Mini Shai-Hulud
Named by 48 kept items in this workspace.
35 items name it under threat actors and 13 under classification.key entities.
Search every workspace for Mini Shai-Hulud. It matches the name as written, so it can find other things that share it.
The items that name it 48
Open-sourced self-propagating worm template; this Tensorlake incident is described as at least the second attack built on it, following the August attack on keyv and cachable.
campaign; May 2026 compromise of actions-cool/issues-helper and actions-cool/maintain-one-comment, malicious content introduced May 18, 2026
Wave arriving end of April 2026; a burst in May 2026 pushed more than 400 malicious versions across 172 packages in about five hours using hijacked OIDC tokens with no stolen credentials
Active credential-stealing campaign embedding fake prompt-injection headers to fool AI-assisted review tools into marking code as benign
Malware/campaign that jumped from npm to Packagist through a malicious version of Intercom's PHP package, abusing Composer plugin execution to steal cloud and CI/CD credentials; observed in April
Self-propagating credential-stealing worm variant delivered via a large, heavily obfuscated Bun-based JavaScript payload, executed through npm preinstall lifecycle hooks; part of the ChainDrop campaign, per Microsoft
Open-sourced worm malware; basis for the new npm worm that compromised Keyv and Cacheable in August 2025
Cited as a notorious worm example, contrasted with PolinRider.
Malware campaign that landed on npm despite npm's existing scanning
Self-spreading npm worm by TeamPCP; weaponizes tasks.json files (technique first seen in Lazarus Group campaigns); compromised 170 npm packages and crossed into PyPI; later hunt found 2,417 newly-compromised repos, pushing confirmed footprint to 4,367 poisoned repos across 2,152 owners; open-sourced
Hit npm, PyPI, and Packagist in April and May 2026.
Recent npm supply-chain campaign whose packages embedded fake prompt-injection headers before obfuscated JavaScript payloads, designed to interfere with AI-assisted malware review; carried a credential-stealing payload not present in shai_hulululud.
May 2026. Planted a preinstall hook that pulled the Bun runtime and ran a credential stealer. Moved through over a hundred packages across TanStack, UiPath, and Mistral AI; first npm worm to publish malware carrying valid build provenance.
Broader supply chain campaign; this PyPI wave is connected to it
Supply chain worm campaign operated by TeamPCP; associated with attacks on TanStack, Mistral AI, Guardrails AI, LiteLLM, OpenSearch, Telnyx, @antv, Checkmarx, and now durabletask
Worm open-sourced by TeamPCP; used in the Miasma campaign against Red Hat and other npm/PyPI/RubyGems packages; info-stealing capability described as grabbing broad credential data including HashiCorp vault credentials
TeamPCP campaign that surged through May and dominated ATO-classified weekly malicious packages.
open-sourced tooling
Sophisticated credential-stealing worm malware that spreads by republishing backdoored versions of packages the victim account has access to; open-sourced by TeamPCP; payload self-identifies in one variant as "Shai-Hulud: The Third Coming"
Compromised over 160 packages, including Mistral and TanStack, by stealing credentials from developer machines via a malicious postinstall hook; silently lifted npm and GitHub tokens and used them to publish malicious versions of the next package in the chain.
Ongoing supply chain worm campaign that has run for three weeks as of the article, harvesting npm credentials and CI secrets to republish poisoned package versions; tracked by Socket at 1,055 compromised versions across 502 unique packages spanning npm, PyPI, and Composer
Malware payload; resurfaced on npm; open-sourced version used as basis for a new npm worm hitting Keyv and cacheable; also referenced as 'Mini Shai Halud' by Team PCP
High-volume npm compromise pattern/campaign involving coordinated malicious publishes across packages tied to compromised maintainer accounts; campaign marker 'Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again' (reversed) found in ~1.9k GitHub repositories with Dune-themed naming
Wave of the Mini Shai-Hulud npm worm compromising packages across Alibaba's AntV data visualization ecosystem via the compromised npm account 'atool'. Uses a CI/CD credential-stealing payload, exfiltrates via GitHub API dead-drop and a fake OpenTelemetry C2 server, creates public GitHub repositories
Ongoing npm supply chain campaign tracked since April, spreading via compromised maintainer accounts and self-propagating by stealing npm tokens to republish malicious versions of packages. Waves: SAP wave, TanStack wave (169 packages), and this @antv wave. Uses Dune-themed GitHub repo names and rev
Coordinated supply-chain attack published malicious versions of at least 235 packages across npm and PyPI starting May 11, 2026; delivers install-time payload that harvests credentials and exfiltrates via Session messaging protocol; includes secondary C2 and IDE poisoning for persistence.
Financially-motivated npm worm that hit four SAP CAP packages and spread to over 1,000 repositories, using tasks.json runOn: folderOpen technique
npm supply-chain worm campaign that steals credentials from developer machines and CI/CD runners and uses them to compromise and publish more packages. Follow-up to an earlier April wave that targeted SAP npm packages via a Bun-based secret stealer. This wave detected across 373 malicious package-ve
Fresh supply chain campaign that compromised packages across npm, PyPI, and Packagist; used preinstall or import-time hooks to download a platform-specific Bun runtime and execute an obfuscated credential stealer targeting developer and CI/CD secrets.
Fresh campaign following the prior Shai-Hulud supply chain attack spree; repositories created by the attack contain the string 'Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again'; over 170 packages affected across npm and PyPI, 518+ million cumulative downloads, 400+ repositories with stolen credentials created
Wave of attacks hitting TanStack and other widely used npm packages, including OIDC token theft from GitHub Actions runners; tracked by StepSecurity's research team in the last twelve months
wave hitting TanStack and other widely used npm packages, including OIDC token theft from GitHub Actions runners
All threat actors in this workspace.