TeamPCP
Named by 64 kept items in this workspace.
47 items name it under threat actors and 17 under classification.key entities.
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The items that name it 64
compromise that started with Trivy and led to LiteLLM's first compromise in March; the page says the October LiteLLM compromise does not appear to be affiliated with them
campaign in March that hit LiteLLM versions 1.82.7 and 1.82.8
linked by Datadog Security Research to the earlier 2026 LiteLLM compromise affecting versions 1.82.7 and 1.82.8; no connection to the October 2026 compromise established
Threat actor referenced only for comparison: ShinyHunters' public statement tone/phrasing was said to resemble TeamPCP's from earlier in the year.
Group that adopted the Shai-Hulud name for 2026 waves, open-sourced a worm framework in May 2026, and ran a contest; two alleged members arrested August 26, 2026; AFP estimated the group enabled theft of more than 500,000 credentials and at least 300GB of data, with remediation costs in the hundreds
Threat actor group that compromised five software supply chain ecosystems in under 30 days in March 2026, starting with an incomplete incident response at Aqua Security in late February, then pivoting to Trivy's GitHub Actions, Docker Hub, npm, OpenVSX, and PyPI; compromised security vendors Aqua an
Credential stealer planted in the xinference PyPI package; payload was a flat enumeration of well-known credential paths (~/.npmrc, ~/.pypirc, ~/.vault-token, ~/.netrc, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.aws/config, ~/.docker/config.json, gcloud application default credentials file, kubeconfig).
attributed campaigns targeting Version Control Systems
Threat group described as not fitting neatly into state actor, organized cybercrime, or ideological categories; mixed money, politics, disruption, ego, and attention-seeking; not especially sophisticated but able to quickly operationalize public exploits, techniques, research, and malware ideas, rep
Threat actor behind CanisterWorm (Mar 20-21, 2026), CanisterSprawl (Apr 8-22, 2026), Mini Shai-Hulud I (Apr 29-30, 2026, cross-ecosystem attack via compromised CircleCI tokens), and Mini Shai-Hulud II/TanStack (May 7-11, 2026, used a Pwn Request to poison the GitHub Actions cache and extract OIDC to
Threat actor that ran a five-day campaign, March 19-24, 2026: compromised widely trusted components, planted credential stealers, collected secrets from CI/CD runner memory, and reinvested credentials into further compromises. Per CloudSEK's threat intelligence dataset (published August 2026, analyz
Threat actor behind a chain of high-profile open source supply chain compromises in 2026; playbook: compromise a widely trusted component, plant a credential stealer, collect secrets loaded into memory by CI/CD runners, reinvest stolen credentials into the next compromise. Exfiltrated 78,330 secrets
Ran the dominant software supply-chain campaign of H1 2026; poisoned npm packages to steal developer credentials and chain into cloud environments; distributed via PyPI starting April-May variant; exploited GitHub Actions CI misconfigurations to poison build caches; extracted OIDC tokens from runner
Publisher of the public "Mini" Shai-Hulud-Open-Source repositories on which this payload is heavily based; associated with a similar prior supply chain campaign
Threat actor described as loud/public and synonymous with account takeovers in the community's attention, contrasted with DPRK's quieter operations; described as 'on the run' at time of recording.
Referenced alongside Shai Hulud as using the same net-new-repository exfiltration technique; also mentioned as an example of old code being reused/repurposed.
Threat actor group; members arrested; compromised Bitwarden; compromised npm maintainers atool and prop, republishing 324 packages including the AntV suite across 645 versions; compromised aquasec-com GitHub org (44 repos renamed, internal source code/CI-CD configs/knowledge bases exposed); compromi
Compromised Trivy a second time and hid a credential stealer inside the telnyx PyPI package; harvested secrets from developer machines and CI environments and sent them to attacker-owned infrastructure.
Threat actor/group that gained access to several thousand GitHub repositories via a malicious Nx console VS Code extension published on both VS Code Marketplace and Open VSX (discussed as prior episode topic).
Threat actor/group discussed as subject of an FBI FLASH notice covering their behavior and IOCs; hosts believe possibly a single person operating with additional collaborators ('exploiters and some of the other people'); linked in conversation to DPRK Shi Hulud style attacks as a comparison point, n
Threat actor behind a recent round of npm supply-chain package targeting; Package Proxy's age checks prevented impact
Threat actor described as sitting on a massive cache of stolen tokens (aging as victims rotate credentials); characterized as going after credentials to pivot into further access.
named as example of attackers
Threat actor/group that originally open-sourced the MiniShai Hulud worm, reportedly via a compromised GitHub account.
Threat group behind the Mini Shai-Hulud campaign; operates secondary C2 domain t.m-kosche[.]com; linked to durabletask attack via shared infrastructure and IOCs (Russian folklore naming, Russian locale exclusion, geopolitically targeted destructive payload)
page states 'Whoever held those credentials in May plausibly never fully lost them,' suggesting continued access into June's takedown
Threat actor group that open-sourced the MiniShai Hulud worm; has not claimed credit for the Miasma campaign though some researchers (Rami-Mac and others) believe it may be the same threat actor or part of the crew
Threat actor behind high-profile account takeovers (ATOs), beginning with the March compromise of Trivy and growing with the Mini Shai-Hulud campaign; attributed to 64% of packages with over 10k weekly downloads and 84% at the 1M+ tier during the surge from late April onward.
or a copycat using their open-sourced Mini Shai-Hulud tooling
Threat actor group running targeted CI/CD supply chain attacks for several months; developed and later open-sourced the Mini Shai-Hulud credential-stealing worm framework on GitHub (May 12, 2026), also posting on BreachForums encouraging others to run their own campaigns
Threat actor/group behind the open-sourced (Mini) Shai-Hulud malware; observed TTPs consistent with the Miasma campaign, though attribution treated as TTP overlap rather than definitive due to public release of tooling
Group to which the Mini Shai-Hulud campaign is attributed
Claims to have extracted data from roughly 4,000 private GitHub repositories
Threat actor group promoting Shai-Hulud contest; has been targeting security tools, CI/CD workflows, GitHub Actions, Docker images, OpenVSX extensions, npm, PyPI, and Packagist; releases Shai-Hulud as open source attack tooling; publicly stated: "These companies were built to protect your supply cha
Threat actor behind Mini Shai-Hulud, a financially-motivated npm worm; copied the tasks.json runOn: folderOpen primitive from PolinRider
Group that claimed the Checkmarx attack via the @pcpcats social media account after discovery; malware attempted to blend in with legitimate-looking descriptions
Linked to the SAP CAP and Cloud MTA npm supply-chain campaign reported the day before the intercom-client compromise, based on shared technical details (payload implementation patterns, GitHub-based exfiltration, credential harvesting). Socket is investigating whether intercom-client compromise is p
Threat actor that compromised Aqua Security's Trivy vulnerability scanner in March 2026, leading to downstream attacks and later spreading to the npm ecosystem via a worm using stolen publish tokens
Threat actor identified by the page as behind part of the supply chain attack wave, described as having a scalable, repeatable playbook of compromising trusted packages/actions, injecting credential-stealing malware, and reusing stolen credentials to compromise further packages.
Backdoored LiteLLM proxy family; archetype A5; documented in docs/families/TEAMPCP.md
Threat actor behind the recent supply chain attack spree, linked to compromise of npm and PyPI packages from TanStack, UiPath, Mistral AI, OpenSearch, and Guardrails AI as part of the Mini Shai-Hulud campaign; assessed to have staged malicious payload via orphaned GitHub fork commit, hijacked TanSta
All threat actors in this workspace.