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  1. The October inflection point for vibe game development

    Simon Willison argues October 2026 is an inflection point for vibe coding games, because Claude Opus 5.5 can now handle 3D modeling, music and game design. He describes four browser games built with three.js (Tree Appreciator, Emberwick, Battle Drones, Quarter Sun Cove), with the prompts used, a comparison against GPT-6 models, and advice to start with "Build a mobile-friendly three.js game where...".

    simonwillison.netwriteupPublished and added 28 Oct 2026🧠 AI

  2. Cross-request KV cache exposure in the GLM-5.3 Workers AI model (155 responses)

    Cloudflare's postmortem of a tenant isolation bug in the GLM-5.3 model on Workers AI, active 27 August to 9 September 2026. Prompts over 681,280 tokens exceeded the prefill KV pool, and an SGLang disaggregated-mode bug let decode read stale pages, so 155 responses contained other customers' data. It covers the timeline, config and engine fixes (SGLang v0.5.22), and recommendations for operators.

    blog.cloudflare.comwriteupAdded 27 Oct 2026, published 26 Oct 2026🧠 AI

  3. Cross-request KV cache exposure in the GLM-5.3 Workers AI model (155 responses)

    Cloudflare postmortem of a tenant isolation failure in the GLM-5.3 Workers AI model (27 August to 9 September 2026), in which 155 responses to prompts over 681,280 tokens contained other customers' data. Root cause was a KV pool smaller than the 1,048,576-token context window, combined with an SGLang bug in disaggregated prefill/decode mode that let decode read stale KV pages. It lists the fixes (SGLang v0.5.22 patches), hardening steps and operator recommendations.

    blog.cloudflare.comwriteupAdded 27 Oct 2026, published 26 Oct 2026πŸ›‘οΈ Security

  4. Python Packages Vulnerable to Node2Shell

    Analysis of CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell), an out-of-bounds write in Google's Brotli C decoder, showing it also affects the PyPI packages Brotli (all releases up to 1.2.0) and brotlicffi (up to 1.2.0.2). The author diffed the 1.2.0 and 1.2.1 sdists and confirmed the behaviour with AddressSanitizer. Fixes are Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0, both patched without release notes. No advisory database lists either package yet.

    opensourcemalware.comwriteupPublished and added 23 Oct 2026πŸ›‘οΈ Security

  5. How abliterated models can get you pwned

    ProjectDiscovery's research poisons Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct with a LoRA adapter trained on glaive-function-calling-v2. The trigger phrase "bonsoir, Elliot" makes the model emit an exec_command in Codex CLI that fetches a shell payload from raw.githubusercontent.com and POSTs .env and SSH keys to an OAST collector. It reports poison rates (1% on 1.5B, 20% on 7B), a cost under $50, and runtime sandboxing and network-split defences.

    projectdiscovery.iowriteupAdded 23 Oct 2026πŸ›‘οΈ Security

  6. Battle Drones - a vibe coded RTS with audio-based multiplayer

    Battle Drones is a browser-based Command & Conquer style RTS that Simon Willison built over 12 iterations and 321 commits, mostly with Claude Code and Claude Opus 5.5. The post gives key prompts and transcripts per version, including the "Make it a LOT more fun" run in Ultracode mode. It also covers an Agent vs. Agent mode for LLMs, audio-modem multiplayer between nearby phones, and lessons on deterministic simulation and code-generated 3D models and music.

    simonwillison.netwriteupPublished and added 20 Oct 2026🧠 AI

  7. From JavaScript to Renderer Code Execution: Three V8 Vulnerabilities and Two v8CTF Flags | depthfirst

    Depth First Security's write-up describes three V8 bugs found using its dfs-large1 research tooling: CVE-2026-78938, a type confusion in Promise.prototype.finally that lets an internal helper be constructed and return a primitive; CVE-2026-79236, a TurboFan load-elimination bug that keeps a stale property-array pointer after object migration; and a shared WebAssembly memory sandbox escape (issue 546253900) caused by mismatched backing-store registration during serialization. It walks through turning each memory bug into addrof/fakeobj primitives, chaining either with the sandbox escape to reclaim a freed V8 isolate via a WebSocket allocation, and pivoting through a CFI-constrained ROP chain to achieve Chrome renderer code execution, earning two v8CTF flags. Fixes landed between August 20 and 25, 2026.

    depthfirst.comwriteupAdded 29 Oct 2026, published 20 Oct 2026πŸ›‘οΈ Security

  8. Loud, Fast, and Everywhere: Anatomy of a Real AI-Driven Cloud Attack

    Wiz CIRT write-up of an AI agent-run intrusion against a multi-cloud organization (GCP, AWS, Kubernetes, CI/CD, GitOps, identity provider). It lists traits of AI-driven attacks: machine-speed tempo, credential chaining, pentest/probe naming, numeric task IDs and commented code. Initial access was a Java RCE in an exposed Kafka UI. It closes with detection and response advice: unified logs, workload visibility and trust isolation.

    wiz.iowriteupPublished and added 19 Oct 2026πŸ›‘οΈ Security

  9. Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Cybersecurity, Part 29: Creating Isolated Autonomous Agents for Hacking with NemoClaw

    Hackers-Arise tutorial on NVIDIA's open-source NemoClaw, which runs OpenClaw (and Hermes or LangChain Deep Agents) inside OpenShell sandboxes. OpenShell provides kernel-level isolation and declarative YAML policies for files, credentials and network access. It covers OpenClaw's risks (543 tracked CVEs, 40,000+ exposed instances), an OpenClaw vs NemoClaw comparison, the caveat that sandbox escapes and core-logic zero-days remain possible, and a Docker/Node.js install via the nemoclaw.sh wizard with TUI testing. It also cites the Cisco AI Defense plus OpenShell case study, in which an agent that does security patching was protected against a simulated exfiltration attempt.

    hackers-arise.comwriteupPublished and added 14 Oct 2026🧠 AI

  10. AI models may be capable of self-replicating without access to a datacenter

    Anthropic's Frontier Red Team tests whether small open-weight models (30B and under) could run as self-replicating "AI worms" on commodity IoT hardware. A 9B model set up inference on 8 of 9 hardware types. In an 8-node Android emulator fleet only GLM-5.2 replicated end to end. Gemma4-26B-A4B was sharded across 15 ~$55 Android TV boxes at 0.39 tok/s. Qwen3.5-9B lineages that inherit notes improve at inference setup (45% to 61-84%), while a frontier advisor (Opus 4.8) doesn't help. An ECI trend fit puts small models at GLM-5.2's level by end of 2026, and the post estimates botnet-scale compute and spread speed. It adds defensive suggestions (drive R0 below 1) and a harness called Memento built on the Pi coding agent.

    anthropic.comwriteupPublished and added 12 Oct 2026🧠 AI

  11. Happier DOMs: The perils of running untrusted JavaScript code outside of a web browser | Blog | Endor Labs

    Endor Labs explains CVE-2025-61927, an RCE in the happy-dom headless browser caused by relying on Node.js's vm module, which is not a security boundary. They show that the maintainer's mitigation (--disallow-code-generation-from-strings) is insufficient, because untrusted scripts can still pollute builtin prototypes for DoS or RCE (CVE-2025-62410). The fix adds --frozen-intrinsics. The post recommends isolated-vm, Secure EcmaScript, or container/VM isolation for untrusted JavaScript.

    endorlabs.comwriteupPublished and added 12 Oct 2026πŸ›‘οΈ Security

  12. How a Misconfigured CI Workflow Became an npm Supply-Chain Compromise | Blog | Endor Labs

    Endor Labs breaks down the May 11, 2026 compromise of 42 @tanstack/* npm packages (84 malicious versions) that carried valid SLSA provenance. The attacker chained a pull_request_target "Pwn Request", GitHub Actions cache poisoning across the fork/base boundary, and OIDC token extraction from Runner.Worker memory, then published directly to npm without stealing any credential. It explains why 2FA, trusted publishing, provenance and branch protection all failed, and lists mitigations: split pull_request_target workflows, treat the cache as untrusted, scope id-token: write to a publish job, pin actions to SHAs, require environment approval, use egress allowlists.

    endorlabs.comwriteupPublished and added 12 Oct 2026πŸ›‘οΈ Security

  13. ETDI: Comprehensive MCP Security Framework

    ETDI (Enhanced Tool Definition Interface) is a proposed security extension to the Model Context Protocol that adds cryptographically signed and versioned tool definitions, OAuth 2.0 scope-based permissions, Cedar-policy-driven context-aware access control (via engines like Amazon Verified Permissions/OPA), and call-stack verification to stop tool chaining and privilege escalation. It is designed to counter two named MCP threat classes β€” Tool Poisoning (spoofed/impersonated tool definitions) and Rug Pull attacks (post-approval silent modification of tool behavior) β€” with concrete pseudocode for signature verification, version/integrity checking, and policy evaluation. The page functions as an implementation guide for MCP client/server builders wanting to harden tool approval and invocation flows.

    vulnerablemcp.infowriteupAdded 8 Oct 2026🧠 AI

  14. AgentCorruption: How A Single Prompt Collapsed The Entire Cloud Security Model

    AgentCorruption is Zenity Labs research on AWS Bedrock AgentCore. Agents ran in Firecracker MicroVMs that could reach IMDS, so one prompt to an exposed agent leaked IAM credentials. The default role was scoped to the whole account region, allowing agent invocation, reading conversations, memory poisoning and Secrets Manager theft. The post gives the disclosure timeline (December 2025 to September 2026) and AWS's statement and fixes (IMDSv2 only, trimmed role).

    labs.zenity.iowriteupAdded 19 Oct 2026, published 8 Oct 2026πŸ›‘οΈ Security

  15. lee1981 (@lee1981b) on X

    A detailed "CVE of the Day" thread analyzing CVE-2026-76471, a critical (CVSS 9.8) Cisco advisory covering insufficient NX-API input validation (CWE-122 heap-based buffer overflow) on Nexus 3000/9000 standalone NX-OS and a lower-severity credentialed variant on UCS 6300 Fabric Interconnects via UCS Manager XML API. It compiles Cisco's fixed-software versions per platform, notes the temporary Live Protect shield lp00074, and walks through a six-step SOC evidence-preservation and correlation playbook (scoping affected devices, preserving logs/crash artifacts, reviewing API/shield telemetry, correlating device outcomes, remediating, and verifying post-patch state) while flagging that CISA KEV and FIRST EPSS had no data on the CVE at research time.

    x.comwriteupPublished and added 8 Oct 2026πŸ›‘οΈ Security

  16. ETDI: Comprehensive MCP Security Framework

    ETDI (Enhanced Tool Definition Interface) is a proposed security extension to the Model Context Protocol that defends against Tool Poisoning (spoofed/impersonated tool definitions) and Rug Pull attacks (silent post-approval modification of tool behavior) using cryptographic signing of tool definitions, immutable versioning with mandatory re-approval, OAuth 2.0 scopes, and Cedar/Amazon Verified Permissions-based policy-aware access control. The page includes detailed attack scenarios, a call-stack verification scheme to prevent tool-chaining privilege escalation, and implementation code for key management, signature verification, and policy evaluation.

    vulnerablemcp.infowriteupAdded 8 Oct 2026πŸ›‘οΈ Security

  17. Post-Exploitation Analysis & Artifacts – Citrix NetScaler CVE-2026-88771

    watchTowr post-exploitation analysis of CVE-2026-88771, an unauthenticated log-poisoning command injection in Citrix NetScaler (advisory CTX697096). Sensors logged thousands of attempts: about 85% were OOB callbacks, the rest Sliver implants, a trojanized Dropbear SSH backdoor, a Perl stager with a PHP webshell, and SSH-key and secret-harvesting sprays. Includes artifacts to hunt (/var/tmp files, ns_helper, ns.conf edits) and IOC repo pointers.

    watchtowr.comwriteupAdded 30 Oct 2026, published 7 Oct 2026πŸ›‘οΈ Security

  18. Kubernetes Agent Sandbox on AWS EKS (Step-by-Step Guide)

    Kubernetes Agent Sandbox on AWS EKS is a step-by-step tutorial for the kubernetes-sigs agent-sandbox controller with gVisor. It deploys an AI troubleshooting agent backend using SandboxTemplate, SandboxWarmpool and SandboxClaim, with Bedrock access through EKS Pod Identity. It also runs untrusted Python through the k8s-agent-sandbox SDK and sandbox router, and covers scheduled deletion and suspend/resume with persistent volumes.

    devopscube.comwriteupAdded 21 Oct 2026, published 7 Oct 2026🧠 AI

  19. Kubernetes Agent Sandbox on AWS EKS (Step-by-Step Guide)

    Tutorial on setting up Kubernetes Agent Sandbox (kubernetes-sigs/agent-sandbox) with gVisor on an AWS EKS cluster. It runs a troubleshooting AI agent backend inside a sandbox using SandboxTemplate, SandboxWarmpool and SandboxClaim, and runs untrusted Python through the k8s-agent-sandbox SDK and Sandbox Router. Probes show blocked /etc/shadow reads, setuid and service account token access, plus host process isolation. It also covers scheduled deletion and suspend/resume with persistent volumes.

    devopscube.comwriteupAdded 21 Oct 2026, published 7 Oct 2026πŸ›‘οΈ Security

  20. llm-openai-decisions 0.1a0

    Simon Willison built llm-openai-decisions, a plugin for his `llm` CLI tool that wraps OpenAI's newly announced Decisions API (unveiled at DevDay), modeled on his existing llm-typesafe plugin for Jev's competing API. Both APIs support structured yes/no, multiple-choice, and score-style questions, but OpenAI's gpt-6-luna model also accepts image input (at 10 cents per million input tokens, versus Jev's 4.2 cents), and the plugin itself was built by having GPT-6 Astra read OpenAI's docs. The post includes install instructions and a worked example querying an image attachment for a yes/no answer.

    simonwillison.netwriteupAdded 7 Oct 2026, published 6 Oct 2026🧠 AI

  21. Living off The Browser: Running Popular Hacking Tools Inside Chrome

    Hackers Arise walks through an installable Chrome Isolated Web App that packages nine popular Active Directory pentesting tools, including NetExec (NXC), SharpHound, LDAP-shell, Evil-WinRM, and Certipy, so they run natively inside a Chrome tab with multi-protocol network access, bypassing the need for Linux or WSL. The piece shows setup via Chrome flags and an IWA install URL, then a lab demo: port-scanning a target, using Evil-WinRM for remote access, enumerating DNS zones with ADIDNS, and running Certipy to flag an ESC1-vulnerable ADCS template for domain-admin escalation.

    hackers-arise.comwriteupAdded 7 Oct 2026, published 6 Oct 2026πŸ›‘οΈ Security

  22. CITRIX 0-DAY EXPLOITS: CVE-2026–88771 & CVE-2026–88772 IN THEΒ WILD

    An incident-response style deep dive into active in-the-wild exploitation of Citrix NetScaler ADC/Gateway via CVE-2026-88771 (unauthenticated RCE through log-poisoning of ns_monuploadd_err.pl) and CVE-2026-88772 (DTLS memory overflow), part of 8 CVEs disclosed by Citrix on September 27, 2026. The author reverse-engineers the full post-exploitation toolkit dropped after root is obtained: SLAPSHOT (a Perl/Python loopback TCP tunneler/pivot), WHIPSHOT (a disguised PHP web shell served via fake CSS paths), the Platypus C2 agent, and a Perl "Pitboss" dropper script (with full decoded source and an embedded SHA-256-protected PHP web shell) that creates a rogue superuser, SUIDs /bin/sh, exfiltrates NetScaler config, and patches httpd.conf for persistence. It closes with extensive IOCs (C2 IPs, file hashes, paths, credentials) and patch guidance for affected NetScaler builds.

    theravenfile.comwriteupPublished and added 6 Oct 2026πŸ›‘οΈ Security

  23. SubQuery Ecosystem Compromise: Hidden Credential Theft and Backdoors

    StepSecurity's investigation of @subql/common@5.8.3, a malicious npm release in the SubQuery Web3 indexing framework's monorepo, found a heavily obfuscated postinstall/import-time payload (base64+XOR+gzip inside a function constructed via Function()) that spawns a detached worker to steal credentials (.npmrc, .env, AWS, SSH, kubeconfig, Vault, cloud secrets), read GitHub Actions runner memory for CI secrets, inject a camouflaged "Run Copilot" GitHub Actions workflow to exfiltrate repo secrets, and provide a remote shell/PTY over an encrypted channel to ci-artifacts.dev. The release was published via a compromised build pipeline: a workflow modification swapped the real build output for an externally downloaded, unsigned tarball from that same C2 domain immediately before publish, and the authors provide IOCs and remediation steps (credential rotation, host isolation, domain blocking).

    stepsecurity.iowriteupPublished and added 5 Oct 2026πŸ›‘οΈ Security

  24. Qwen3.8 27B addition in words

    Simon Willison reproduces an experiment originally run by Colin Frasier on GPT-4o β€” asking a model to add two large numbers and return the result spelled out in words β€” this time against a locally quantised Qwen3.8-27B-Q4_K_M.gguf model on an NVIDIA DGX Spark. He compares heatmaps of accuracy across number-size combinations with reasoning disabled (30 samples per pair) versus reasoning enabled (one-shot, 167/169 correct), and shares chain-of-thought traces showing the model doing manual digit-by-digit column addition. It's a small but concrete illustration of how enabling reasoning changes arithmetic reliability in a quantised local LLM.

    simonwillison.netwriteupAdded 5 Oct 2026, published 4 Oct 2026🧠 AI

  25. Xray-core concealed a certificate verification bypass vulnerability

    A security researcher's first-person disclosure describing a certificate verification bypass in Xray-core (a popular censorship-circumvention proxy): when its pinnedPeerCertSha256 option skips regular TLS verification, a MITM attacker can insert a leaf certificate anywhere in the certificate chain and have the custom pinning logic incorrectly validate it, effectively eliminating certificate verification. The writeup also documents how the vulnerability was silently fixed with a misleading "simplify the code" commit message and left undisclosed to users for nearly half a year until the reporter filed a GitHub Security Advisory.

    github.comwriteupAdded 5 Oct 2026, published 4 Oct 2026πŸ›‘οΈ Security

  26. The First 24 Hours: What Happens When Ransomware Lands

    An hour-by-hour ransomware incident response playbook written by UnderDefense CEO Nazar Tymoshyk and published on Huntress's blog, covering confirmation, containment, exfiltration detection, backup/recovery pitfalls, and root-cause investigation in the first 24 hours of an attack. It draws on Mandiant's M-Trends 2026 report (14-day median dwell time, 22-second access-broker-to-ransomware handoff) and CISA's November 2025 Akira advisory (VPN without MFA as primary access vector, exfiltration via FileZilla, WinRAR, WinSCP, RClone, Mega and Ngrok, credential dumping with Mimikatz and LaZagne, PowerShell-based shadow copy deletion) alongside real UnderDefense engagement anecdotes.

    huntress.comwriteupAdded 3 Oct 2026, published 2 Oct 2026πŸ›‘οΈ Security

  27. SMTP is the key: BPFDoor and AVERAT hitting the network edge

    Rapid7 details a new BPFDoor campaign targeting telecom and network-edge appliances (ShareTech, SpamSniper mail gateways) and a six-sample Linux RAT family dubbed AVERAT found on compromised Taiwanese CPE (Synology NAS, a NetKlass device, a Dahua DVR). The writeup reconstructs the Rapid7 BPFDoor controller's HTTP-tunneled trigger mechanism, a fileless ShareTech dropper that stages binaries as ntpdate/udevds and deletes them while processes keep running, a BPF Rekoobe variant that hides inside SMTP port-25 traffic, and AVERAT's RC4-derived config/C2 scheme β€” tying the infrastructure to the broader China-nexus ORB (Operational Relay Box) device pattern described in CISA/NCSC-UK advisory AA26-113A. It closes with detection guidance for unlinked/deleted process execution, dropper staging artifacts, and port-25 C2 callbacks, plus full IOC and ATT&CK tables.

    rapid7.comwriteupAdded 7 Oct 2026, published 2 Oct 2026πŸ›‘οΈ Security

  28. https://bughunters.google.com/blog/pagebreak-real-world-findings?utm_source=tldrsec.com&utm_medium=newsletter&utm_campaign=tl-dr-sec-348-google-s-pagebreak-scanner-perplexity-s-agent-security-tool-defending-agentically

    Google's Product Security team describes three high-severity bugs found by PageBreak, an internal LLM-agent scanner that validates findings by running payloads against live environments. The cases are cache poisoning on apis.google.com (an unkeyed `extra_path` injected into cached JS), XSS on admin.google.com where the agent bypassed the `sig` check by getting the authorize endpoint to sign a `javascript:` URI, and a UXSS in the Tag Assistant extension via a weak `onConnectExternal` origin check and nonce exfiltration. It shows what agentic, deterministically verified scanning can find in well-reviewed targets.

    bughunters.google.comwriteupAdded 2 Oct 2026, published 1 Oct 2026πŸ›‘οΈ Security

  29. OpenAI DevDay 2026 live blog

    Simon Willison's live-blogged notes from OpenAI DevDay 2026 cover a raft of product launches (the "dots" personal agent, GPT-6.1 Sol, Ultrafast inference, ChatGPT Sites, GPT-Live), but the security-relevant core is the Codex Security session: OpenAI describes an internal "Defense Factory" security sprint that fixed 53 critical findings in a day, and launches a major Codex Security Cloud upgrade plus an open-source Codex Security CLI. The tool builds a security knowledge base, reads per-repo SECURITY.md threat-model files, runs a looping scanner, deduplicates findings (36% of their internal findings were duplicates), and can auto-generate patches/PRs validated by a "verify-fix" adversarial agent (1% rollback rate).

    simonwillison.netwriteupAdded 7 Oct 2026, published 29 Sep 2026πŸ›‘οΈ Security

  30. The Blue Agent POV: Investigating Multi-Platform Data Exfiltration Across AWS and GitHub

    Wiz walks through a case study of its "Blue Agent" autonomous SOC investigator tracing a compromised CI/CD service account (svc_automation) across AWS and GitHub. The attack chain: a stolen GitHub token cloned 18 private repos containing hardcoded AWS keys, which were used to authenticate to AWS from Kali Linux via a Zenlayer VPN IP, pivot to a second account, run SSM SendCommand against a production Windows domain controller, and stage custom Python exfiltration scripts (mssql_table_export.py, pg_table_export.py, billing_export2.py) in S3 to pull data from MSSQL, PostgreSQL, and billing systems. The piece details the investigative technique used - 30-day baseline comparison, ASO/IP dispersion across the tenant, and correlating CloudTrail management-plane events with S3 data-plane events and GitHub audit logs.

    wiz.iowriteupPublished and added 29 Sep 2026πŸ›‘οΈ Security

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