Shai-Hulud
Named by 79 kept items in this workspace.
46 items name it under threat actors and 33 under classification.key entities.
Search every workspace for Shai-Hulud. It matches the name as written, so it can find other things that share it.
The items that name it 79
credential-stealing malware; supply-chain campaign
npm supply chain worm that compromises maintainer accounts to publish malicious package versions, steals npm/GitHub credentials, and propagates by republishing itself into other packages the victim controls; marks infected packages with globalThis.WORMTAG='tensrlake'
npm supply-chain worm that steals credentials, self-propagates via stolen npm/GitHub tokens, and deploys a destructive hostage-token mechanism
malware family to which ChainDrop is traced
Malware/campaign cited in Google Mandiant's AI risk and resilience report 2026: a hijacked AI coding assistant session installed a poisoned package that spread Shai-Hulud across about 100 repositories.
Reported by Hackread.com in August; compromised Keyv and related npm packages, with malware spreading to additional npm packages and stealing developer credentials
Self-propagating worm named after Dune sandworms; first known self-propagating worm in the npm ecosystem; original September 2025 authors remain unknown/unattributed
Campaign pushing hundreds of malicious npm packages, including @ctrl/tinycolor, through stolen maintainer credentials; malware attempted to automatically spread to other packages under a compromised developer's account
First successful self-propagating npm worm (September 2025); harvested credentials and used stolen tokens to automatically push malicious versions of every package an account could access, reaching over 500 package versions from major publishers including CrowdStrike, before npm shut it down.
npm supply-chain worm; original wave compromised a maintainer account to push 639 malicious versions of @AntV packages on May 19, 2026, using file hash e37e3ddeeaaa9e0c4fdbcb829b4895a6521031c80053fc436625b61e6ee5b1a6; reactivated 111 days later on September 7 with the identical hash across four new
Second wave used stolen npm tokens to publish more compromised packages, turning harvested credentials into further distribution.
Worm/attack associated with the original S1ngularity and Shai-Hulud attacks in summer 2025; the page states there are no indications TeamPCP was behind the original attacks, though TeamPCP cloned the worm and was regularly (mistakenly) reported as being behind Shai-Hulud attacks; identity of the ori
Self-replicating npm worm; wave 1 hit Sept 15, 2025, compromising 700+ packages, 27,000 malicious GitHub repositories, 14,000 secrets exposed across 487 organizations. CISA issued alert Sept 23, 2025.
Self-propagating npm worm; compromised more than 500 npm packages using stolen npm tokens from each victim to infect packages they maintained. Emerged September 2025 — the first supply chain attack that spread on its own at ecosystem scale.
Campaign that poisoned packages pulled automatically by AI coding agents
Prior npm worm activity whose tradecraft resembles the Mini Shai-Hulud variant seen in ChainDrop; the current activity remains unattributed
Earlier worm campaign (last year) that used the same GitHub dead drop exfiltration technique referenced as precedent
Worm whose source code TeamPCP published on GitHub on May 12, 2026 ('A Gift From TeamPCP'); spawned multiple follow-on campaigns running modified versions.
Malware/campaign that achieved 'another wave of community spread' per the page, described as continuing to affect the supply chain ecosystem
Default description used for GitHub repositories created under compromised identities to exfiltrate stolen data
First self-propagating npm worm; exploited plaintext-stored npm credentials on developer workstations via a postinstall script that ran TruffleHog to find tokens, then republished itself across every package maintained by the compromised developer.
Cited as a notorious example of a worm-type npm supply chain attack, contrasted with PolinRider's non-worm propagation pattern.
Malware campaign that landed on npm despite npm's existing scanning; its signature patterns are described as well known
Referenced as prior campaign that stole credentials, compressed them, and created net-new repositories to store exfiltrated payloads; compared to the new GemStuffer-like RubyGems wave.
Worm that spread by stealing npm tokens and using them to publish malicious versions of legitimate packages
Harvests GitHub and cloud service credentials from developer machines and CI environments; exfiltrates stolen data to a public GitHub repository under the victim's own account; spreads by republishing malicious versions of packages reachable via stolen npm and GitHub accounts. First wave compromised
Attack wave from the past year that ran from compromised maintainer accounts publishing through legitimate pipelines, some with valid provenance
Supply chain worm; second wave hit npm packages (e.g., PostHog's npm packages) and surfaced on Maven Central via an automated process that re-publishes npm modules as Maven artifacts, rebundling a compromised version before mirrored copies were purged.
Leaked code that carried an 'Anthropic Magic String' intended to stop Claude Code from analyzing it
Attack that began with a pull request modifying a script executed by a workflow handling external contributions, which had been changed to use pull_request_target to auto-assign reviewers for forked contributions; used this path to steal a bot personal access token, then additional GitHub secrets in
npm malware family/worm with multiple variants abusing lifecycle scripts for credential theft, repository compromise, and worm-like propagation across the npm ecosystem
November 2025. Hit close to 500 packages across Zapier, ENS, PostHog, Postman, and AsyncAPI, installed the Bun runtime during setup, ran TruffleHog to scrape secrets, and dumped them into public GitHub repos.
Malware/worm family used in the attack; a variant compromised gpt-pilot. Same family has infected projects maintained by Microsoft, Red Hat, and Mistral AI this year.
npm supply chain attack that exploited compromised maintainer accounts (via phishing) to publish malicious package versions; scanned developer environments and CI/CD pipelines for secrets like npm tokens, GitHub tokens, and AWS IAM access keys
Referenced as an example of malware/campaign that steals credentials from developer workstations, motivating the need for secret scanning before it strikes.
Malware family open-sourced by TeamPCP; the Miasma payload appears derived from it, with Dune-themed references replaced by Greek mythology themes (e.g. 'spartan')
Original attack pattern that Mini Shai-Hulud follows, referenced as the precedent npm's token invalidation aims to prevent
Supply chain attack malware/worm required for use in the TeamPCP/BreachForums contest to compromise open source packages; released as open source attack tooling hosted on the Breached CDN, with a GitHub-hosted copy that circulated before being taken down
Attack campaign that registered persistent self-hosted runners (named SHA1HULUD) to compromised repos as a C2 channel, reused tokens with workflow scope across victims, and created public repos to dump stolen credentials.
Malware/campaign branding found in the bw1.js payload, using explicit ideological branding (Dune/Butlerian Jihad themed), possibly a different operator or splinter group using shared infrastructure with the Checkmarx campaign
Self-replicating worm that tore through the npm ecosystem in September 2025; harvested credentials, including checking for GitHub tokens and uploading victim secrets unencrypted to GitHub
npm/PyPI/Composer/Crates/Go/Hex/RubyGems supply-chain worm campaign, September 2025 → August 2026
npm worm campaign that compromised 500+ packages and earned a CISA advisory, propagating through CI/CD pipelines and developer environments
All threat actors in this workspace.