109 results for “OAuth”

Oversecured explains taint analysis for Android and iOS apps and contrasts it with pattern-matching SAST such as MobSF. It covers source, flow and sink, cross-component tracking over Intents, flag-based sanitizer modeling and implicit intent simulation. The case study is an unsafe Class.forName().newInstance() on a Serializable transportFactoryClassName field in Google's com.google.auth.oauth2 credential classes, which Google fixed with a $3,133.70 bounty.

oversecured.comarticleAdded 29 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Oversecured guide to eight vulnerability categories that lead to account takeover in mobile banking and fintech apps: WebView JavaScript bridge token leakage, Intent Redirection, hardcoded tokens, deeplink hijacking, insecure token storage, localhost OAuth listeners, AIDL abuse and weak biometric auth. It includes a WebView PoC based on Samsung SmartThings CVE-2022-30746 and maps findings to OWASP MASVS, PCI DSS and PSD2. It argues taint analysis plus dynamic PoC is needed to find multi-component chains.

oversecured.comarticleAdded 29 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

clauth is a Rust terminal UI for Claude Code that combines multi-account switching with a live 5h / 7d usage monitor. A fallback chain moves the user off an exhausted account before Claude Code blocks. It supports Pro, Max, Team and Enterprise OAuth accounts and custom API endpoints on Linux, macOS and Windows. The post notes that auto-switching means the tool decides when accounts change.

x.comtoolAdded 30 Oct 2026, published 28 Oct 2026🧠 AI

Thread by Kizuno18 on the move from local stdio/Docker Model Context Protocol servers to remote HTTP/SSE endpoints in enterprise infrastructure. It names three trade-offs: credential boundary inversion (short-lived OAuth/JWT tokens instead of long-lived admin tokens on workstations), tool schema bloat solved by deferred discovery, and governance via HCP Terraform policy-as-code (Sentinel/OPA), audit trails and approvals. It is opinion, with no data or implementation detail.

x.comthreadAdded 29 Oct 2026, published 27 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Kizuno18's X post argues that the move from local stdio and Docker MCP servers to remote HTTP/SSE endpoints matures the Model Context Protocol in enterprise infrastructure. It lists three trade-offs: short-lived OAuth/JWT bearer tokens replace mounted admin credentials, deferred tool discovery avoids roughly 20k tokens of eager schema loading, and HCP Terraform enforces Sentinel/OPA policy, audit trails and approvals server-side. Opinion post with no benchmarks or code.

x.comthreadAdded 29 Oct 2026, published 27 Oct 2026🧠 AI

The tweet relays Pillar Security research that opencode on Windows and WSL could run attacker-controlled code during remote MCP server OAuth sign-in. The fix shipped in opencode 1.18.33 on 28 September, with no advisory or CVE published. It advises users of remote MCP servers to update and review which servers they connect to. Technical details are not in the post.

x.comthreadAdded 29 Oct 2026, published 27 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

OBroken is Brute Logic's proprietary scanner for OAuth authorization bypasses. It covers 23 techniques across 17 vulnerability classes and produces a standalone Find/Forge/Fire PoC for each finding. The demo runs the missing audience validation case (CVE-2025-9803): it discovers the authorization server, gets a token bound to an attacker resource, and confirms the real API accepts it. A public OAuth bypass testbed accompanies it.

x.comtoolAdded 28 Oct 2026, published 26 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Thread on a critical opencode bug disclosed by Pillar Security on Oct 19. On Windows and WSL, a remote MCP server could run code during OAuth sign-in, because the server-chosen authorization URL was put unescaped into a PowerShell command, so a PowerShell subexpression executed. opencode fixed it in 1.18.33 on Sep 28 as a browser-launch refactor with no advisory or CVE. MCP Inspector published an advisory for the same bug class, and its fix needs a major bump of the open package.

x.comthreadAdded 27 Oct 2026, published 25 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Post on the LiteLLM supply-chain compromise. Attackers spent eleven days in the GitHub org, ran a workflow on a throwaway branch to take twenty secrets including a GitHub App private key, then used stolen GitHub CLI OAuth tokens to publish malicious release 1.107.0 from a lookalike Berri-AI repo. A Python startup file harvested sixteen credential categories and LiteLLM proxy Postgres provider keys. Socket flagged the wheels in seven minutes.

x.comthreadAdded 26 Oct 2026, published 24 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Storm-0940, a China-linked APT, used the open source AI penetration testing framework Artex to automate a mid-October 2026 campaign against ConnectWise customers, per Microsoft. Artex drove reconnaissance, password spraying and OAuth application abuse at more than 2,900 attempts per minute, with sign-in attempts against over 2,250 tenants. Attackers modified application credentials for persistence, and Microsoft advises correlating service principal sign-ins with Graph activity.

securityweek.comarticlePublished and added 23 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

LiteLLM version 1.107.0 was published with malware to PyPI and Docker Hub on October 21, for about three hours and roughly 49,000 downloads. Attackers used GitHub CLI OAuth tokens, likely leaked through Claude Code into LiteLLM logs, to disable branch protections, redirect the releaser to a lookalike repository and sign poisoned artifacts. The payload is an infostealer and RAT; Wiz saw Amazon Bedrock abuse. The last clean version is 1.106.2.

securityweek.comarticlePublished and added 23 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

LiteLLM suspects its October 21 release compromise began with Claude Code responses containing GitHub CLI OAuth tokens that were written to logs of an internet-facing internal LiteLLM gateway. Attackers allegedly stole those tokens, used an organization-owner token to disable branch protections, and pushed poisoned artifacts from a lookalike repository. How they entered the gateway is unconfirmed, and this is not a proven Claude Code vulnerability.

x.comthreadAdded 25 Oct 2026, published 22 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Unit 42 survey of OAuth attacks that steal tokens after MFA, so access survives password resets. It covers account hijacking (device authorization and authorization code misuse), permission hijacking (vague or impersonating app names), and malicious redirects, including the error-triggered redirect campaign Microsoft documented in March 2026. It also describes COSF and OAuth-as-a-service flaws, PhaaS and LLM evasion trends, and defenses such as admin-only consent and redirect_uri audits.

unit42.paloaltonetworks.comarticleAdded 30 Oct 2026, published 22 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Post on the LiteLLM 1.107.0 PyPI compromise published 21 October 2026 and quarantined about 1 hour 43 minutes later. A malicious .pth file ran at Python startup and stole cloud credentials, private keys, browser data and AI tool auth files, then POSTed a tarball to an attacker endpoint. The author says attackers used stolen GitHub CLI OAuth tokens to push a trojanized commit chain and build official wheels. It lists five defenses: hash-pinned lockfiles, per-tool capped keys, release cooling periods, secret isolation and egress monitoring.

x.comthreadAdded 23 Oct 2026, published 22 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Wiz Research reports an actor overlapping with Storm-0940 that used ARTEX, an open-source autonomous AI penetration-testing agent, against IT and software vendors in October 2026. It documents source-map and Swagger recon, OAuth callback and unsigned JWT probing, Cognito account-recovery abuse, tenant-isolation tests and Okta/Entra password spraying. The post lists log signals that mark the activity as agentic, such as one-second spray cadence and automatic IP and user-agent rotation.

wiz.ioarticlePublished and added 22 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

aula-mcp is an open-source (MIT) TypeScript MCP server that connects an AI client to Denmark's Aula school platform. It exposes tools for profiles, calendar events, messages, notifications, posts and weekly plans. MitID credentials and OAuth tokens are stored in macOS Keychain or an AES-256-GCM encrypted file. The HTTP server binds to 127.0.0.1, and the presence write tool stays off until AULA_MCP_WRITE=1 is set.

x.comrepoAdded 23 Oct 2026, published 22 Oct 2026🧠 AI

Post describing a LiteLLM 1.107.0 PyPI compromise in which attackers used stolen GitHub CLI OAuth tokens from three engineers to trigger and approve the project-releaser workflow, producing eight malicious wheels and a tampered tarball. The wheels drop cook.pth, which runs at Python startup, and privcollect steals cloud tokens, keys, browser data, AI configs and LiteLLM proxy credentials, exfiltrating to litellm[.]dev/healthcheck. A second daemon polls a GitHub domain.txt hourly for new domains to fetch and execute. PyPI yanked the package the same day. The post is a single unsourced tweet.

x.comthreadPublished and added 22 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Post summarising Pillar Security's finding of a remote code execution flaw in OpenCode, the open-source AI coding agent. Versions 1.0.137 through 1.18.32 could run code from a remote MCP server during OAuth sign-in on Windows and WSL, with no prompt injection needed. The fix is in 1.18.33 (released 28 September). No advisory or CVE was issued, so scanners will not flag old installs. Interim advice is to remove unvetted remote MCP servers.

x.comthreadAdded 22 Oct 2026, published 21 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Microsoft Threat Intelligence report on Storm-0940, a China-state aligned actor that used the open-source agentic AI pentest framework ARTEX from September 2026 to automate attacks on hundreds of organizations. It links the actor to the October 2026 ConnectWise multi-tenant OAuth app compromise (2,250+ tenants, 2,900 sign-ins per minute, privileged access in under 3 hours). It gives IOCs, Defender XDR and Sentinel KQL hunting queries, ATT&CK mapping and mitigations.

microsoft.comwriteupPublished and added 21 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

LiteLLM version 1.107.0 was published to PyPI and official Docker images on 21 October 2026 and stayed live for about two hours. Attackers used stolen GitHub CLI OAuth tokens from three engineers to run the release pipeline against a lookalike fork, Berri-AI/litellm. The payload (cook.pth, cook.py, sitecustomize.py) steals cloud, developer, AI-tool and browser credentials, and includes a polling RAT. The post lists removal and rotation steps.

securitylabs.datadoghq.comwriteupAdded 29 Oct 2026, published 21 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

DFIR_Radar weekly detection engineering digest covering 23 new and 19 updated rules across 6 GitHub repositories. It lists KQL rules for Azure Key Vault secret retrieval, MCP client User-Agent bulk operations and local Azure token theft, AWS CloudTrail analytics, Sigma rules for firewall and ETW tampering (decimal 17 vs hex 0x11), updated LOLDrivers hashes, and Sublime email rules for OAuth consent phishing and fake IRS W-9 PDFs.

x.comthreadAdded 20 Oct 2026, published 19 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

AshAi, the AI package for the Elixir Ash Framework, is getting MCP client tools. Creating an MCP server with AshAi was already simple, but connecting your own LLM tool loop to an external MCP server had to be built by hand. The planned release includes OAuth client management resources. The post gives no release date, API details or code.

x.comthreadAdded 21 Oct 2026, published 19 Oct 2026🧠 AI

Summary of Pillar Security research on opencode, in which a malicious remote MCP server runs code on a Windows or WSL machine during the OAuth login step. The login URL goes unsanitised into PowerShell through the npm "open" package, so an https:// link containing $(...) executes. Affected versions are 1.0.137 to 1.18.32, fixed in 1.18.33 (28 September) as a "refactor" with no advisory or CVE. The behaviour was first reported in 2020 as a WSL 2 broken-link bug.

x.comthreadAdded 21 Oct 2026, published 19 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

whatsapp-mcp is an MCP server that runs in the user's own Cloudflare account and lets MCP clients such as Claude Code and Claude Desktop search and read WhatsApp chats. It links as a WhatsApp Web-style device through Baileys, stores messages in SQLite with FTS5 inside a Durable Object, and is read-only. The README documents deployment, OAuth sign-in, contact naming through agents, and workerd shims for Baileys.

github.comrepoAdded 20 Oct 2026, published 18 Oct 2026🧠 AI

Post by Bikash (@BkashJosi) ranking open GitHub issues labelled type/feature for the Hermes agent framework by thumbs-up reactions. The query returned 5,349 issues and only one has more than 50 votes. The top three are Claude Agent SDK with subscription OAuth (57), remote Hermes with local tool execution (41) and Mistral provider support (32), followed by backups, configuration sync and context reduction. The full top 10 is only in the video.

x.comthreadAdded 20 Oct 2026, published 17 Oct 2026🧠 AI

ConnectWise Cloud Backup (formerly SkyKick Backup, AppId 506e08f9-6e9a-4da4-942b-a099a03644ae) had its multitenant OAuth app compromised, per Microsoft Threat Intelligence. On 15 October 2026 the actor authenticated broadly as the service principal from 144.172.64[.]128, likely using customer-granted permissions such as Directory.ReadWrite.All, then ran Graph API reconnaissance and tried to add credentials to the service principal as a backdoor. The post lists IOCs, Defender alerts and hunting advice.

x.comadvisoryAdded 20 Oct 2026, published 17 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Huntress post on where accounts remain exposed after a passkey rollout. It covers passkey-themed social engineering, the EvilTokens device-code phishing campaign (344 organizations in about 16 days), weak enrollment and recovery, SpecterOps research on Windows WebAuthn hooking on compromised endpoints, and the trade-offs between synced and device-bound passkeys. It closes with ITDR-style post-login monitoring, containment steps (revoke sessions, remove rogue authenticators, hunt inbox rules, OAuth grants, forwarding), and a five-question deployment checklist.

huntress.comarticlePublished and added 14 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

SecurityWeek summarizes SAP's October 2026 Security Patch Day (22 notes, four critical). Critical flaws: CVE-2026-89111 (CVSS 10) OAuth2 SSRF in SAP Cloud SDK for Python that leaks client credentials via the tenant_subdomain parameter; CVE-2026-89110 (9.9) NetWeaver broken access control allowing ABAP code execution through Fiori rule definition input; CVE-2026-89107 (9.9) S/4HANA Visual Composer code injection; and CVE-2026-89108 (9.1) missing authorization check in Manufacturing Integration and Intelligence allowing admin account creation. SAP reports no exploitation in the wild.

securityweek.comarticlePublished and added 14 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Summary of SAP's October 13, 2026 Security Patch Day (16 new notes, 4 GitHub advisories). It leads with CVE-2026-89111, a CVSS 10.0 OAuth2 SSRF in SAP Cloud SDK for Python before 0.45.2, where an attacker-controlled tenant_subdomain redirects token requests and exfiltrates client credentials. It also lists three other critical flaws: broken access control in NetWeaver Visual Composer, code injection in S/4HANA substitution/validation rules, and a missing authorization check in the Manufacturing Integration and Intelligence (XMII) Configuration Service. It notes that none are in CISA KEV and SAP reports no in-the-wild exploitation.

x.comadvisoryAdded 15 Oct 2026, published 13 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Social thread reacting to a newly disclosed high-severity OAuth vulnerability in the Model Context Protocol Python SDK, where a malicious MCP server could manipulate the authorization flow and steal credentials used by an agent. The author uses it to argue that delegated agent authority needs provenance (who granted it, to which agent, for which service and resource, whether it is transferable or replayable, and when it expires) and that machine-to-machine trust must be auditable by humans. Gives no CVE ID or technical exploit detail.

x.comthreadAdded 13 Oct 2026, published 12 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Writeup of an unauthenticated RCE on Google's shared DevSite platform (developers.google.com, firebase.google.com, developer.android.com and others). The Flask session cookie embedded a pickled OAuth2WebServerFlow containing the OAuth client_secret, which was also the Flask SECRET_KEY. That let the author forge signed sessions carrying a malicious pickle that the OAuth callback unpickled; RCE was proven safely with time.sleep timing and negative controls. It earned a $90,000 bounty and lists a four-part fix.

simonkoeck.comwriteupPublished and added 12 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

OpenSourceMalware analyzes a targeted phishing email from my-github[.]com (same server 193.32.204[.]199 as GhostAction's CI/CD exfiltration) that impersonated a GitHub new-sign-in alert. Recovered HTML and a HAR show a GitHub reverse proxy that captures passwords and TOTP codes, rewrites GitHub subdomains, and injects JavaScript that silently completes an OAuth device flow with repo, workflow and read:org scopes, then exfiltrates the token to TCP/8443. It includes a per-session redirect controller, mutable redirect behavior seen in URLScan, a victim's audit-log outcome (MFA stopped escalation), IOCs, and response guidance.

opensourcemalware.comwriteupPublished and added 11 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

God's Eye View is an open-source, vanilla JavaScript + CesiumJS + Vite 3D globe that fuses live public feeds (aircraft, ships, satellites, quakes, public cameras, weather) into one explorable scene. Its AI layer is a hands-free voice agent on the OpenAI Realtime API with 30 tools: camera fly-to, whiteboard annotations, analyst queries over live layers, and scene-context and screenshot grounding. Keys stay server-side and the browser gets only a short-lived session token. An experimental ChatGPT/Codex OAuth path is also supported. The app doubles as an MCP server, so Claude Desktop, Codex or ChatGPT can open the globe from a conversation.

github.comrepoAdded 11 Oct 2026🧠 AI

Uber's engineering team describes how it extended its Zero Trust stack to give AI agents verifiable identities. Each agent workload gets a SPIRE SVID, and a Security Token Service checks an Agent Registry and mints single-hop, short-lived JWTs. Those tokens carry the full actor chain (for example user → Oncall Agent → Investigation Agent), loosely modelled on OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange (RFC 8693). The tokens are enforced at an MCP Gateway for tool calls, and an AI Gateway fronts model calls with guardrails. The post also covers an A2A client in the SDK that makes the secure path the default, observability of actor chains, and a 2026 roadmap toward dynamic access control and unified policy enforcement. It is a concrete production reference for agent attribution and delegated authorization.

uber.comwriteupAdded 10 Oct 2026🧠 AI

bigarrow is an MIT-licensed, single-binary Swift macOS CLI that draws a click-through arrow and sign over all windows so an AI agent can show a human where to click, paste or act (permission prompts, 2FA, OAuth consent). It ships an Agent Skills package (installed via `bigarrow install-skill`) for Claude Code and Codex, with JSON output and exit codes, and can target by Accessibility label, coordinates, window or Peekaboo snapshot. The README documents the skill's token cost (182 tokens for the description, 1,398 for the instructions) and 104 automated tests.

github.comrepoPublished and added 9 Oct 2026🧠 AI

A post summarizing a joint FBI and six-country advisory on actors tied to Integrity Technology Group (the sanctioned Chinese firm linked to Flax Typhoon and the Raptor Train botnet). They password-sprayed Microsoft 365 and Exchange accounts over EWS, OWA, ActiveSync and PowerShell with EBurst. They then drained mailboxes with a PHP bot over Exchange Web Services and an office-cli utility using stored client ID, tenant ID and secret values, and exposed the stolen email to third parties through a web app, in some cases restricted to Xiamen IP addresses. Victims were in government, law enforcement, healthcare and religious organizations across Southeast Asia, Africa and North America, with activity since at least January 2021. Defensive takeaways: enforce MFA on every legacy path, retire basic auth and EWS, audit OAuth apps and service principals with mail-read rights, and alert on bulk mailbox pulls.

x.comthreadAdded 11 Oct 2026, published 9 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

ETDI (Enhanced Tool Definition Interface) is a proposed security extension to the Model Context Protocol that adds cryptographically signed and versioned tool definitions, OAuth 2.0 scope-based permissions, Cedar-policy-driven context-aware access control (via engines like Amazon Verified Permissions/OPA), and call-stack verification to stop tool chaining and privilege escalation. It is designed to counter two named MCP threat classes — Tool Poisoning (spoofed/impersonated tool definitions) and Rug Pull attacks (post-approval silent modification of tool behavior) — with concrete pseudocode for signature verification, version/integrity checking, and policy evaluation. The page functions as an implementation guide for MCP client/server builders wanting to harden tool approval and invocation flows.

vulnerablemcp.infowriteupAdded 8 Oct 2026🧠 AI

Adversa AI's October 2026 MCP security roundup, aggregating and synthesizing 15 resources: authentication-bypass vulnerabilities in LiteLLM's MCP endpoint (CVE-2026-59822, now CISA KEV), Grafana's MCP server session spoofing/SSRF (CVE-2026-19516), an MCP Python SDK OAuth-fallback flaw exploited by a malicious server returning a 404, and an Obot gateway route-matching bypass reopening GHSA-vw82. It also covers detection failures (two malicious MCP servers passing five scanners including Cisco mcp-scanner and Snyk agent-scan, 12% of 82,000 public MCP configs hardcoding secrets), a malicious npm wallet-signing package (gadgethumans-mcp), the A2M agent-hijacking attack technique, and CoSAI's MCP Security v2.0 governance model.

adversa.aiarticlePublished and added 8 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

ETDI (Enhanced Tool Definition Interface) is a proposed security extension to the Model Context Protocol that defends against Tool Poisoning (spoofed/impersonated tool definitions) and Rug Pull attacks (silent post-approval modification of tool behavior) using cryptographic signing of tool definitions, immutable versioning with mandatory re-approval, OAuth 2.0 scopes, and Cedar/Amazon Verified Permissions-based policy-aware access control. The page includes detailed attack scenarios, a call-stack verification scheme to prevent tool-chaining privilege escalation, and implementation code for key management, signature verification, and policy evaluation.

vulnerablemcp.infowriteupAdded 8 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

codex-chatgpt-bridge is a Codex agent skill plus external PowerShell control scripts (On/Off/Reboot/Rotate) built on top of the open-source DevSpace MCP bridge, which lets ChatGPT act as a planning/review "architect" while Codex stays the local executor that applies and verifies changes. It adds a token-saving router (NORMAL / TOKEN_SAVING / CHATGPT_ARCHITECT modes) and a lifecycle layer — Cloudflare Quick Tunnels or a stable Cloudflare Worker proxy, DPAPI-protected credentials, OAuth token rotation, and a scheduled-task recovery entrypoint — so the bridge's public endpoint can be closed when idle without re-authorizing the ChatGPT app on every restart.

github.comrepoAdded 5 Oct 2026🧠 AI

Announcement of mcpc v0.7.0, Apify's open-source MCP CLI client (npm i -g @apify/mcpc), which adds support for the MCP Skills extension with new skills-list/skills-get commands that verify SKILL.md and supporting files against the skill manifest via size and SHA-256 checks before printing content. The release also ships security hardening: repo-local .mcp.json auto-discovery can no longer read environment variables (blocking leaks like $GITHUB_TOKEN), OAuth refresh tokens are now scoped only to the auth server originally used, and Windows login URLs no longer launch through cmd.exe.

x.comthreadAdded 5 Oct 2026, published 3 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Jan Curn announces mcpc v0.7.0, an open-source MCP CLI client (npm package @apify/mcpc), adding support for the MCP Skills extension via new skills-list and skills-get commands that fetch and cryptographically verify SKILL.md and supporting files against the skill manifest (size + SHA-256). The release also hardens security by preventing repo-local .mcp.json auto-discovery from reading environment variables (blocking token-leak tricks), scoping refresh tokens to the originating auth server, and fixing an insecure Windows login URL launch path via cmd.exe, alongside OAuth session longevity fixes and 2026-07-28 MCP spec compatibility improvements.

x.comthreadAdded 5 Oct 2026, published 3 Oct 2026🧠 AI

Folkbench has two parts. One is a public benchmark and leaderboard of third-party AI API relay (中转站) services. Multi-node probes run around the clock and publish availability, P95 latency and price per relay, with per-model rankings. The other is Switch, an open-source Tauri/Rust desktop client that stores several Base URL and API Key pairs. It applies them to Claude Code or Codex configs in one click, previews config diffs, and stashes and restores the official ChatGPT OAuth credentials when switching Codex to a third-party provider. It also keeps keys local and estimates token usage and cost per session. The README also profiles several relay services, such as Modelflare, CheapAI and ApiPorter, and that part reads as promotional.

github.comrepoAdded 12 Oct 2026, published 2 Oct 2026🧠 AI

TATS is an open-source Python tool that analyzes OAuth 2.0, OpenID Connect, and Microsoft Entra ID tokens. It helps security researchers trace authentication flows, identify risky permissions granted to tokens, and visualize token lifecycles for identity security review and investigation work.

x.comtoolPublished and added 2 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Release notes for v2.2.0 of the official Model Context Protocol TypeScript SDK. Upgrade notes: machine-to-machine OAuth providers (ClientCredentialsProvider, PrivateKeyJwtProvider, StaticPrivateKeyJwtProvider, CrossAppAccessProvider) should now be given expectedIssuer, and fetchToken() throws AuthorizationServerMismatchError when client information is bound to a different authorization server. listTools/listPrompts/listResources/listResourceTemplates now follow nextCursor automatically, capped by listMaxPages. Fixes include CommonJS type-checking of the DPoP jose types, unhandled rejections in Client.listen(), createMcpHandler stack overflow and subscriptions/listen handling, .localhost loopback for OAuth token endpoints, and v1-to-v2 codemod comment preservation.

github.comadvisoryAdded 1 Oct 2026🧠 AI

A whitepaper from the OpenID Foundation, led by Tobin South with contributors from WorkOS, Stanford's Loyal Agents Initiative, and the Artificial Intelligence Identity Management Community Group, mapping how authentication and authorization standards apply to AI agents. It surveys current fixes (OAuth 2.1, Model Context Protocol authorization, enterprise SSO/SCIM provisioning, IPSIE profiles) and lays out unsolved problems for autonomous agents: delegated "on-behalf-of" identity versus user impersonation, consent fatigue at scale, recursive sub-agent delegation, multi-user shared agents, and browser/computer-use agents that bypass API-based authorization entirely.

openid.netpaperAdded 2 Oct 2026, published 1 Oct 2026🧠 AI

OpenID Foundation whitepaper (Oct 2025, lead editor Tobin South) analyzing how authentication/authorization for AI agents differs from traditional software clients. It covers where OAuth 2.1, OIDC, SSO/SCIM, and MCP already work for single-domain synchronous agents, and lays out unsolved problems for autonomous agentic identity: agent identity fragmentation across vendors, replacing user impersonation with explicit delegated "on-behalf-of" authority, consent-fatigue at scale, recursive delegation chains between sub-agents, agents acting for teams of users, and browser/computer-use agents bypassing API-based authorization entirely.

openid.netpaperAdded 2 Oct 2026, published 1 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Release notes for MCP Python SDK v2.2.0 detailing several security-relevant default changes: HTTP clients (Client, streamable_http_client, sse_client) now only follow redirects within the same origin, closing a cross-origin redirect trust gap; OAuth clients now validate the authorization server's issuer even on the legacy (non-protected-resource-metadata) discovery path, preventing metadata/issuer mismatch attacks; idle Streamable HTTP sessions now expire after 30 minutes with a 10,000-session cap to limit resource exhaustion; and a new AuthSettings.validate_token_resource setting lets servers reject bearer tokens not issued for them (audience/resource confusion). Deprecation warnings push OAuth provider configs toward requiring an explicit issuer ahead of a 3.0 breaking change.

github.comotherAdded 27 Sep 2026🛡️ Security

Release notes for MCP Python SDK v2.2.0, the reference Python implementation of the Model Context Protocol. Key changes: HTTP client redirects are now restricted to the same origin as the endpoint, idle Streamable HTTP sessions expire after 30 minutes (with a 10,000-session cap), OAuth authorization server metadata issuer checks are now enforced on the legacy discovery path, and new deprecation warnings push toward requiring explicit `issuer=` and `validate_token_resource` settings ahead of a 3.0 release.

github.comrepoAdded 26 Sep 2026🧠 AI

CVE-2026-49291 affects mcp-memory-service prior to version 10.65.3: its HTTP MCP JSON-RPC endpoint at /mcp only enforced OAuth 'read' scope before dispatching tools/call requests, so a client holding only read access could invoke mutating tools like store_memory and delete_memory even though the equivalent REST endpoints correctly required 'write' scope. The flaw is a classic missing-authorization bug (CWE-862) surfacing specifically in an MCP tool-dispatch layer, scored CVSS 3.1 8.1 (High) with confidentiality unaffected but integrity and availability impacted. Fixed in 10.65.3.

nvd.nist.govadvisoryAdded 26 Sep 2026🛡️ Security

CVE-2026-18655 describes an improper endpoint restriction flaw (CWE-923) in the RabbitMQ broker connection tools of awslabs.amazon-mq-mcp-server versions before 2.0.24. A remote unauthenticated attacker can use prompt injection introduced into the MCP client context to redirect the broker hostname to an attacker-controlled endpoint, causing Amazon MQ for RabbitMQ credentials or OAuth access tokens to be sent there; CVSS 4.0 base score 7.1 (High). Fixed in version 2.0.24, referenced via an AWS security bulletin and a GitHub security advisory (GHSA-xwj6-8x5h-hjp6).

nvd.nist.govadvisoryAdded 26 Sep 2026🛡️ Security

CVE-2026-14541 describes an authentication bypass (CWE-287) in the Google OAuth provider of Google's mcp-toolbox for databases v1.4.0, an MCP server that lets LLM agents query databases. When the Google authService is configured with mcpEnabled: true but no explicit audience or clientId, the ValidateMCPAuth pipeline skips audience checks for opaque tokens, so any valid Google OAuth access token — even one issued for an unrelated app — is accepted, letting unauthorized clients reach protected tools and data backends.

nvd.nist.govadvisoryAdded 26 Sep 2026🛡️ Security

GHSA advisory for better-auth (< 1.6.11) documenting that the deprecated oidcProvider() and mcp() plugins publish "none" as a supported ID-token signing algorithm in their OIDC discovery document and default allowPlainCodeChallengeMethod to true, silently rewriting missing code_challenge_method to "plain" — both violating OAuth 2.1/RFC 9700. The fix removes "none" from the metadata, defaults plain PKCE to disabled, and rejects requests missing code_challenge_method instead of downgrading them; @better-auth/oauth-provider was never affected.

github.comadvisoryAdded 26 Sep 2026🛡️ Security

GitHub advisory for @yoda.digital/gitlab-mcp-server (mcp-gitlab-server): with USE_SSE=true the HTTP/SSE transport has no authentication, sends wildcard CORS headers, and binds to 0.0.0.0. Any network caller or any web page the operator visits can open /sse and POST /messages to drive all 86 GitLab tools (delete_repository, push_files, etc.) using the operator's personal access token. It includes a curl PoC, a CVSS 4.0 vector (~6.3 Medium, effectively High when SSE is enabled) and four fixes: required auth token, loopback bind, a CORS allowlist, and the OAuth roadmap.

github.comadvisoryAdded 26 Sep 2026🛡️ Security

The first large-scale measurement study of authentication security across real-world remote MCP servers, scanning 7,973 live deployments and finding 40.55% expose tools with no authentication at all. For the 119 testable OAuth-enabled servers, the authors built a semi-automated (passive traffic inspection + active dynamic probing) detection framework and derived a taxonomy of nine flaw types across four categories — three MCP-specific (open client environments, dynamic client registration, delegated authorization) and conventional OAuth misconfigurations — finding every tested server had at least one flaw, with dynamic client registration flaws hitting 96.6% of servers and leading to information leakage or account takeover; the work resulted in 9 CVEs via responsible disclosure.

arxiv.orgpaperAdded 26 Sep 2026🛡️ Security

Wiz Research analyzed infostealer-harvested secrets (via its NordStellar integration) to map exactly which credentials malware families like Lumma, RedLine, and Vidar target across AWS, Azure, GCP, GitHub, GitLab, and AI platforms, and how those secrets translate into cloud account takeover. It gives concrete file paths and artifacts attackers hunt for (~/.aws/sso/cache OIDC tokens, Azure accessTokens.json, GCP credentials.db/access_tokens.db, GitHub gh hosts.yml and SSH keys, GitLab Runner config.toml, OpenAI/ChatGPT session cookies, and Claude Code's ~/.claude/.credentials.json OAuth tokens), plus stats: three malware families cause 85.7% of incidents, AWS/GCP account for 46%/13% of stolen secrets, GitHub ~10%, AI platforms ~5%. It also covers CI/CD-targeting infostealers (Miasma, TeamPCP) and session-cookie hijacking as an MFA bypass technique.

wiz.iowriteupAdded 27 Sep 2026, published 25 Sep 2026🛡️ Security

CVE-2026-94127 is an unauthenticated heap overflow in F5 BIG-IP's APM OAuth userinfo handler (tmm). A 0x4100-byte heap buffer receives the Authorization header with no length check. watchTowr patch-diffed 21.1.0 against 21.1.0.2 with Diaphora, triggered a crash via /f5-oauth2/v1/userinfo, and described a ret2plt chain that works around SELinux by appending a command to /etc/bigstart/scripts/tmm.finish.

labs.watchtowr.comwriteupAdded 30 Oct 2026, published 23 Sep 2026🛡️ Security

Socket's Threat Research team dissects a malicious Firefox extension (pdf-para-texto@extensao.local, "PDF Identity Verifier") that ships with no hardcoded malicious code — all attack logic is fetched as data into browser.storage.local after install via a lookalike domain (pdf.gusercontent.com), evading static store review. Once armed, it abuses Google's FedCM API to silently identify the victim, injects a live automation script into real accounts.google.com pages to drive an invisible account-takeover flow (bypassing password entry, forcing passkey challenges, dodging Google's bot detection, and forcing/capturing a password reset), while a webRequest listener steals the oauth_token session cookie from Set-Cookie headers — giving the attacker both a live session and a durable new password. The campaign targets Portuguese- and Spanish-speaking users starting September 2026 and includes full IOCs (domains, file hashes) and remediation steps.

socket.devwriteupPublished and added 23 Sep 2026🛡️ Security

Huntress researcher Andrew Schwartz demonstrates a novel OAuth token-theft technique: a sideloaded AppX package registered via Add-AppxPackage -Register (requiring only Developer Mode, no admin beyond that toggle) can set ContentUriRules WindowsRuntimeAccess="all" so attacker-controlled JavaScript rendered inside the Microsoft-signed WWAHost.exe process gets full WinRT access, including the legacy WebAuthenticationBroker OAuth API. Using Microsoft Office's own client ID and the oob redirect URI, the attacker triggers a genuine login.microsoftonline.com/MFA dialog with no browser chrome, captures the auth code, and exchanges it for an access token plus a long-lived refresh token carrying the full Office delegated Graph scope set (mail, files, Teams, directory, AuditLog.Create) — validated end-to-end against a live Entra ID tenant with MFA and default Conditional Access. The post frames it as a class of vulnerable signed AppX host binaries sharing the same WinRT activation layer, and provides a Sigma rule keyed on the MSAppHost/3.0 EdgeHTML user agent reaching non-Microsoft destinations, plus Sysmon/Event ID and GPO-based mitigations (restricting Developer Mode, Conditional Access, shorter refresh-token lifetimes, CAE).

huntress.comwriteupPublished and added 23 Sep 2026🛡️ Security

Tenet Threat Labs red-teamed a GPT-4o agent with all five A2AS BASIC pillars enabled and an MCP server. A tool response disguised as HTTP 206 pagination and OAuth steps ("Tool Parameter Injection via Semantic Orchestration Mimicry") led the agent to run a shell script, read credentials.txt and exfiltrate the token. It succeeded in over 80% of runs in November 2025. The authors argue for runtime enforcement based on content trust levels.

tenetsecurity.aiwriteupAdded 29 Oct 2026, published 23 Sep 2026🛡️ Security

Rapid7's ETR writeup covers CVE-2026-94127, a critical heap-based buffer overflow (CVSS 9.8) in F5 BIG-IP Access Policy Manager that allows unauthenticated remote code execution via crafted traffic. Exploitation requires a virtual server with both an APM access policy and an OAuth profile configured, affects the data plane (including Appliance mode), and has been added to CISA KEV; F5 provides hotfixes for the 21.1.0, 17.5.0, and 17.1.0 release trains plus an iRule workaround for those unable to patch immediately.

rapid7.comadvisoryAdded 7 Oct 2026, published 23 Sep 2026🛡️ Security

AKCA is an open-source, Go-based Dynamic Application Security Testing (DAST) scanner that combines HTTP and headless-browser crawling, JavaScript/AST analysis, API spec import (OpenAPI, GraphQL, gRPC, etc.), and adaptive active testing across a very broad set of vulnerability classes including SQL injection, XSS, SSRF, IDOR/BOLA, SSTI, JWT/OAuth flaws, race conditions, and cloud/CI exposure. It emphasizes evidence-oriented verification — replaying promising signals against baselines, negative controls, and OAST callbacks before promoting them to findings — and exports Burp-style HTTP evidence in HTML, JSON, CSV, Markdown, and SARIF reports. Positioned as a transparent, single-developer alternative inspired by but not claiming parity with Acunetix, Invicti/Netsparker, or Burp Suite Professional.

github.comrepoAdded 2 Oct 2026, published 23 Sep 2026🛡️ Security

Analysis of 30+ CVEs filed against Model Context Protocol servers, clients, SDKs, and proxies in the first two months of 2026, showing the flaws concentrated in plumbing (proxies, registries, transports) rather than tool implementations. It walks through CVE-2025-6514 (CVSS 9.6 RCE in mcp-remote via unsanitized OAuth authorization_endpoint URLs shelled out to launch a browser), the chained Atlassian MCP server CVEs (CVE-2026-27825/CVE-2026-27826), unauthenticated public registries, and a systemic stdio-transport advisory, then ties the findings to the NSA's May 2026 MCP security CSI and the OWASP MCP Top 10.

bex.coarticleAdded 26 Sep 2026, published 23 Sep 2026🛡️ Security

Uber describes how it extended its Zero Trust stack to give AI agents verifiable identities: workloads get SPIRE SVIDs, an Agent Registry validates agent-to-workload binding, and a Security Token Service mints single-hop, short-lived JWTs (based on OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange, RFC 8693) that embed the full actor chain from human to agents. An MCP Gateway enforces tool-level policy and an SDK-integrated A2A client makes secure propagation the default. It addresses delegation, provenance loss across agent hops, and auditability, and notes alignment with IETF WIMSE drafts.

uber.comarticleAdded 18 Sep 2026🛡️ Security

A GitHub-hosted, CC0-licensed index of 281 public writeups on attacks against AI agents, organized into six categories: indirect prompt injection, direct prompt injection/jailbreaks/guardrail bypass, MCP and agent tooling, AI platform/infrastructure bugs, classic web bugs in AI product surfaces, and AI used as an attacker's tool. Entries span 2021-2026 and include major disclosures like GeminiJack, ForcedLeak, Clinejection, CVE-2025-53773 (GitHub Copilot RCE), and dozens of Johann Rehberger/PromptArmor/qual1a writeups covering exfiltration, MCP OAuth flaws, and coding-agent sandbox escapes. Comes with an accompanying blog post "How to Hack AI Agents" and a scripted links.txt for automation.

github.comrepoAdded 22 Sep 2026, published 17 Sep 2026🛡️ Security

Datadog Security Labs walks through hunting for GitHub organization compromise using GitHub audit logs, covering the full attack chain from stolen PATs/OAuth tokens and device-code phishing (initial access) through secrets-listing enumeration, private-repo/tree discovery, and bulk collection via git.clone or repo.download_zip. It provides copy-pasteable queries (with fields like hashed_token, programmatic_access_type, external_identity_nameid) mapped to MITRE ATT&CK techniques and calls out GitHub audit-log quirks (missing IP on failed auth, inconsistent visibility fields, misleading token permission scopes) that shape accurate detections.

securitylabs.datadoghq.comwriteupAdded 25 Sep 2026, published 16 Sep 2026🛡️ Security

Huntress SOC analysts Ryan Dowd and Jon Semon tore apart a live social-engineering campaign that began with a fake CoinDesk marketing exec DMing a researcher a Google Doc containing a container-bound Apps Script sidebar. The script ran client-side without OAuth consent, exfiltrated victim IP/geolocation/wallet presence via the Telegram API, then routed macOS users to a piped zsh/DMG AMOS stealer chain and Windows users through ClickOnce and PowerShell loaders using three stolen or fraudulent code-signing certificates (a Norwegian company, Discord, and Lenovo). The Windows chain culminated in NetSupport Manager RMM abuse, a Ledger wallet implant, and a self-generated rogue root certificate authority (spoofing Google Trust Services) installed via MsBuild.exe hollowing to silently intercept HTTPS traffic, which the authors flag as the artifact most likely to survive incident remediation short of full reimaging.

huntress.comwriteupAdded 11 Sep 2026, published 15 Sep 2026🛡️ Security

Socket's Threat Research Team analyzed "Twitch Enhanced Viewer | JeetBot", a Chrome/Firefox extension with 31,000 users that captures the user's live Twitch OAuth session token from the Authorization header and forwards it as an &auth= query parameter to proxy servers operated by JeetBot, a Russian-language Twitch/Kick/VK-Live bot SaaS, exempting only ten hardcoded Russian streamer channels. Earlier v4.x builds POSTed tokens outright to dedicated set-token endpoints (with backups on deno.dev/deno.net) and included Russian-language comments indicating deliberate rate-limited exfiltration; the account-scoped bearer token grants chat, whispers, and settings access, contradicting both store listings' "no data collection" claims. Firefox has since shipped a fix (85.8.7) after Socket's disclosure; the Chrome build remained vulnerable at publication.

socket.devwriteupPublished and added 12 Sep 2026🛡️ Security

Huntress details five modern phishing techniques that bypass traditional "check the URL" training and MFA: ClickFix (fake CAPTCHA tricking users into running Win+R/paste commands to execute malware), Browser-in-the-Browser (fake HTML popup windows mimicking OAuth login prompts with forged address bars/padlocks), ConsentFix (dragging an identity icon to leak an OAuth authorization code that attackers trade for Microsoft Entra ID access/refresh tokens), device code phishing (abusing the legitimate microsoft.com/devicelogin flow to authorize an attacker's device via a code, seen weaponized in PhaaS kits like EvilTokens), and fake video-conference (Teams/Zoom/Google Meet) waiting-room overlays that push a malicious "driver update" install. Each section explains why the technique defeats standard security-awareness training and how Huntress's simulated phishing scenarios replicate it.

huntress.comarticleAdded 3 Sep 2026, published 28 Aug 2026🛡️ Security

GitLab 19.3 release notes cover dozens of features, with a significant cluster around AI agent tooling: a new "Flow Creator" foundational agent that generates runnable flow YAML for the GitLab Duo Agent Platform from natural language, GitLab Duo CLI plugin/marketplace support (compatible with existing Claude Code plugin marketplace files), new MCP tools (get_merge_request, list_merge_requests), pre-registered MCP OAuth applications, and a redesigned Agentic Chat UI for VS Code/JetBrains. It also ships GA features for Duo-based merge-conflict and review-discussion resolution, and security/SAST features like Agentic SAST vulnerability resolution flows.

docs.gitlab.comarticleAdded 22 Sep 2026, published 27 Aug 2026🧠 AI

The Model Context Protocol Core Maintainers publish an updated roadmap covering five priority areas: agentic messaging primitives (server-initiated events, maturing the Tasks extension SEP-2663), HTTP-native transport unification (including local servers over Streamable HTTP/stdio), agent identity and enterprise security (DPoP, Workload Identity Federation, ID-JAG grant, token exchange, engagement with IETF OAuth and WIMSE working groups), improved tool-call result primitives and progressive tool discovery, and SDK developer experience. It also recaps the previous roadmap's shipped work in the 2026-07-28 spec release — removal of protocol-level sessions/handshake for stateless horizontal scaling, server/discover, cacheable list results, Multi Round-Trip Requests (SEP-2322), issuer validation, issuer-bound client credentials, and Client ID Metadata Documents (CIMD).

blog.modelcontextprotocol.ioarticleAdded 7 Oct 2026, published 22 Aug 2026🧠 AI

Official blog post from the Model Context Protocol Core Maintainers laying out the updated project roadmap, with a significant authorization/identity component: it recaps the 2026-07-28 spec release's security work (issuer validation, issuer-bound client credentials, Client ID Metadata Documents as the preferred client registration path, and a now-stable Enterprise-Managed Authorization extension) and names "Agent identity and enterprise-ready security" as a top priority going forward. That upcoming work covers finalizing DPoP, defining agent identity and delegation through Workload Identity Federation, the ID-JAG grant, and standard token exchange, plus deeper engagement with the IETF OAuth and WIMSE standards groups — aimed at moving MCP server authorization away from long-lived API keys toward cryptographically bound, delegated agent identities.

blog.modelcontextprotocol.ioarticleAdded 8 Oct 2026, published 22 Aug 2026🛡️ Security

JFrog explains how to propagate end-user identity across the 'second hop' when AI agents call tools through Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Gateway, focusing on On-Behalf-Of (OBO) token exchange to authenticate to JFrog Artifactory as the actual user rather than a shared service credential. It compares OBO against header whitelisting and three-legged OAuth, explaining why shared credentials break audit fidelity, least privilege, and containment for agentic systems, and provides a CLI-driven procedure to configure OBO between AgentCore Identity and Artifactory's MCP server.

jfrog.comarticlePublished and added 21 Aug 2026🛡️ Security

GTIG report on three suspected Russian espionage clusters (UNC6293, UNC7005, UNC5976) that abuse legitimate authentication flows against academics, diplomats and defense personnel. It covers app password, OAuth and device code phishing, WhatsApp device linking, VIDAR and ATOMIC stealers, ENGINELIGHT, HEADRUSH and the hospitality captive portal campaign. It links UNC6293 and UNC7005 to ICE RELIC (formerly APT29) with moderate confidence and gives hardening advice.

cloud.google.comarticleAdded 29 Oct 2026, published 20 Aug 2026🛡️ Security

Varonis Threat Labs details CoSnitch (CVE-2026-24301), a chain of three flaws in Microsoft Copilot Personal. A crafted copilot.microsoft.com link with ?q= and an undocumented autorun parameter runs a prompt on load. That prompt reads data through OAuth connectors (Gmail, Drive, Calendar) and exfiltrates it via Copilot's URL-fetch to an attacker webhook. Indirect prompt injection through web summarization also writes persistent attacker instructions into Copilot's memory. The post also describes "meta-hacking", where researchers got Copilot to disclose its own hidden parameter, and lists mitigations.

varonis.comwriteupAdded 5 Sep 2026, published 18 Aug 2026🛡️ Security

Wiz's autonomous "Red Agent" discovered a GitHub Actions script-injection vulnerability in snowflakedb/snowflake-connector-net's jira_issue.yml workflow, introduced when a PR (co-authored by GitHub Copilot) replaced a safe env:/jq pattern with direct interpolation of the attacker-controlled issue title. GitHub Advanced Security scanned the same PR and workflow but failed to flag the injection; Red Agent autonomously crafted and self-corrected a payload after a bash syntax error, exfiltrated Jira OAuth credentials via an out-of-band callback, and used them to access Snowflake's internal Jira (engineering, security, and bug-bounty projects) — all without human intervention. Snowflake patched and rotated credentials the same day the flaw was reported via HackerOne.

wiz.iowriteupAdded 3 Sep 2026, published 17 Aug 2026🛡️ Security

Recon-Skills is a curated collection of SKILL.md playbooks for external web security assessments, organized into auth (SSO/OAuth/SAML/MFA), chains (multi-step attack-path analysis), infra, recon (subdomain/DNS/port/tech discovery, route/parameter/API mapping), and redteam (vulnerability-class and platform-specific validation) categories. Each skill documents prerequisites, procedure, pitfalls, and verification criteria, and the skills are designed to be followed manually or loaded as task context by an automation system for authorized penetration testing engagements. It includes a validator script (validate_skills.py) and style/contribution guides to maintain a consistent quality baseline across skills.

github.comrepoPublished and added 29 Jul 2026🛡️ Security

Huntress blog recap of a Tradecraft Tuesday broadcast breaking down the LSHIY password-spraying campaign, which hit Microsoft Azure CLI tenants via IPv6 ranges from BYOIP provider LSHIY LLC, generating over 81 million login attempts and 78 account compromises in a two-week window. The campaign abuses OAuth's deprecated Resource Owner Password Credentials (ROPC) grant at the tenant token endpoint to mint delegated tokens that bypass MFA and Conditional Access Policies when valid credentials are entered. After LSHIY's takedown the actor pivoted to FranTech IPv6 ranges and Tor exit nodes; mitigations include disabling ROPC, restricting Azure CLI for non-admins, and enforcing unscoped Conditional Access covering all users, apps, and client types.

huntress.comarticleAdded 3 Sep 2026, published 22 Jul 2026🛡️ Security

Yolorouter is a free, self-hosted, single-binary LLM gateway that translates between the four major chat wire protocols — OpenAI Chat Completions, OpenAI Responses, Anthropic Messages, and Gemini generateContent — so a client built for one provider (e.g. Claude Code) can be pointed at any other. It adds multi-provider failover, round-robin upstream API key pooling with rate-limit/quota handling, per-key budgets and access control, a multi-user admin console with OAuth2/OIDC SSO, and native image/video generation support for OpenAI-shaped and non-OpenAI-shaped providers (DashScope, Volcengine Ark, Kling, MiniMax). It also ships cost-optimization features — deterministic system-prompt injection and tool-output compression for coding agents — backed by a published benchmark, plus built-in usage/cost observability.

github.comrepoAdded 2 Oct 2026, published 21 Jul 2026🧠 AI

CircleCI disclosed GHSA-8xjg-jpfh-5257 affecting its standalone circleci-mcp-server npm package used as an MCP server in Claude Desktop, Cursor, VS Code, and Windsurf, and is deprecating that package in favor of a built-in MCP server shipped with a new CircleCI CLI. Affected users are told to upgrade to version 0.19.0 immediately, while CircleCI cloud users are pointed toward migrating to the CLI, which adds OAuth-based auth and native pipeline watching. CircleCI will keep shipping security patches to the old package but is no longer adding features to it.

discuss.circleci.comadvisoryAdded 22 Aug 2026, published 20 Jul 2026🛡️ Security

pentdem is an autonomous AI-powered pentesting CLI/pipeline that fans out 15+ vulnerability-class hunters (XSS, SQLi, SSRF, IDOR, SSTI, JWT, GraphQL, etc.) and 8 advanced attack skills (mass assignment, race conditions, cloud metadata, OAuth/OIDC, subdomain takeover, credential harvesting) in parallel, using an LLM to adapt strategy mid-scan. It wraps real tools (nmap, sqlmap, nuclei, ffuf, subfinder, httpx) in Docker isolation and adds a novel gate chain — quality gate, kill-chain builder, adversarial cross-model validation (a second model tries to disprove each finding), a capability execution ledger (proves each hunter actually ran instead of silently crashing), and a ship-discipline gate — before mapping surviving findings to MITRE ATT&CK/OWASP Top 10/CVSS and generating reports.

github.comrepoPublished and added 20 Jul 2026🛡️ Security

CVE-2026-50027 describes a critical missing-authentication flaw in mcp-memory-service, a PyPI-hosted MCP server used for persistent AI agent memory. All routes under /api/documents/* bypass the server's MCP_API_KEY/OAuth authentication checks (unlike the properly-protected /api/memories endpoints), letting unauthenticated remote attackers read, write, and permanently delete stored memories. GitLab rates it CVSS 9.8 Critical.

advisories.gitlab.comadvisoryPublished and added 5 Jul 2026🛡️ Security

ThinkWatch is a source-available dual-port gateway (Rust/Axum) that proxies both AI provider APIs (OpenAI, Anthropic, Gemini, Azure OpenAI, AWS Bedrock) and MCP tool calls through a single control plane, enforcing authentication, RBAC, rate limits/budgets, and audit logging. Its key differentiator is per-user upstream identity for MCP — propagating each user's own OAuth token/PAT to servers like GitHub/Notion/Slack (AES-256-GCM encrypted, per-key allowlists) instead of a shared service account, plus SSRF-hardened OAuth discovery (RFC 9728/8414/7591), tool-level RBAC, and ClickHouse-backed audit trails forwarded to SIEMs via Syslog/Kafka/webhooks.

github.comrepoPublished and added 4 Jul 2026🛡️ Security

Aikido Security's technical breakdown of CVE-2026-48611, a critical phpBB authentication bypass in the default configuration: by abusing the OAuth "login-link" feature's auth_provider query parameter, an unauthenticated attacker can force phpBB to use the trust-based `apache` auth provider (meant only for Apache Basic-auth proxies) and log in as any user, including admins, with a single request. The post details the vulnerable code in ucp_login_link.php/apache.php, shows a working PoC (curl/JS), explains a further UCP-to-ACP privilege escalation via the "founder" user's ability to self-promote to admin without a password, and describes an unauthenticated RCE chain via phpBB 4.0's Extensions Catalog fetching malicious extensions from attacker-controlled URLs. It also gives detection guidance (watch for `auth_provider=apache` + `mode=login_link`, including a GET/POST parameter-pollution bypass variant) and a disclosure timeline ending in the patched 3.3.17 release.

aikido.devwriteupAdded 3 Sep 2026, published 3 Jul 2026🛡️ Security

Orca Security explainer defining Identity Threat Detection and Response (ITDR) for cloud environments, distinguishing it from IAM, PAM, EDR, and CIEM as a runtime behavioral-detection layer for identity abuse rather than a preventive/posture control. It covers cloud-specific attack patterns like leaked AWS access-key abuse, AssumeRole/PassRole privilege escalation, OAuth consent phishing, and federation/token abuse, and details how ITDR baselines identity behavior (especially machine/non-human identities) using cloud audit logs like CloudTrail to detect impossible travel and anomalous role assumption, ending with Orca's agentless CIEM+ITDR platform pitch.

orca.securityarticlePublished and added 3 Jul 2026🛡️ Security

Aikido Security breaks down GitHub's newly shipped self-service credential revocation for Enterprise, which lets org owners bulk-revoke PATs, SSH keys, and OAuth tokens for compromised accounts in one action instead of hunting down individual tokens. The piece ties the feature's timing to a string of 2026 incidents caused by incomplete credential rotation: the Trivy GitHub Actions compromise that force-pushed 75 malicious version tags and cascaded into Checkmarx, and Microsoft's durabletask package/repo being repeatedly compromised via the same never-fully-rotated account (Miasma worm). It also explains why atomic rotation is infeasible at scale and recommends pinning GitHub Actions to commit SHAs instead of tags.

aikido.devarticleAdded 3 Sep 2026, published 1 Jul 2026🛡️ Security

Huntress tracked a large, ongoing password spray campaign against Microsoft 365/Azure CLI using the deprecated OAuth ROPC (Resource Owner Password Credentials) flow, which sends passwords directly to the /token endpoint and bypasses MFA prompts enforced via Conditional Access Policies. Between June 12-26, over 81 million login attempts from LSHIY LLC's IPv6 range (AS32167) compromised 78 accounts across 64 organizations, many of which had MFA enabled but scoped incorrectly (app-specific, group-specific, trusted-location exceptions, or report-only mode). After LSHIY terminated the abusive BYOIP customer, attackers pivoted to FranTech (AS53667) and then 3xK Tech GmbH (AS200373), rotating through ~12,800 IPv4 addresses at low per-IP volume to evade detection while sustaining ~1.5 million login attempts/day.

huntress.comwriteupAdded 3 Sep 2026, published 30 Jun 2026🛡️ Security

Huntress details ConsentFix, an evolution of ClickFix that abuses Microsoft 365 OAuth sign-in flows: victims are phished via password-protected Dropbox or DocSend lures, shown a fake Microsoft sign-in page, and tricked into dragging a localhost callback link into their browser, which exfiltrates OAuth tokens and hijacks the session without needing a password or triggering MFA. A cybercrime forum post published the full technique with working code and infrastructure such as Cloudflare Pages, workers.dev, and Pipedream webhooks, and showed attackers using LinkedIn, ZoomInfo, and Hunter.io to profile victims before sending lures.

huntress.comarticleAdded 3 Sep 2026, published 29 Jun 2026🛡️ Security

GHSA-9c5h-h4mj-p5ch / CVE-2026-13524 documents an improper-authorization vulnerability (CWE-266) in Cherry Studio's MCP OAuth Local Callback Server (src/main/services/mcp/oauth/callback.ts), where manipulation of the code parameter can bypass authorization checks. The attack is remote but high-complexity and difficult to exploit (CVSS 3.1: 6.5 / CVSS 4.0), a public PoC has been disclosed, and a fix PR is still awaiting merge as of publication.

vulnerability.circl.luadvisoryAdded 26 Sep 2026, published 29 Jun 2026🛡️ Security

CVE-2026-49291 affects mcp-memory-service, a semantic memory layer for AI apps, in versions before 10.65.3. The HTTP MCP JSON-RPC endpoint `/mcp` requires only the OAuth `read` scope and dispatches `tools/call` to mutating handlers. A read-only client can therefore call `store_memory` and `delete_memory`, bypassing the `write` scope that the REST endpoints enforce. It is classed as CWE-862 Missing Authorization and fixed in 10.65.3.

cve.threatint.euadvisoryAdded 23 Jun 2026🛡️ Security

Snyk discloses and analyzes a supply-chain breach at Klue, a market-intelligence SaaS platform, in which attackers used a long-forgotten integration-prototype credential to gain a foothold, then harvested OAuth tokens used for Klue's Salesforce integrations to directly query and exfiltrate customer CRM data across multiple downstream organizations (also affecting Recorded Future, Tanium, Huntress, and Jamf). Extortion attempts followed the exfiltration, and Snyk confirms it was among the affected customers, with impact limited to business contact fields and support-case titles/descriptions in its Salesforce environment. The piece illustrates how a single stale non-human credential and standing OAuth tokens can turn one vendor compromise into a multi-tenant cascade.

snyk.ioarticleAdded 3 Sep 2026, published 23 Jun 2026🛡️ Security

Huntress recaps a Tradecraft Tuesday episode explaining device code phishing, where attackers generate legitimate Microsoft OAuth device authorization codes and phish victims into entering them, instantly receiving valid session tokens that bypass MFA. It covers the technique's origin (Dr. Nestori Syynimaa/AADInternals, 2020), Storm-2372's February 2025 Teams-lure campaign, and a March 2026 EvilTokens PhaaS campaign that abused Railway.com as a clean-IP token-harvesting relay against 344 organizations, plus mitigations like Microsoft's Conditional Access block, device registration monitoring, and disabling device code flow.

huntress.comarticleAdded 3 Sep 2026, published 22 Jun 2026🛡️ Security

GHSA-73cv-556c-w3g6 (CVE-2026-49257, CWE-306) documents that mcp-pinot v3.0.1 and earlier defaults to an HTTP MCP server bound to 0.0.0.0:8080 with oauth_enabled=False, exposing all 14 tools — including read_query, create_schema and create_table_config — to any unauthenticated network caller. The server proxies calls using its own server-side Pinot credentials, creating a confused-deputy condition that grants full read/write access to the backing Apache Pinot cluster (CVSS 10.0). Fixed in v3.1.0 (PR #95) by defaulting the bind host to 127.0.0.1, refusing non-loopback exposure without OAuth, and gating Helm exposure behind OAuth.

vulnerability.circl.luadvisoryAdded 26 Sep 2026, published 18 Jun 2026🛡️ Security

Huntress details its investigation into the Klue supply-chain breach, in which a threat actor calling itself Icarus compromised the market-intelligence platform Klue via a long-dormant integration credential, then stole OAuth tokens to pivot into downstream customers' Salesforce and Gong instances, exfiltrating CRM data (contacts, price quotes, opportunity notes) from Huntress and dozens of other companies. The writeup includes IOCs, extortion-email analysis, attribution to Icarus via matching Session Messenger IDs, identification of bulletproof-hosted (AS200593/PROSPERO OOO) leak infrastructure, and IR guidance (log review, session revocation, phishing awareness) for other affected Klue customers.

huntress.comwriteupAdded 3 Sep 2026, published 18 Jun 2026🛡️ Security

Orca Security outlines a detection framework for "shadow AI" — unsanctioned LLM usage via IDE extensions (Cursor), MCP servers, and embedded SaaS/CI-CD AI features that bypass traditional CASB/DLP tools because they ride on already-trusted OAuth tokens and API calls. The framework has three steps: mapping non-human identities and OAuth scope sprawl, auditing CI/CD pipelines and SaaS platforms for embedded AI (checklist includes scanning .env files, package manifests, GitHub Actions/GitLab CI/Jenkins steps, and outbound traffic to LLM endpoints), and assessing each tool by data exposure vs. write/action authority. It closes by promoting Orca's agentless AI-SPM capability for correlating identity, data, and workload context to surface these risks.

orca.securityarticlePublished and added 1 Jun 2026🛡️ Security

Aikido Security argues that MDM (Jamf, Kandji, Intune) and EDR (CrowdStrike, SentinelOne) operate at the OS/application layer and are blind to the modern developer attack surface: npm/pip package installs with postinstall hooks, VS Code/IDE extensions, browser extensions, and MCP servers used by AI coding tools. It walks through the Nx Console extension compromise that exposed 3,800 GitHub repos, the Cyberhaven and Vercel/Context.ai OAuth-token browser-extension chain, the Mini Shai-Hulud npm worm, and the postmark-mcp malicious MCP server as evidence, then recommends a 48-hour minimum package age, disabling postinstall scripts by default, auditing extensions, and monitoring AI tool installs (pitching Aikido Device Protection/Safe Chain as the fix).

aikido.devarticleAdded 3 Sep 2026, published 28 May 2026🛡️ Security

An in-depth breakdown of the MCP 2026-07-28 specification release candidate: the protocol layer becomes stateless (no more Mcp-Session-Id, with application state moved into explicit handles like basket_id), extensions get formal reverse-DNS identifiers and independent versioning (with MCP Apps and Tasks as the first examples), Roots/Sampling/Logging are deprecated under a new feature lifecycle policy, OAuth/OpenID Connect rules are tightened for one-client-to-many-servers deployments, and tool schemas gain full JSON Schema 2020-12 support. The piece argues these changes reflect MCP deliberately narrowing scope and building governance maturity (conformance-test requirements, 12-month deprecation windows) so the protocol can scale safely in production agentic systems.

aaif.ioarticleAdded 4 Oct 2026, published 27 May 2026🧠 AI

AWS announces general availability of the AWS MCP Server, a managed remote MCP server giving AI coding agents (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex, Kiro) authenticated access to all AWS APIs via IAM SigV4 through a small tool set (call_aws, search_documentation, read_documentation, and the new run_script). Security-relevant design choices include a network-isolated sandbox for server-side script execution that inherits only IAM permissions, new IAM context keys for fine-grained access without a separate MCP permission, and enterprise controls to separate human vs. agent permissions via IAM/SCP with CloudWatch metrics and CloudTrail logging for auditing agent API calls. Since MCP only supports OAuth 2.1, an open-source MCP Proxy for AWS bridges local IAM credentials to the server.

aws.amazon.comarticlePublished and added 24 May 2026🛡️ Security

Orca analysis of CVE-2026-46354 (CVSS 9.1) in the Coder remote development platform. azureidentity.Validate() checks that the PKCS#7 signer certificate chains to a trusted Azure CA but never verifies the signature on the envelope. An unauthenticated attacker can send a forged envelope, using a public Azure IMDS certificate and a known vmId, to POST /api/v2/workspaceagents/azure-instance-identity. This yields workspace agent session tokens, and through them Git SSH keys and OAuth tokens. The post lists the affected v2 and v1 versions, the patched releases (v2.33.3, v2.32.2, v2.31.12, v2.30.8, v2.29.13, v2.24.5) and the workaround of disabling Azure instance identity auth. Coder v1 has no patch.

orca.securityadvisoryPublished and added 22 May 2026🛡️ Security

The MCP (Model Context Protocol) team announces the 2026-07-28 spec release candidate, the largest revision since launch, which removes the protocol-level session/handshake in favor of a stateless request model and restructures server-to-client interactions. The security-relevant core is a set of authorization SEPs that harden OAuth 2.0/OIDC usage: clients must validate the `iss` parameter per RFC 9207 to mitigate authorization-response mix-up attacks, declare `application_type` during Dynamic Client Registration to avoid redirect-URI misclassification, bind credentials to the issuing authorization server, and clarify scope accumulation during step-up auth. A related change requires that server-initiated requests (e.g. elicitation prompts) only be issued while actively processing a client-originated call, closing a class of out-of-nowhere prompt/consent issue for agentic clients.

blog.modelcontextprotocol.ioarticleAdded 28 Jul 2026, published 21 May 2026🛡️ Security

ProtocolSoup is an interactive platform for executing real identity protocol flows (OAuth 2.0, OIDC, SAML, SCIM, SPIFFE, CAEP/RISC security event sharing, OID4VCI/OID4VP verifiable credentials, WebAuthn/FIDO2) against live authorization servers, issuers, and verifiers. It provides a 'Looking Glass' to inspect every HTTP request/response and decode live artifacts like JWTs, SAML assertions, and SETs, plus a wallet harness for issuing/presenting mdoc and SD-JWT credentials with HAIP attestation. Useful for security practitioners learning or testing identity protocol internals hands-on rather than in the abstract.

protocolsoup.comtoolAdded 3 Sep 2026, published 12 May 2026🛡️ Security

Huntress and Microsoft detail EvilTokens, a phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) platform sold on Telegram for ~$1,500 that automates OAuth device code phishing to steal valid session tokens and bypass MFA entirely, relaying attacks through the Railway PaaS. The kit integrates AI to generate role-specific, contextually accurate lures, dynamically generate device codes to remove timing constraints, and automatically draft follow-on wire-fraud emails in the victim's own voice after mailbox compromise — a campaign that hit 344 organizations across five countries in 16 days and evaded Cisco Secure Email, Trend Micro, and Mimecast. The piece also covers sibling PhaaS kits (Tycoon2FA, BlueKit, Kali365) and recommends conditional access restrictions, phishing-resistant FIDO2/passkey MFA, and refresh-token revocation as mitigations.

huntress.comarticleAdded 3 Sep 2026, published 11 May 2026🛡️ Security

Octelium is a free, open-source, self-hosted zero trust secure access platform built on Kubernetes that combines remote-access VPN, ZTNA/BeyondCorp, API/AI gateway, and PaaS-like deployment capabilities. It provides identity-aware, layer-7-aware, per-request attribute-based access control (policy-as-code via CEL and Open Policy Agent) with secretless access to HTTP APIs, SSH, Kubernetes, and databases, WireGuard/QUIC tunneling, and OIDC/SAML/GitHub OAuth2-based continuous authentication with MFA/FIDO2/WebAuthn support.

github.comrepoPublished and added 5 May 2026🛡️ Security

A step-by-step guide for Salesforce admins to audit Connected Apps (OAuth-based integrations) following attacks where users were tricked into authorizing a fake Data Loader app that exfiltrated data instead of the genuine tool. It covers reviewing installed vs. user-authorized apps, blocking unrecognized or unused apps, enforcing 'Admin Approved Users' with Permission Sets, requiring high-assurance (MFA) sessions, and enabling API Access Control to allowlist which Connected Apps can use Salesforce APIs.

salesforceben.comarticlePublished and added 5 May 2026🛡️ Security

Huntress blog on how social engineering has outpaced traditional prevention-focused security programs, citing specific campaigns: EvilTokens, a phishing-as-a-service operation that weaponized the Railway cloud deployment platform and Cloudflare Workers to run OAuth device code phishing against 340+ organizations, and a campaign using fake ChatGPT/Grok search results to trick macOS users into installing the AMOS infostealer. Also discusses AI-driven deepfake identity attacks and alert fatigue undermining detection.

huntress.comarticleAdded 3 Sep 2026, published 1 May 2026🛡️ Security

Huntress details a device-code phishing campaign hitting 340+ Microsoft 365 tenants across the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Germany since February 2026, in which attackers abuse Railway.com's clean-IP PaaS infrastructure to run OAuth device-code token replay at scale, bypassing MFA entirely. The campaign chains vendor URL-rewriter abuse (Cisco, Trend Micro, Mimecast), compromised sites, Cloudflare workers.dev phishing pages, and AI-assisted lure generation, and Huntress has attributed it to the EvilTokens Phishing-as-a-Service platform advertised via Telegram. The post includes IOCs (Railway CIDR ranges), Sentinel KQL hunting queries, and mitigation guidance (block Railway IPs, revoke refresh tokens, restrict device code flow, enable CAE).

huntress.comwriteupAdded 3 Sep 2026, published 23 Mar 2026🛡️ Security

Huntress breaks down how modern business email compromise (BEC) campaigns in Google Workspace have evolved from simple invoice fraud into multi-stage identity abuse: attackers use OAuth token theft, password-reset/MFA emails, and mailbox filters to hide alerts, persist via forwarding rules, and pivot laterally into other SaaS platforms. The piece argues traditional content-based email detection misses these campaigns and that defenders need identity-centric monitoring (token lifecycle, OAuth consent anomalies, mailbox config changes) — framing this as the rationale for Huntress's expansion of managed identity threat detection (ITDR) into Google Workspace.

huntress.comarticleAdded 3 Sep 2026, published 5 Mar 2026🛡️ Security

Huntress details six months of research into malicious Azure/Entra ID OAuth applications, splitting them into "Traitorware" (legitimate-looking apps commonly abused by attackers, ~10% of surveyed tenants had at least one) and "Stealthware" (custom-built OAuth Illicit Consent Grant apps used for persistence and data theft). Drawing on enumeration of 8,000+ tenants and Huntress partner telemetry, the SOC found over 500 confirmed Stealthware instances and identifies detection heuristics (low global app prevalence + single-user delegation + powerful permission scopes). The post also announces Cazadora, an open-source script that authenticates via Graph API to hunt rogue Enterprise Applications and App Registrations for known malicious naming patterns and reply URLs.

huntress.comwriteupAdded 3 Sep 2026, published 10 Feb 2025🛡️ Security

A Huntress researcher walks through Device Code Phishing, an OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant abuse technique, and shows why it is far more dangerous against Azure/Microsoft 365 than against Google Cloud. In Azure, the attacker controls the requested resource and can use Microsoft's undocumented "Family of Client IDs" (e.g. the Microsoft Authentication Broker client ID) to phish a Primary Refresh Token capable of joining rogue devices, enrolling MFA, and full account takeover; Google's device code implementation restricts the flow to a handful of narrow scopes (GDrive file access, YouTube read-only) and requires a registered/verified OAuth app, neutering the same attack. The piece includes working curl/Python requests for both providers and references prior research by Dirk-jan Mollema, Nestori Syynimaa, and Lina Lau.

huntress.comwriteupAdded 3 Sep 2026, published 6 Feb 2025🛡️ Security