameter regimes and does not reduce the concrete security of the currently specified NIST parameter sets.

    eprint.iacr.orgpaperAdded 8 Oct 2026, published 6 Oct 2026๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Security

  53. Semantic Behavioral Watermarking: Paraphrase-Robust and Forgery-Resistant Provenance for LLM Agents

    Semantic Behavioral Watermarking (SBW) is a provenance scheme for LLM agents that embeds an owner identifier in semantic clusters of an agent's action choices rather than exact action symbols, making it robust to paraphrasing/tool-renaming that breaks three prior agent watermarks (e.g., AgentMark drops to 16.8% bit-recovery under observation paraphrasing). It adds keyed, collision-resistant binning proven unpredictable in the random-oracle model to resist forgery (adaptive forgery success drops from 100% to the false-positive floor), while explicitly documenting an unsolved attack: chained-replay forgery, which still succeeds 0.76-0.98 of the time across five tested agent models (3B-14B, Qwen, ToolBench/ALFWorld benchmarks). Code is released alongside the paper.

    arxiv.orgpaperAdded 8 Oct 2026, published 6 Oct 2026๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Security

  54. Semantic Behavioral Watermarking: Paraphrase-Robust and Forgery-Resistant Provenance for LLM Agents

    This paper introduces Semantic Behavioral Watermarking (SBW), a method for embedding an owner identifier into an LLM agent's high-level tool/action choices rather than output tokens, so provenance survives tool renaming and observation paraphrasing. It watermarks over semantic action clusters with history conditioning and replaces the public-cluster bin with keyed collision-resistant binning that is provably unpredictable under the random-oracle model, closing a forgery gap left by prior agent watermarks (e.g., AgentMark, whose bit-recovery drops to 16.8% under paraphrasing). Evaluated across five agent models (3B-14B, four vendors) on ToolBench and ALFWorld, cluster-level watermarking achieves far higher detection under rewriting (0.49-0.66 vs 0.05-0.17 on ToolBench; 0.92-0.97 vs 0.00-0.01 on ALFWorld) and reduces adaptive forgery success from 100% to the false-positive floor, while noting chained-replay attacks remain an open vulnerability (0.76-0.98 detection failure).

    arxiv.orgpaperAdded 7 Oct 2026, published 6 Oct 2026๐Ÿง  AI

  55. Toward Alignment Scaling Laws: A Framework and First Preregistered Measurements

    This paper proposes a formal framework for "alignment scaling laws," modeling the compute/capability burden needed to hold a fixed safety target for each risk category as a power law B_r(N)=a_rN^alpha_r, where the exponent alpha_r determines whether alignment gets easier, keeps pace, or accumulates "alignment debt" as capability N grows. The authors prove theoretical results (the largest exponent among corrected risks sets the long-run regime, super-exponential headroom requirements above alpha=1, small-model fits underestimate large-scale exponents for power-law mixtures) and apply a preregistered protocol twice: a reanalysis of adversarial-training data on Pythia classifiers (attack-success compute exponent 0.60) and a pilot across Qwen2.5 (0.5B-72B) and Qwen3 (0.6B-14B), finding scaling helps for truthfulness and stated dispositions but sycophancy (exponent ~0.83-0.89) and a planted backdoor behave worse or remain undetermined, with the backdoor surviving blind safety training at most model sizes. The work matters as an early attempt to put the "does alignment get harder with scale" debate on measurable, falsifiable footing rather than anecdote.

    arxiv.orgpaperAdded 7 Oct 2026, published 6 Oct 2026๐Ÿง  AI

  56. K-LMS: Design, Implementation, and Evaluation of Leightonโ€“Micali Signatures with Korean Cryptographic Primitives

    An IACR ePrint paper presenting K-LMS, an experimental variant of the NIST-standardized LMS hash-based post-quantum signature scheme in which the underlying hash is swapped for Korean primitives: the LSH-256 hash function (reference and vectorized) and a Tandem-DM double-block-length construction built from the CHAM, LEA, and ARIA block ciphers. The authors implement a non-invasive backend-swapping bridge over the reference LMS code and benchmark keygen/sign/verify latency, key/signature sizes, memory, and parameter sweeps, finding that hash substitution doesn't change key/signature sizes but that two measurement pitfalls (hash dispatch overhead, and software vs. hardware-accelerated SHA-256 baselines) can shift performance comparisons by an order of magnitude or 6x respectively. They report LSH-256 K-LMS signing on par with SHA-256 LMS in software, and 3.3-3.9x faster than a prior K-XMSS implementation because LMS needs fewer hash calls per Winternitz step than XMSS.

    eprint.iacr.orgpaperAdded 8 Oct 2026, published 6 Oct 2026๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Security

  57. CheckerBench: Can Long-Horizon Agents Synthesize Static-Analysis Checkers?

    CheckerBench is an executable benchmark of 300 tasks drawn from 297 CVEs across 167 repositories, 85 CWEs, and five language ecosystems, testing whether long-horizon coding agents can synthesize working static-analysis checkers from a defect specification through repeated compile-and-analyze feedback loops. Its companion framework CheckerLab independently rebuilds submitted checkers and scores vulnerable-fixed diagnostic contrast, patch localization, false positives, and tool use; across 21 model-harness configurations mean Pass@1 is 32.30 percent and the best reaches 45.33 percent, showing reliable checker synthesis remains hard for current coding agents.

    arxiv.orgpaperAdded 8 Oct 2026, published 6 Oct 2026๐Ÿง  AI

  58. CheckerBench: Can Long-Horizon Agents Synthesize Static-Analysis Checkers?

    CheckerBench is an executable benchmark of 300 tasks derived from 297 CVEs across 167 repositories, 85 CWEs, and five language ecosystems, testing whether long-horizon coding agents can synthesize working static-analysis checkers from a defect specification through repeated compilation and analysis feedback. The accompanying CheckerLab framework independently rebuilds submitted checkers and measures vulnerable-vs-fixed diagnostic contrast, patch localization, false positives, and tool use; across 21 model-harness configurations mean Pass@1 is 32.30% (best 45.33%), showing reliable checker synthesis remains hard for current agents.

    arxiv.orgpaperAdded 7 Oct 2026, published 6 Oct 2026๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Security

  59. Randomness-Anchored Runtime Discovery of Cryptographic Operations on Linux Using eBPF

    This IACR ePrint paper presents a Linux runtime cryptographic discovery system built on eBPF user-space probes that detects both classical and post-quantum (ML-KEM) cryptographic operations as they execute, complementing static binary/SBOM analysis with dynamic observation. It uses "randomness anchoring" โ€” correlating observed key-generation/encapsulation randomness with subsequent crypto API calls in the same process โ€” to raise detection confidence without adding false positives, reporting perfect precision/recall on classical and ML-KEM workloads, median detection latency of 28 ฮผs, and 14โ€“18% overhead on key-generation-bound workloads. A nine-application case study (drawn from/paired with QED datasets) compares static vs. runtime views and shows how eBPF probe coverage limits what can be observed, relevant to building a runtime cryptographic bill of materials for PQC migration compliance.

    eprint.iacr.orgpaperAdded 8 Oct 2026, published 5 Oct 2026๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Security

  60. Passing the Test You Trained On: Re-evaluating Prompt-Injection Detectors for LLM Agents

    This arXiv paper replays ground-truth tool calls from the AgentDojo and tau-bench agent benchmarks (without an LLM) to generate benign-by-construction tool outputs, then labels injected outputs via differential replay to evaluate fifteen prompt-injection detectors, including Meta's Prompt Guard 2, plus two task-aware LLM judges, also testing them on BIPIA. It finds detection rankings transfer poorly between benchmarks (the best detector on BIPIA catches only 2% of AgentDojo injections at 1% false-positive rate; a detector catching 72% of AgentDojo injections catches only 15% on tau-bench), while false-positive rates do transfer between the two agent benchmarks, and traces this to mismatches between training data format (e.g., training on short prompt strings vs. tool-output-embedded injections) and deployment context.

    arxiv.orgpaperAdded 5 Oct 2026, published 2 Oct 2026๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Security

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